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13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gorbey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026See Maziarz, 312 A.3d at 1241 (“The court must make specific findings as to whether the defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary decision on whether to raise or waive the defense.”) (citation modified); Gorbey, 54 A.3d at 693 (holding that the trial court “did not conduct the inquiry that Frendak envisions” where “the court did no more than confirm that appellant was, in fact, waiving the insanity defense”); Phenis, 909 A.2d at 155 (noting that Frendak is concerned with the defendant’s “capacity at the time of trial to recognize the availability of the defense and whatever advantages—as | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. County Concrete Co., Inc.green2 sentences2012Whereas Maryland has applied this doctrine in Cranson , and as recently as 1996, has recognized that the doctrine remains in existence in Hill v. County Concrete Co., 108 Md.App. 527 , 672 A.2d 667, 672 (1996), it is unsettled whether D.C. law even recognizes the corporation by estoppel doctrine. 2012Whereas Maryland has applied this doctrine in Cranson , and as recently as 1996, has recognized that the doctrine remains in existence in Hill v. County Concrete Co., 108 Md.App. 527 , 672 A.2d 667, 672 (1996), it is unsettled whether D.C. law even recognizes the corporation by estoppel doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Patton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012“The scope of [a Frendak ] inquiry ... will vary according to the circumstances present in each case[.]” Patton v. United States, 782 A.2d 305, 312 (D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 40 However, “because the court is dealing with an individual whose sanity has been questioned, a cursory explanation or a rote interrogation cannot satisfy the court’s duty.” Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380. | 1 | 1 |
Briggs v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006See id. at 592. 2006See id. at 592. | 1 | 1 |
New York v. Quarlesgreen2 sentences2003Quarles established a “public safety exception” to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and held that the availability of that exception “does not depend on the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . 2003Quarles established a “public safety exception” to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and held that the availability of that exception “does not depend on the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s 1993“We are simply unpersuaded by the government’s suggestion,” made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). . | 1 | 1 |
Ormiston v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence1983Ormiston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 58 Pa.Commw. 225, 227, 427 A.2d 746, 747 (Pa.Commw.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Kephart v. Kephartgreen2 sentences1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). 1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). | 1 | 1 |
Schmittinger v. Schmittingergreen2 sentences1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). 1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Floyd B. Harmongreen1 sentence1976United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354, 359 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 , 85 S.Ct. 1025 , 13 L.Ed.2d 963 (1965), and it is at that time that the trial judge must measure the claimed privilege against the traditional criteria of whether the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer to the question. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK
green
1 sentence2022We review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion, “broadly defer[ring] to the trial court due to its ‘familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters.’” Johnson v. United States, 960 A.2d 281 , 294 (D.C. 2008) (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Berman v. Watergate West, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995In Berman v. Watergate West, 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C.1978), this court recognized a cause of action for strict liability in tort based on principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1993Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 191 , 104 S.Ct. at 3017 . 1993Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 191 , 104 S.Ct. at 3017 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Adams v. United States
green
2 sentences1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s 1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Guillard v. United States
green
2 sentences1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s 1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. James L. Crowder
green
1 sentence1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Davis v. Scherer
green
2 sentences1993Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 191 , 104 S.Ct. at 3017 . 1993Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 191 , 104 S.Ct. at 3017 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hale v. United States
green
2 sentences1993"We are simply unpersuaded by the government's suggestion," made with the concession that it can find no case authority for its suggestion, "that we should make the availability of an instruction on [self-defense] where the evidence justifies it subject to a requirement of consistency to which no other defense is subject." Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 66 (referring to the defense of entrapment). [19] In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a s 1993In Guillard, supra note 16 , 596 A.2d at 62 n. 1, the court rejected the view that Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C.1976), stood for the proposition that a defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction where he did not admit he committed the crime, noting that the government's position was contrary to Adams, supra, 558 A.2d 348 . . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Amidon v. Amidon
green
2 sentences1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). 1982See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 1015 , §§ 4, 5 (1981); compare Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 967 (1979) (laches available as a defense to an action seeking to collect past due child support payments provided for in separation agreement which was not merged in divorce decree); Amidon v. Amidon, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 82 (1971) (same); and Kephart, supra at 376 , 193 F.2d at 680 (laches available as defense to contempt proceeding based on failure to satisfy court-ordered support obligations). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Pan-American Life Insurance v. Botana
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354, 359 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 , 85 S.Ct. 1025 , 13 L.Ed.2d 963 (1965), and it is at that time that the trial judge must measure the claimed privilege against the traditional criteria of whether the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer to the question. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Northern Metal Co. v. Pennsylvania Board of Finance & Revenue
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354, 359 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 , 85 S.Ct. 1025 , 13 L.Ed.2d 963 (1965), and it is at that time that the trial judge must measure the claimed privilege against the traditional criteria of whether the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer to the question. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
James A. Baker v. Walter E. Washington
neutral
2 sentences1973Baker v. Washington, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 277 , 448 F.2d 1200 (1971); Carter v. Carlson, su pra; Spencer v. General Hospital of District of Columbia, supra; Elgin v. District of Columbia, supra. Proceeding from general principles to the facts of this case, we think it settled that for immunity purposes the act of making an arrest is ministerial. 1973Baker v. Washington, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 277 , 448 F.2d 1200 (1971); Carter v. Carlson, su pra; Spencer v. General Hospital of District of Columbia, supra; Elgin v. District of Columbia, supra. Proceeding from general principles to the facts of this case, we think it settled that for immunity purposes the act of making an arrest is ministerial. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.