availability defense in California

1974People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 10-11 [ 345 P.2d 928 ], provides the. complete answer to this argument: “California formulations of the doctrine of entrapment state that the availability of the defense depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer [citations], and that where a defendant has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a decoy he commits a crime does not show entrapment [citations].

1974People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 10-11 [ 345 P.2d 928 ], provides the. complete answer to this argument: “California formulations of the doctrine of entrapment state that the availability of the defense depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer [citations], and that where a defendant has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a decoy he commits a crime does not show entrapment [citations].

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

1999(People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 181 , 749 P.2d 836 ] [fee collection for prostitution services]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168,1182 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ] [distribution of proceeds from forgery ring]; see also People v. Johnson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457-458 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 579 ] [payment for a drug deal].) The rationale and holdings of these decisions do not contravene our conclusion in this case that the availability of the claim-of-right defense to robbery was envisioned by the Legislature and incorporated into the statutory definitio

1999(People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 181 , 749 P.2d 836 ] [fee collection for prostitution services]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168,1182 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ] [distribution of proceeds from forgery ring]; see also People v. Johnson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457-458 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 579 ] [payment for a drug deal].) The rationale and holdings of these decisions do not contravene our conclusion in this case that the availability of the claim-of-right defense to robbery was envisioned by the Legislature and incorporated into the statutory definitio

1999(People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 181 , 749 P.2d 836 ] [fee collection for prostitution services]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168,1182 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ] [distribution of proceeds from forgery ring]; see also People v. Johnson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457-458 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 579 ] [payment for a drug deal].) The rationale and holdings of these decisions do not contravene our conclusion in this case that the availability of the claim-of-right defense to robbery was envisioned by the Legislature and incorporated into the statutory definitio

1999(People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 181 , 749 P.2d 836 ] [fee collection for prostitution services]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168,1182 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ] [distribution of proceeds from forgery ring]; see also People v. Johnson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457-458 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 579 ] [payment for a drug deal].) The rationale and holdings of these decisions do not contravene our conclusion in this case that the availability of the claim-of-right defense to robbery was envisioned by the Legislature and incorporated into the statutory definitio

1960This does not constitute entrapment for it is obvious that the criminal intent was already present in the minds of the defendants and that they were neither imposed upon, persuaded nor solicited by the officers in the course of their conduct. . . the availability of the defense [of entrapment] depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer (People v. Nunn (1956), 46 Cal.2d 460, 471 [17] [ 296 P.2d 813 ]; People v. Terry (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372 [2] [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Jackson (1954), 42 Cal.2

1960This does not constitute entrapment for it is obvious that the criminal intent was already present in the minds of the defendants and that they were neither imposed upon, persuaded nor solicited by the officers in the course of their conduct. . . the availability of the defense [of entrapment] depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer (People v. Nunn (1956), 46 Cal.2d 460, 471 [17] [ 296 P.2d 813 ]; People v. Terry (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372 [2] [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Jackson (1954), 42 Cal.2

1960This does not constitute entrapment for it is obvious that the criminal intent was already present in the minds of the defendants and that they were neither imposed upon, persuaded nor solicited by the officers in the course of their conduct. . . the availability of the defense [of entrapment] depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer (People v. Nunn (1956), 46 Cal.2d 460, 471 [17] [ 296 P.2d 813 ]; People v. Terry (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372 [2] [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Jackson (1954), 42 Cal.2

1960This does not constitute entrapment for it is obvious that the criminal intent was already present in the minds of the defendants and that they were neither imposed upon, persuaded nor solicited by the officers in the course of their conduct. . . the availability of the defense [of entrapment] depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer (People v. Nunn (1956), 46 Cal.2d 460, 471 [17] [ 296 P.2d 813 ]; People v. Terry (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372 [2] [ 282 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Jackson (1954), 42 Cal.2

2020An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.’ ” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270-271 (Trujeque).) The availability of the defense is tested from the defendant’s perspective.

2020An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.’ ” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270-271 (Trujeque).) The availability of the defense is tested from the defendant’s perspective.

