inference test in Georgia

48 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (38)

Case	Followed	Cited
Brooks v. Stategreen gactapp · 1988 · cited in 10 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1990–2014 2 sentences 2014Under Georgia law, the refusal of a criminal defendant to submit to a State-administered breath, blood, or urine test for determining alcohol or drug content “itself may be considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test would show the presence of the prohibited substance.” Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988). 2014Under Georgia law, the refusal of a criminal defendant to submit to a State-administered breath, blood, or urine test for determining alcohol or drug content “itself may be considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test would show the presence of the prohibited substance.” Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988).	7	10
Selph v. Stategreen gactapp · 1977 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1978–1984 2 sentences 1984The discovery of one of the major missing items in close proximity to the dwelling of one of the co-defendants, when coupled with eyewitness testimony, was sufficient to warrant such a jury instruction. “[R]ecent unexplained possession of stolen items taken from . . . burglarized [premises] . . . create [s] an inference or presumption of facts sufficient to convict.” Nash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 533, 535 ( 304 SE2d 727 ) (1983); McGee v. State, supra. See also Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26 ( 234 SE2d 831 ) (1977); Lee v. State, 126 Ga. App. 38 ( 189 SE2d 872 ) (1972). 1984The discovery of one of the major missing items in close proximity to the dwelling of one of the co-defendants, when coupled with eyewitness testimony, was sufficient to warrant such a jury instruction. “[R]ecent unexplained possession of stolen items taken from . . . burglarized [premises] . . . create [s] an inference or presumption of facts sufficient to convict.” Nash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 533, 535 ( 304 SE2d 727 ) (1983); McGee v. State, supra. See also Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26 ( 234 SE2d 831 ) (1977); Lee v. State, 126 Ga. App. 38 ( 189 SE2d 872 ) (1972).	4	5
Williams v. Stategreen gactapp · 1992 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–2006 2 sentences 2006According to OCGA § 16-7-1(a), "[a] person commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within the dwelling house of another." "The rule has been long established in this state that where a theft, whether by simply larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, that recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict." (Punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State. [5] See also In the Interest of A.L. [6] In addition, "[m]ere presence a 2006According to OCGA § 16-7-1(a), "[a] person commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within the dwelling house of another." "The rule has been long established in this state that where a theft, whether by simply larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, that recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict." (Punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State. [5] See also In the Interest of A.L. [6] In addition, "[m]ere presence a	2	3
Wells v. Stategreen gactapp · 1979 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1980–1996 2 sentences 1996Where a theft is proved, “recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict.” Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416 (1), 417 ( 260 SE2d 374 ) (1979). 1996Where a theft is proved, “recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict.” Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416 (1), 417 ( 260 SE2d 374 ) (1979).	2	3
Stephens v. Stategreen gactapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2005–2018 2 sentences 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th	2	2
City of Atlanta v. Mitchamgreen ga · 2015 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) provides a narrow waiver of a municipal corporation’s sovereign immunity “[f]or neglect to perform or for improper or unskillful 7 We reject a reading of Wright v. City of Cochran, 253 Ga. App. 314 ( 558 SE2d 844 ) (2002) that suggests that the dicta therein may be read to support an inference that an exception to sovereign immunity, not anchored to any statutory or constitutional waiver, exists for nuisance actions resulting in personal injury. 8 performance of their ministerial duties[.]” “This provision has for more than a century been interpreted to mean that municipal c 2018OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) provides a narrow waiver of a municipal corporation’s sovereign immunity “[f]or neglect to perform or for improper or unskillful 7 We reject a reading of Wright v. City of Cochran, 253 Ga. App. 314 ( 558 SE2d 844 ) (2002) that suggests that the dicta therein may be read to support an inference that an exception to sovereign immunity, not anchored to any statutory or constitutional waiver, exists for nuisance actions resulting in personal injury. 8 performance of their ministerial duties[.]” “This provision has for more than a century been interpreted to mean that municipal c	2	2
