21 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen2 sentences1993B The United States Supreme Court has held that when an inference "is not the sole and sufficient basis" (County Court of Ulster Cy. v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 167) for finding an element of the crime charged, the "rational connection" required to submit it by means of an inference instruction must be stronger than the "rational connection" required to submit it without an instruction. 7 In Ulster, the Court had before it an instruction telling the jury it was permitted to infer, from the presence of a handgun in a car, the fact that every occupant of the car was illegally possessing the handgun. 1993The United States Supreme Court has not directly spoken on how strong a "rational connection" must be when an inference is to be submitted, by means of an inference instruction, as the only or alternate basis for finding an element of the crime charged (i.e., as "the sole and sufficient basis" for finding an element of the crime charged, Ulster, 442 U.S. at 167 ). | 3 | 4 |
cluster 720696green1 sentence1999The Ninth Circuit rejected this reliance upon speed alone, after stating: “The jury was told, in effect, that it could ignore all the other evidence, consider only the evidence of Schwendeman’s speed, and if it found Schwendeman was exceeding the speed limit, that was enough to convict him—not of speeding, but of reckless driving.” Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Randhawagreen2 sentences1999This is considerably faster than the ten to twenty miles per hour the Randhawa court found insufficient to support an inference instruction. 133 Wn.2d at 77-78 . 1999Randhawa apparently recognized this problem when it noted that an inference instruction poses a very real danger of inviting the jury to infer reckless driving solely on the basis of speed. 133 Wn.2d at 77-78 . | 1 | 1 |
David Schwendeman v. Arthur Wallenstein, Director, King County Jailgreen1 sentence1999The Ninth Circuit rejected this reliance upon speed alone, after stating: “The jury was told, in effect, that it could ignore all the other evidence, consider only the evidence of Schwendeman’s speed, and if it found Schwendeman was exceeding the speed limit, that was enough to convict him—not of speeding, but of reckless driving.” Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences1993Indeed, the vexy idea is nonsensical, for it defies logic to say that an inference not strong enough to be sub mitted to the jury without an inference instruction can nevertheless be submitted to the jury by means of such an instruction. 8 Thus, if an inference must meet a. reasonable doubt test to be submitted, without an instruction, as the only or alternate basis for finding an element of the crime, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 82 , it also must meet a reasonable doubt test in order to be submitted, by means of an inference instruction, as the only or 1993Indeed, the very idea is nonsensical, for it defies logic to say that an inference not strong enough to be submitted *782 to the jury without an inference instruction can nevertheless be submitted to the jury by means of such an instruction. [8] Thus, if an inference must meet a reasonable doubt test to be submitted, without an instruction, as the only or alternate basis for finding an element of the crime, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319 ; State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 82 , it also must meet a reasonable doubt test in order to be submitted, by means of an inference instruction, as the o | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences1986See State v. Nelson, 72 Wn.2d 269 , 432 P.2d 857 (1967). 1986See State v. Nelson, 72 Wn.2d 269 , 432 P.2d 857 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Ammerman v. Old National Bankgreen2 sentences1974See Ammerman v. Old Nat'l Bank, 28 Wn.2d 239, 249 , 182 P.2d 75 (1947). 1974See Ammerman v. Old Nat'l Bank, 28 Wn.2d 239, 249 , 182 P.2d 75 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rowe v. James
green
2 sentences2014Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267 , 128 Pac. 539 [(1912)]. 2014Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267 , 128 Pac. 539 [(1912)]. | 3 | 1914–2014 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2024Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 . 2020Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 5 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
United States v. Lawrence Michael Duff
green
2 sentences2017For example, in United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit noted that a urinalysis test of a probationer must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 6 Id. at 179 . 2017For example, in United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit noted that a urinalysis test of a probationer must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 6 Id. at 179 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Caliguri
green
2 sentences2011Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d at 506 , 664 P.2d 466 (citing State v. Caldwell, 94 Wash.2d 614, 617-18 , 618 P.2d 508 (1980)). ¶ 18 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that he did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that he might offer. 2011Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d at 506 , 664 P.2d 466 (citing State v. Caldwell, 94 Wash.2d 614, 617-18 , 618 P.2d 508 (1980)). ¶ 18 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that he did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that he might offer. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences2011Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d at 506 , 664 P.2d 466 (citing State v. Caldwell, 94 Wash.2d 614, 617-18 , 618 P.2d 508 (1980)). ¶ 18 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that he did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that he might offer. 2011Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d at 506 , 664 P.2d 466 (citing State v. Caldwell, 94 Wash.2d 614, 617-18 , 618 P.2d 508 (1980)). ¶ 18 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that he did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that he might offer. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Myers