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (1999) 1999 S.D. 122 [ 599 N.W.2d 364 , 374—375] [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because “ ‘[treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the tre

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

1990In New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ], the police chased an armed rapist, caught and handcuffed him, and asked him where the gun was; he replied that it was "`over there.'" ( Id., at pp. 651-652.) The United States Supreme Court held that where there was no claim that defendant's statements were compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist, "on these facts there is a `public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exce

1990In New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ], the police chased an armed rapist, caught and handcuffed him, and asked him where the gun was; he replied that it was "`over there.'" ( Id., at pp. 651-652.) The United States Supreme Court held that where there was no claim that defendant's statements were compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist, "on these facts there is a `public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exce

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

1986Regarding disclosure of *937 incriminating evidence however, “the privilege not to disclose any incriminating matter may be asserted by any person either in a civil or criminal proceeding. [Citation.]” (People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 258 ]; see also Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 684-688 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 499 P.2d 968 ] and cases cited therein.) “In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked [i.e., civil or criminal], but upon

2024(Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 ; see also Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 350 [“The availability of immunity from liability under section 1983 in state court is governed by federal, not state law”].) Yet if a plaintiff does not suffer an underlying constitutional deprivation by a deputy or officer of a government entity, the plaintiff’s Monell claim automatically fails.

2005(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 350 , citing Will v. Michigan, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71 .) In contrast, local governments, including counties, are subject to suit under 42 United States Code section 1983 , where the allegedly unconstitutional action implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or governmental custom. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 348-349, citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ] and McMillian v. Monroe

2021“The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged. . . . ‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241 .) “If there is no dispute as to the operative facts, the av

1991(Gootee v. Lightner (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 587, 591 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) On the record before us, we find section 47(b) inapplicable because Podboy’s statements to the press do not satisfy the requirement that the communication be “made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings . . . .” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212 .) 4 Podboy correctly points out that the privilege is available “even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) However, republications to nonparticipants in the action

2009The high court held that the officer’s initial question to the defendant did not violate Miranda because of “a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 655 .) Quarles held that “the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” (Id. at p. 656.) Quarles explained that the officers in that case were faced with a “kaleidoscopic situation” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 656 ) in which “spontaneity rather than adher

2009The high court held that the officer’s initial question to the defendant did not violate Miranda because of “a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 655 .) Quarles held that “the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” (Id. at p. 656.) Quarles explained that the officers in that case were faced with a “kaleidoscopic situation” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 656 ) in which “spontaneity rather than adher

2005(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 350 , citing Will v. Michigan, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71 .) In contrast, local governments, including counties, are subject to suit under 42 United States Code section 1983 , where the allegedly unconstitutional action implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or governmental custom. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 348-349, citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ] and McMillian v. Monroe

2005(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 350 , citing Will v. Michigan, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71 .) In contrast, local governments, including counties, are subject to suit under 42 United States Code section 1983 , where the allegedly unconstitutional action implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or governmental custom. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 348-349, citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ] and McMillian v. Monroe

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (1999) 1999 S.D. 122 [ 599 N.W.2d 364 , 374—375] [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because “ ‘[treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the tre

2003After its enactment but before its effective date, we recognized the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as a defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. ( Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507 , 90 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 476 P.2d 97 (Schweiger) .) At that time, few appellate courts had considered the availability of the defense.

2003After its enactment but before its effective date, we recognized the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as a defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. ( Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507 , 90 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 476 P.2d 97 (Schweiger) .) At that time, few appellate courts had considered the availability of the defense.

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

2003(E.g., Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th *738 Cir.2002) 305 F.3d 989, 998 [because Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, court considered historical context in which particular amendment had been offered]; Bruguier v. Class (S.D.1999) 599 N.W.2d 364, 374-375 [looking to historical context of treaty to determine whether a particular Indian reservation would continue].) Because "`[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, ... to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, t

1998(E.g., People v. Holmes (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 21, 24 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 889 ] [unliquidated contract claim]; People v. Poindexter (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 566, 570 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 332 ] [unliquidated tort claim for personal injuries resulting from a barroom brawl].) In responding to defendant’s arguments, the People do not seek reconsideration of Butler .

1998(E.g., People v. Holmes (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 21, 24 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 889 ] [unliquidated contract claim]; People v. Poindexter (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 566, 570 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 332 ] [unliquidated tort claim for personal injuries resulting from a barroom brawl].) In responding to defendant’s arguments, the People do not seek reconsideration of Butler .

1998(E.g., People v. Holmes (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 21, 24 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 889 ] [unliquidated contract claim]; People v. Poindexter (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 566, 570 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 332 ] [unliquidated tort claim for personal injuries resulting from a barroom brawl].) In responding to defendant’s arguments, the People do not seek reconsideration of Butler .

1998(E.g., People v. Holmes (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 21, 24 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 889 ] [unliquidated contract claim]; People v. Poindexter (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 566, 570 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 332 ] [unliquidated tort claim for personal injuries resulting from a barroom brawl].) In responding to defendant’s arguments, the People do not seek reconsideration of Butler .