Costin v. Stategreen gactapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015See, e.g., Costin v. State, 269 Ga. App. 632, 634 ( 605 SE2d 73 ) (2004) (“Although Costin’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may create an inference that the test would show the presence of alcohol, it does not establish that his blood-alcohol concentration was greater than 0.08.”). 2015See, e.g., Costin v. State, 269 Ga. App. 632, 634 ( 605 SE2d 73 ) (2004) (“Although Costin’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may create an inference that the test would show the presence of alcohol, it does not establish that his blood-alcohol concentration was greater than 0.08.”).	2	2
Baird v. Stategreen gactapp · 2003 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2011 2 sentences 2010Accord Alewine v. State, 273 Ga. App. 629, 631 (1) ( 616 SE2d 472 ) (2005) (same). 10 (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lee v. State, 280 Ga. App. 706, 707 ( 634 SE2d 837 ) (2006). 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 653 SE2d 823 ) (2007) (speeding). 12 See Jackson, supra. 13 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 472 (2) ( 687 SE2d 863 ) (2009). 14 See Alewine, supra (“the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance”) (citation 2010Accord Alewine v. State, 273 Ga. App. 629, 631 (1) ( 616 SE2d 472 ) (2005) (same). 10 (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lee v. State, 280 Ga. App. 706, 707 ( 634 SE2d 837 ) (2006). 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 653 SE2d 823 ) (2007) (speeding). 12 See Jackson, supra. 13 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 472 (2) ( 687 SE2d 863 ) (2009). 14 See Alewine, supra (“the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance”) (citation	2	2
Mendoza v. Stategreen gactapp · 1990 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1993–1999 2 sentences 1993That a refusal to submit to the test may create an inference that the test would show the presence of alcohol, see Givens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 709 ( 405 SE2d 898 ); Mendoza v. State, 196 Ga. App. 627, 629 (2) ( 396 SE2d 576 ); Shults v. State, 195 Ga. App. 525, 528 (3) ( 394 SE2d 573 ); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ). 1993That a refusal to submit to the test may create an inference that the test would show the presence of alcohol, see Givens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 709 ( 405 SE2d 898 ); Mendoza v. State, 196 Ga. App. 627, 629 (2) ( 396 SE2d 576 ); Shults v. State, 195 Ga. App. 525, 528 (3) ( 394 SE2d 573 ); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ).	2	2
Jackson v. Virginiared scotus · 1979 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1984–2011 2 sentences 2011The rule is that proof of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant is sufficient to create an inference that the defendant is guilty of the [theft] of the goods ... [but] proof of recent, unexplained possession is not automatically sufficient to support a conviction for [theft].... [I]t is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of [theft] based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only evidence supporting the conviction is the evidence giving rise to the inference or presumption, then under Jackso 2011The rule is that proof of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant is sufficient to create an inference that the defendant is guilty of the [theft] of the goods ... [but] proof of recent, unexplained possession is not automatically sufficient to support a conviction for [theft].... [I]t is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of [theft] based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only evidence supporting the conviction is the evidence giving rise to the inference or presumption, then under Jackso	1	4
Massa v. Stategreen gactapp · 2007 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018 2 sentences 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th	1	2
Alewine v. Stategreen gactapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018 2 sentences 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th	1	2
Brown v. Stategreen gactapp · 1981 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1983–1992 2 sentences 1992Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. “ ‘The rule has been long established in this state that where a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, that recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict.’ . . . [W]hether or not a defendant’s explanation of his possession of the stolen property was satisfactory or reasonable is a question for the jury. [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 1992Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. “ ‘The rule has been long established in this state that where a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, that recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict.’ . . . [W]hether or not a defendant’s explanation of his possession of the stolen property was satisfactory or reasonable is a question for the jury. [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App.	1	2
