11 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1950–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen2 sentences2026Ct. May 11, 2018) (quoting SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187 , 190 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187 , 1194 n.8 (Del. 2015) (citing the “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause” (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)); cf. Del. 2015Feb. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Order] (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (noting that it is a "prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause’ ") (internal citation omitted)). . | 2 | 2 |
Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc.green1 sentence2026Ct. May 11, 2018) (quoting SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187 , 190 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187 , 1194 n.8 (Del. 2015) (citing the “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause” (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)); cf. Del. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Stategreen1 sentence2025C. § 221(c) (“If a word used in this Criminal Code is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision as declared in s 201 of this title.”); Waters, 443 A.2d at 506 (“We hold, therefore, that it was plain and reversible error not to charge the jury as to the commonly accepted meaning of the brief language of § 635(1) under which this defendant was convicted.”). 78 Black’s Law Dictionary 396–97 (5th ed. 1978) (definition of “depraved”); see also Rogers v. State, 41 A.3d 430 (Del. 2012) (“In its initial instruct | 1 | 1 |
Plass v. Stategreen1 sentence2025C. § 221(c) (“If a word used in this Criminal Code is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision as declared in s 201 of this title.”); Waters, 443 A.2d at 506 (“We hold, therefore, that it was plain and reversible error not to charge the jury as to the commonly accepted meaning of the brief language of § 635(1) under which this defendant was convicted.”). 78 Black’s Law Dictionary 396–97 (5th ed. 1978) (definition of “depraved”); see also Rogers v. State, 41 A.3d 430 (Del. 2012) (“In its initial instruct | 1 | 1 |
Poole v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Thus, Amazon seeks to use a rule of evidence to apply an inference or presumption that simply does not exist. 82 See Poole, 77 A.3d at 322-23 (noting that the 2007 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act did not amend 19 Del. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2021To rule otherwise, would be tantamount to pulling the adversarial teeth from an effective prosecutor’s mouth in summation.”88 Similarly, in Coverdale v. State, the Court held that the prosecutor’s characterization of defense counsel’s argument as a “red herring” did not warrant reversal because it was a one-off remark, supported by the record, that had “no effect on [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial.”89 86 Id. (emphasis added); see also Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002) (“Arguments by the prosecutor to the jury . . . should focus on evidence introduced at trial rather than | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Vito Sblendorio
green
2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 224 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). 1994Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v. Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). | 2 | 1994–2022 |
Johnson v. Armontrout
green
2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 224 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). 1994Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v. Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). | 2 | 1994–2022 |
Melton v. United States
green
2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 224 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). 1994Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v. Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). | 2 | 1994–2022 |
Roy v. United States
green
2 sentences2022Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 224 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). 1994Nevertheless, “unless the prosecutor’s comment uses the defendant’s privilege as evidence against him, it is not objectionable.” U.S. v. Sblendorio, 7th Cir., 830 F.2d 1382 , 1391 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 , 108 S.Ct. 1034 , 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). | 2 | 1994–2022 |
Flamer v. State
green
2 sentences1973The defendant makes two inter-related arguments: (1) The case of Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 123 (1967) controls and the complicity test there prescribed has not been met; and (2) the case was tried before the circumstantial evidence rule was modified by this Court in Henry v. State, Del.Supr., 298 A.2d 327 (1972) ; that, under the old rule, the circumstantial evidence here would not support a conviction. 1972At the close of the State’s case, which was based entirely upon the inference or presumption arising from possession of recently stolen goods, the Trial Court granted motions of acquittal as to the passengers, upon the basis of Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 123 (1967). | 2 | 1972–1973 |
Securities And Exchange Commission v. Graystone Nash, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Ct. May 11, 2018) (quoting SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187 , 190 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187 , 1194 n.8 (Del. 2015) (citing the “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause” (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)); cf. Del. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hunter v. State
green
1 sentence2021To rule otherwise, would be tantamount to pulling the adversarial teeth from an effective prosecutor’s mouth in summation.”88 Similarly, in Coverdale v. State, the Court held that the prosecutor’s characterization of defense counsel’s argument as a “red herring” did not warrant reversal because it was a one-off remark, supported by the record, that had “no effect on [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial.”89 86 Id. (emphasis added); see also Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002) (“Arguments by the prosecutor to the jury . . . should focus on evidence introduced at trial rather than | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Crawley v. State
green
1 sentence1973Supr., 235 A.2d 282 (1967). (2) Applying the Flamer test, which we find apposite under the facts of this case, there is sufficient evidence of the defendant’s complicity in the burglary (the time, the place, the removal activity) to establish that the defendant acted in concert with his co-defendant in joint possession, permitting the inference or presumption of guilt to arise from such joint possession. (3) The change in the general circumstantial evidence rule, under Henry , is irrelevant. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Laubacher v. State
green
2 sentences1973The inference or presumption of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods supersedes the general circumstantial evidence rule, old or new, Laubacher v. State, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 728 (1973). 1973The inference or presumption of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods supersedes the general circumstantial evidence rule, old or new, Laubacher v. State, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 728 (1973). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Henry v. State
green
1 sentence1973The defendant makes two inter-related arguments: (1) The case of Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 123 (1967) controls and the complicity test there prescribed has not been met; and (2) the case was tried before the circumstantial evidence rule was modified by this Court in Henry v. State, Del.Supr., 298 A.2d 327 (1972) ; that, under the old rule, the circumstantial evidence here would not support a conviction. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Cox v. Greenlease-Lied Motors
green
2 sentences1950The Court’s words were quoted with approval in Cox v. Greenlease- *559 Lied Motors, 134 Neb. 1 , 277 N.W. 819 . 1950The Court’s words were quoted with approval in Cox v. Greenlease- *559 Lied Motors, 134 Neb. 1 , 277 N.W. 819 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Sweeney v. Erving
green
2 sentences1950Consequently, there is no need to consider this point further, ex-cejpt to point out that the inference theory is now well established in this jurisdiction. 1 We regard the following quotation from Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 , 33 S.Ct. 416, 418 , 57 L.Ed. *233 815, as an acceptable explanation of the inference theory: “In our opinion, res ipso loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence 1950Consequently, there is no need to consider this point further, ex-cejpt to point out that the inference theory is now well established in this jurisdiction. 1 We regard the following quotation from Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 , 33 S.Ct. 416, 418 , 57 L.Ed. *233 815, as an acceptable explanation of the inference theory: “In our opinion, res ipso loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.