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26 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Childress v. Nordmangreen2 sentences2021F. Inference Running Backwards ¶ 57 Finally, Berkeley Investors and Mr. Bell argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s summary judgment order by violating the prohibition against relying upon inferences that “r[a]n backward.” In support of this argument, Berkeley Investors and Mr. Bell direct our attention to our decision in Childress v. Nordman, which they claim enunciates a “general rule that mere proof of the existence of a condition or state of facts at a given time does not raise an inference or presumption that the same condition or state of facts existed on a 2021F. Inference Running Backwards ¶ 57 Finally, Berkeley Investors and Mr. Bell argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s summary judgment order by violating the prohibition against relying upon inferences that “r[a]n backward.” In support of this argument, Berkeley Investors and Mr. Bell direct our attention to our decision in Childress v. Nordman, which they claim enunciates a “general rule that mere proof of the existence of a condition or state of facts at a given time does not raise an inference or presumption that the same condition or state of facts existed on a | 2 | 6 |
United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.green1 sentence2007In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the United States Supreme Court construed the Sherman Act to reach the following: [A]ll contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or performed for the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest or developing trade, but on the contrary were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or pr | 1 | 1 |
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen1 sentence2004E. {33} Frady’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in response to questions about his personal behavior does not preclude the consequence that a jury may draw adverse inferences. “[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where privilege is claimed by a party to civil cause.’ ” Baxter v. Palmigiano , 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1975)(quoting 8 J. | 1 | 1 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen2 sentences2000Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L. 2000Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fairgreen2 sentences1979The doctrine merely permits an inference or presumption of fact after the State proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the property shown to have been possessed by the accused was the stolen property, and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny.” State v. Fair, 291 N.C. 171, 174 , 229 S.E. 2d 189, 190 (1976). 1979The doctrine merely permits an inference or presumption of fact after the State proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the property shown to have been possessed by the accused was the stolen property, and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny.” State v. Fair, 291 N.C. 171, 174 , 229 S.E. 2d 189, 190 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Maines
green
2 sentences2002The Court noted that "[t]he `exclusive' possession required to support an inference or presumption of guilt need not be a sole possession but may be joint." Id. (citation omitted). 1985“The ‘exclusive’ possession required to support an inference or presumption of guilt need not be a sole possession but may be joint.” State v. Maines, 301 N.C. at 675 , 273 S.E. 2d at 294 . | 5 | 1985–2014 |
State v. . Best
neutral
2 sentences1933Conceding that the recent possession .of the stolen automobile (if, indeed, the evidence establishes such possession, which may be doubted) was a circumstance tending to show the larceny thereof by the defendant (S. v. Best, 202 N. C., 9 , 161 S. E., 535 ), still it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. 1933Conceding that the recent possession .of the stolen automobile (if, indeed, the evidence establishes such possession, which may be doubted) was a circumstance tending to show the larceny thereof by the defendant (S. v. Best, 202 N. C., 9 , 161 S. E., 535 ), still it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. | 4 | 1933–1956 |
State v. . Oxendine
green
2 sentences1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . 1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . | 3 | 1952–1956 |
State v. . Lowe
green
2 sentences1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . 1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . | 3 | 1952–1956 |
State v. . Larkin
neutral
2 sentences1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . 1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . | 3 | 1952–1956 |
State v. Holloway
green
2 sentences1987State v. Holloway, 265 N.C. 581 , 144 S.E. 2d 634 (1965).” Maines, 301 N.C. at 675 , 273 S.E. 2d at 294 . 1987State v. Holloway, 265 N.C. 581 , 144 S.E. 2d 634 (1965).” Maines, 301 N.C. at 675 , 273 S.E. 2d at 294 . | 2 | 1981–1987 |
Luttrell v. . Mineral Co.
green
2 sentences1942Reeves v. Staley , 220 N.C. 573 ; Luttrell v. Mineral Co. , 220 N.C. 782 . 1942Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C., 573 ; Luttrell v. Mineral Co., 220 N. C., 782 . | 2 | 1942–1942 |
Reeves v. . Staley
green
2 sentences1942Reeves v. Staley , 220 N.C. 573 ; Luttrell v. Mineral Co. , 220 N.C. 782 . 1942Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C., 573 ; Luttrell v. Mineral Co., 220 N. C., 782 . | 2 | 1942–1942 |
State v. Osborne
neutral
1 sentence2014App. 235, 240-41 , 562 S.E.2d 528, 533 , aff’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 424 , 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002) (quoting Maines, 301 N.C. at 675 , 273 S.E.2d at 294 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Osborne
neutral
1 sentence2014App. 235, 240-41 , 562 S.E.2d 528, 533 , aff’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 424 , 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002) (quoting Maines, 301 N.C. at 675 , 273 S.E.2d at 294 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Osborne
green
2 sentences2014The possession “‘required to support an inference or presumption of guilt need not be a sole possession but may be joint.’” State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. 2014As previously discussed, the possession “required to support an inference or presumption of guilt need not be a sole possession but may be joint.” Osborne, 149 N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Appts. v. United States
green
