inference challenge in Alabama

2000"An examination of the voir dire questioning shows a complete lack of meaningful questions directed to the black venirepersons and related to the reasons given for striking them. `A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors "in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all," before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias.'" People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).

2000"An examination of the voir dire questioning shows a complete lack of meaningful questions directed to the black venirepersons and related to the reasons given for striking them. `A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors "in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all," before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias.'" People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).

1992"A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias.' " People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).' Avery v. State , 545 So.2d 123 , 127 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988)." Parker v. State , 568 So.2d 335 , 337 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990).

1991Here again, the prosecutor could have dispelled her doubts by asking further questions on voir dire. " ' "A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias." People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).' " Parker , 568 So.2d at 337 , quoting Avery v. State , 545 So.2d 123 , 127 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988).

1992"A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias.' " People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).' Avery v. State , 545 So.2d 123 , 127 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988)." Parker v. State , 568 So.2d 335 , 337 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990).

1991Here again, the prosecutor could have dispelled her doubts by asking further questions on voir dire. " ' "A prosecutor's failure to engage black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the challenge is in fact based on group bias." People v. Turner , 42 Cal.3d 711 , 726 P.2d 102 , 111 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986).' " Parker , 568 So.2d at 337 , quoting Avery v. State , 545 So.2d 123 , 127 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988).

1991Smith v. State , 364 So.2d 1 , 10 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978); Rutledge v. State , 482 So.2d 1250 , 1254 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 482 So.2d 1262 (Ala. 1984).

1983Smith , supra, at 10-11 .

1982In Tittle v. State , 252 Ala. 377 , 379 , 41 So.2d 295 (1949), it was held: "Prima facie evidence is `evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted or overcome by other evidence.' * * * An inference or presumption of law, affirmative or negative of a fact, in the absence of proof, or until proof can be obtained or produced to overcome the inference.

1982In Tittle v. State , 252 Ala. 377 , 379 , 41 So.2d 295 (1949), it was held: "Prima facie evidence is `evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted or overcome by other evidence.' * * * An inference or presumption of law, affirmative or negative of a fact, in the absence of proof, or until proof can be obtained or produced to overcome the inference.

1981Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970)." 351 So.2d, at 664.

1977Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970).

1981Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970)." 351 So.2d, at 664.

1977Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970).

1981Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970)." 351 So.2d, at 664.

1977Mitchell v. United States , 140 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 434 F.2d 483 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970).

2011Our precedent holds that the record must at least present an inference of error before an appellate court will hold that reversible error occurred.” Ex parte Walker, 972 So.2d at 752 .

2007For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074 (Ala. 1987), this Court conducted a plain-error review of an alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (addressing a constitutional violation with regard to discrimination in jury selection).

2007For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074 (Ala. 1987), this Court conducted a plain-error review of an alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (addressing a constitutional violation with regard to discrimination in jury selection).

2007For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074 (Ala. 1987), this Court conducted a plain-error review of an alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (addressing a constitutional violation with regard to discrimination in jury selection).

2006Finally, although it is clear that Tucker helped Miller in the latter stages of Miller's life, the evidence does not show that he helped Miller so much that the "the testamentary disposition [of Miller's entire estate to Tucker] is proper as a matter of law." Armstrong v. McGee , 579 So.2d 1310 , 1314 (Ala. 1991).

2005The Aldridge Court then explained that, provided the issue of causation is otherwise due to be presented to a jury, "[c]ases from jurisdictions providing a remedy for retaliatory discharge when an employee has suffered an on-the-job injury and has then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits that do not require the employee to prove sole causation are illustrative of the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of causation." Aldridge , 854 So.2d at 566 .

2004See Rickard v. Shoals Distrib., Inc., 645 So.2d 1378 (Ala.1994); Overton v. Amerex Corp., 642 So.2d 450 (Ala.1994); Graham v. Shoals Distrib., Inc., 630 So.2d 417, 418 (Ala.1993); Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., supra. The alleged dishonesty occurred in conjunction with the claims process itself; therefore, it was not coincidental that CCBCC terminated Hollander's employment close in time to his filing of a workers' compensation claim.

1992The allegations made by the State with regard to its reasons for striking D.L. and A.M. "are not only wholly without support in the record, but are directly refuted by it." Ex parte Yelder , [Ms. 1910345, August 14, 1992], 1992 WL 192836 (Ala. 1992).

1991Smith v. State , 364 So.2d 1 , 10 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978); Rutledge v. State , 482 So.2d 1250 , 1254 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 482 So.2d 1262 (Ala. 1984).

1991Smith v. State , 364 So.2d 1 , 10 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978); Rutledge v. State , 482 So.2d 1250 , 1254 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 482 So.2d 1262 (Ala. 1984).

1989Furthermore, we have held: "There is no principle better settled than that the spoliation or an attempt to suppress material evidence by a party to a suit, favorable to an adversary, is a sufficient foundation for an inference that the claim of such party is unjust or fraudulent." *Page 89 Southern Homes Insurance Co. of the Carolinas v. Boatwright , 231 Ala. 198 , 204 , 164 So. 102 (1935); see also Baltic Cotton Co. v. United States , 50 F.2d 257 (S.D.Ala.), aff'd, 55 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1931).

1989Furthermore, we have held: "There is no principle better settled than that the spoliation or an attempt to suppress material evidence by a party to a suit, favorable to an adversary, is a sufficient foundation for an inference that the claim of such party is unjust or fraudulent." *Page 89 Southern Homes Insurance Co. of the Carolinas v. Boatwright , 231 Ala. 198 , 204 , 164 So. 102 (1935); see also Baltic Cotton Co. v. United States , 50 F.2d 257 (S.D.Ala.), aff'd, 55 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1931).

1981In Kresge v. Ruby, supra , the Court said: Consequently the mere fact that the plaintiff was acquitted of the charge does not prove that there was no probable cause to believe him or her guilty at the time the warrant was issued.

1981In Kresge v. Ruby, supra , the Court said: Consequently the mere fact that the plaintiff was acquitted of the charge does not prove that there was no probable cause to believe him or her guilty at the time the warrant was issued.

1980“An inference of a waiver may be drawn from the making of a statement after warnings have been given and when the defendant was aware of his right not to speak.” Sullivan v. State, 351 So.2d 659, 664 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Sullivan, 351 So.2d 665 (Ala.1977).