green
1 sentence2021App. at 579 (citing State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38 , 941 P.2d 1102 (1997)). -8- No. 79696-8-I/9 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of [their] acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that [they] did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that [they] might offer. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Myers
green
1 sentence2021App. at 579 (citing State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38 , 941 P.2d 1102 (1997)). -8- No. 79696-8-I/9 While the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference or presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of [their] acts, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury give equal consideration to the possibility that [they] did not act intentionally, including any theory of nonintentional conduct that [they] might offer. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Bea
green
1 sentence2021Bea, 162 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Torno v. Hayek
green
1 sentence2017Torno, 133 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Reid
green
2 sentences2015In orderto determine whether an inference instruction, such as the missing witness instruction, violates a defendant's right to due process, appellate courts "must determine whether the instruction was only part of the State's proof supporting an element of the crime or whether the State relied solely on the inference." State v. Reid, 74 Wn. 2015App. 281,285 , 872 P.2d 1135 (1994). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ma'ele v. Arrington
green
1 sentence2012If the jury does not draw this inference, Dr. Tencer’s testimony, while interesting, is irrelevant to the proceeding before the court. [15] Another order excluded Tencer’s testimony about his experiment “as the court has concluded that the conditions were not substantially similar to the event at issue.” 16 ¶19 One Washington case in which Tencer was allowed to give expert testimony reached the appellate level in Ma’ele v. Arrington, 111 Wn. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Darlin
green
1 sentence1999Darlin, 857 P.2d at 863 ; Mink, 567 P.2d at 1036 . 7 The standard of proof required for an inference instruction is still somewhat unsettled in Washington. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Hanna
green
2 sentences1999“When an inference is only part of the prosecution’s proof supporting an element of the crime, due process requires the presumed fact to flow ‘more likely than not’ from proof of the basic fact.” State v. Hanna, 123 Wn.2d 704, 710 , 871 P.2d 135 (1994) (citing Allen, 442 U.S. at 165 ); accord Randhawa, 133 Wn.2d at 76 . 1999“When an inference is only part of the prosecution’s proof supporting an element of the crime, due process requires the presumed fact to flow ‘more likely than not’ from proof of the basic fact.” State v. Hanna, 123 Wn.2d 704, 710 , 871 P.2d 135 (1994) (citing Allen, 442 U.S. at 165 ); accord Randhawa, 133 Wn.2d at 76 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Mink
neutral
1 sentence1999Darlin, 857 P.2d at 863 ; Mink, 567 P.2d at 1036 . 7 The standard of proof required for an inference instruction is still somewhat unsettled in Washington. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wood v. Miller
green
1 sentence1996Wood did not hold an inference instruction is required; it held merely that any such instruction must “indicate clearly to the jury that they might consider such collateral matter only in determining whether the party’s cause lacked honesty and truth.” Wood, 147 Wash. at 256 . 10 The Hendersons also argue Mr. Lapan lacked personal knowledge. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Francis v. Franklin
green
1 sentence1994See Ulster, 442 U.S. at 162-63, 165 ; Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1993Indeed, the vexy idea is nonsensical, for it defies logic to say that an inference not strong enough to be sub mitted to the jury without an inference instruction can nevertheless be submitted to the jury by means of such an instruction. 8 Thus, if an inference must meet a. reasonable doubt test to be submitted, without an instruction, as the only or alternate basis for finding an element of the crime, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 82 , it also must meet a reasonable doubt test in order to be submitted, by means of an inference instruction, as the only or 1993Indeed, the very idea is nonsensical, for it defies logic to say that an inference not strong enough to be submitted *782 to the jury without an inference instruction can nevertheless be submitted to the jury by means of such an instruction. [8] Thus, if an inference must meet a reasonable doubt test to be submitted, without an instruction, as the only or alternate basis for finding an element of the crime, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319 ; State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 82 , it also must meet a reasonable doubt test in order to be submitted, by means of an inference instruction, as the o | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Leary v. United States
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Jackson, supra, the court said that an inference instruction must meet "at least" a preponderance test. 112 Wn.2d at 875 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 ). 1993In State v. Jackson, supra , the court said that an inference instruction must meet "at least" a preponderance test. 112 Wn.2d at 875 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Jackson, supra, the court said that an inference instruction must meet "at least" a preponderance test. 112 Wn.2d at 875 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 ). 1993In State v. Jackson, supra , the court said that an inference instruction must meet "at least" a preponderance test. 112 Wn.2d at 875 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co.
green
2 sentences1950Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co., 63 Wash. 423 , 115 Pac. 838 , L. 1950Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co., 63 Wash. 423 , 115 Pac. 838 , L. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.