2 sentences2007In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the United States Supreme Court construed the Sherman Act to reach the following: [A]ll contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or performed for the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest or developing trade, but on the contrary were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or pr 2007In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the United States Supreme Court construed the Sherman Act to reach the following: [A]ll contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or performed for the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest or developing trade, but on the contrary were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or pr | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1991Such a mandatory presumption is constitutional because 1) the mandatory presumption disappears when the defendant comes forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption, or takes advantage of evidence offered by the prosecution in order to rebut the presumption, 2) there is a logical connection between the basic and elemental facts such that “upon proof of the basic facts, the elemental facts are more likely than not to exist,” and 3) “there is other evidence in the case which, taken together with the inference of presumption, is sufficient for a jury to find the elemental facts beyond a re | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences1991Such a mandatory presumption is constitutional because 1) the mandatory presumption disappears when the defendant comes forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption, or takes advantage of evidence offered by the prosecution in order to rebut the presumption, 2) there is a logical connection between the basic and elemental facts such that “upon proof of the basic facts, the elemental facts are more likely than not to exist,” and 3) “there is other evidence in the case which, taken together with the inference of presumption, is sufficient for a jury to find the elemental facts beyond a re 1991Such a mandatory presumption is constitutional because 1) the mandatory presumption disappears when the defendant comes forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption, or takes advantage of evidence offered by the prosecution in order to rebut the presumption, 2) there is a logical connection between the basic and elemental facts such that “upon proof of the basic facts, the elemental facts are more likely than not to exist,” and 3) “there is other evidence in the case which, taken together with the inference of presumption, is sufficient for a jury to find the elemental facts beyond a re | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau
green
1 sentence1991Such a mandatory presumption is constitutional because 1) the mandatory presumption disappears when the defendant comes forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption, or takes advantage of evidence offered by the prosecution in order to rebut the presumption, 2) there is a logical connection between the basic and elemental facts such that “upon proof of the basic facts, the elemental facts are more likely than not to exist,” and 3) “there is other evidence in the case which, taken together with the inference of presumption, is sufficient for a jury to find the elemental facts beyond a re | 1 | 1991–1991 |
McCombs v. McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANY
green
2 sentences1961In the case of McCombs v. Trucking Co., 252 N.C. 699 , 114 S.E. 2d 683 , this Court, speaking through Winborne, C.J., stated the correct rule in such cases as follows: “It being admitted that the collision involved in this action occurred in Virginia, ‘the question of liability for negligence must be determined by the law of that State. 1961In the case of McCombs v. Trucking Co., 252 N.C. 699 , 114 S.E. 2d 683 , this Court, speaking through Winborne, C.J., stated the correct rule in such cases as follows: “It being admitted that the collision involved in this action occurred in Virginia, ‘the question of liability for negligence must be determined by the law of that State. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
State v. Hoskins
neutral
2 sentences1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . 1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
State v. . Yow
neutral
2 sentences1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . 1956S. v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412 , 72 S.E. 2d 876 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 ; S. v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585 , 42 S.E. 2d 661 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Jarvis v. . Vanderford
neutral
1 sentence1953Jarvis v. Vanderford, 116 N.C. 147 , 21 S.E. 302 ; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Jarvis v. Vanderford
neutral
1 sentence1953Jarvis v. Vanderford, 116 N.C. 147 , 21 S.E. 302 ; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
State v. Adams.
green
2 sentences1952S. v. Adams, 133 N.C. 667 , 45 S.E. 553 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 . *416 Applying tbe provisions of tbe statute and tbis principle to tbe evidence offered upon tbe trial below, taken in tbe light most favorable to tbe State, it shows recent possession of tbe stolen automobile tires, and nothing more, and is insufficient to make out a case for tbe jury on tbe charge of receiving tbe automobile tires of Jake Hill, described by tbe officer, knowing 1952S. v. Adams, 133 N.C. 667 , 45 S.E. 553 ; S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9 , 161 S.E. 535 ; S. v. Lowe, 204 N.C. 572 , 169 S.E. 180 ; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659 , 27 S.E. 2d 814 ; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126 , 47 S.E. 2d 697 . *416 Applying tbe provisions of tbe statute and tbis principle to tbe evidence offered upon tbe trial below, taken in tbe light most favorable to tbe State, it shows recent possession of tbe stolen automobile tires, and nothing more, and is insufficient to make out a case for tbe jury on tbe charge of receiving tbe automobile tires of Jake Hill, described by tbe officer, knowing | 1 | 1952–1952 |
State v. . Graves
neutral
1 sentence1931Conceding that the recent possession of the stolen property was a circumstance tending tó show the larceny thereof by the defendants (S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656 , 45 S. E., 513 ), or that it raised a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571 , 77 S. E., 238 ), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482 ), of such guilt, nevertheless, it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1931Conceding that the recent possession of the stolen property was a circumstance tending tó show the larceny thereof by the defendants (S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656 , 45 S. E., 513 ), or that it raised a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571 , 77 S. E., 238 ), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482 ), of such guilt, nevertheless, it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. 1931Conceding that the recent possession of the stolen property was a circumstance tending tó show the larceny thereof by the defendants (S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656 , 45 S. E., 513 ), or that it raised a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571 , 77 S. E., 238 ), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482 ), of such guilt, nevertheless, it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
State v. Hullen.
green
2 sentences1931Conceding that the recent possession of the stolen property was a circumstance tending tó show the larceny thereof by the defendants (S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656 , 45 S. E., 513 ), or that it raised a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571 , 77 S. E., 238 ), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482 ), of such guilt, nevertheless, it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. 1931Conceding that the recent possession of the stolen property was a circumstance tending tó show the larceny thereof by the defendants (S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656 , 45 S. E., 513 ), or that it raised a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571 , 77 S. E., 238 ), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482 ), of such guilt, nevertheless, it is the holding with us that the inference or presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, without more, does not extend to the statutory charge (C. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.