Payne v. Thompsongreen gactapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 2 sentences 2024Specifically, the instruction shown to the jury in writing was as follows: Physicians do not guarantee the results of treatment, and in the absence of a breach of the standard of care, proof that the outcome of treatment was different than that expected neither establishes [n]or supports an inference that the standard of care was violated.35 . 34 Payne v. Thompson, 234 Ga. App. 533, 533 ( 507 SE2d 257 ) (1998) (punctuation omitted); see McCorkle v. Dep’t of Transp., 257 Ga. App. 397, 404 (4) ( 571 SE2d 160 ) (2002) (“When an error in the charge of the court is shown to exist, it is presumed to 2024Specifically, the instruction shown to the jury in writing was as follows: Physicians do not guarantee the results of treatment, and in the absence of a breach of the standard of care, proof that the outcome of treatment was different than that expected neither establishes [n]or supports an inference that the standard of care was violated.35 . 34 Payne v. Thompson, 234 Ga. App. 533, 533 ( 507 SE2d 257 ) (1998) (punctuation omitted); see McCorkle v. Dep’t of Transp., 257 Ga. App. 397, 404 (4) ( 571 SE2d 160 ) (2002) (“When an error in the charge of the court is shown to exist, it is presumed to	1	1
McCorkle v. Department of Transportationgreen gactapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 2 sentences 2024Specifically, the instruction shown to the jury in writing was as follows: Physicians do not guarantee the results of treatment, and in the absence of a breach of the standard of care, proof that the outcome of treatment was different than that expected neither establishes [n]or supports an inference that the standard of care was violated.35 . 34 Payne v. Thompson, 234 Ga. App. 533, 533 ( 507 SE2d 257 ) (1998) (punctuation omitted); see McCorkle v. Dep’t of Transp., 257 Ga. App. 397, 404 (4) ( 571 SE2d 160 ) (2002) (“When an error in the charge of the court is shown to exist, it is presumed to 2024Specifically, the instruction shown to the jury in writing was as follows: Physicians do not guarantee the results of treatment, and in the absence of a breach of the standard of care, proof that the outcome of treatment was different than that expected neither establishes [n]or supports an inference that the standard of care was violated.35 . 34 Payne v. Thompson, 234 Ga. App. 533, 533 ( 507 SE2d 257 ) (1998) (punctuation omitted); see McCorkle v. Dep’t of Transp., 257 Ga. App. 397, 404 (4) ( 571 SE2d 160 ) (2002) (“When an error in the charge of the court is shown to exist, it is presumed to	1	1
Mayor of Dalton v. Wilsongreen ga · 1903 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018“A municipal corporation has a dual character, the one public and the other private, and exercises correspondingly two-fold functions, the one governmental and legislative, and the other private and ministerial.” Mayor and Council of Dalton v. Wilson, 118 Ga. 100, 102 ( 44 SE 830 ) (1903) (citation omitted).	1	1
Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc.green gactapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010See Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 255, 257-258 (3) ( 381 SE2d 322 ) (1989); see also DuPree v. South Atlantic Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 299 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 ( 683 SE2d 1 ) (2009). 2010See Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 255, 257-258 (3) ( 381 SE2d 322 ) (1989); see also DuPree v. South Atlantic Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 299 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 ( 683 SE2d 1 ) (2009).	1	1
DuPree v. South Atlantic Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc.green gactapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Pace v. Stategreen ga · 1999 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Accord Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 843 (32) (a) ( 524 SE2d 490 ) (1999). 29 See Varner v. State, 285 Ga. 300, 301 (2) (b), (c) ( 676 SE2d 189 ) (2009). 30 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Carswell-Danso v. State, 281 Ga. App. 576, 578 (4) ( 636 SE2d 735 ) (2006). 31 See Emmanuel v. State, 300 Ga. App. 378, 382 (4) ( 685 SE2d 361 ) (2009). 2010Accord Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 843 (32) (a) ( 524 SE2d 490 ) (1999). 29 See Varner v. State, 285 Ga. 300, 301 (2) (b), (c) ( 676 SE2d 189 ) (2009). 30 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Carswell-Danso v. State, 281 Ga. App. 576, 578 (4) ( 636 SE2d 735 ) (2006). 31 See Emmanuel v. State, 300 Ga. App. 378, 382 (4) ( 685 SE2d 361 ) (2009).	1	1
Sistrunk v. Stategreen gactapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Accord Alewine v. State, 273 Ga. App. 629, 631 (1) ( 616 SE2d 472 ) (2005) (same). 10 (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lee v. State, 280 Ga. App. 706, 707 ( 634 SE2d 837 ) (2006). 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 653 SE2d 823 ) (2007) (speeding). 12 See Jackson, supra. 13 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 472 (2) ( 687 SE2d 863 ) (2009). 14 See Alewine, supra (“the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance”) (citation 2010Accord Alewine v. State, 273 Ga. App. 629, 631 (1) ( 616 SE2d 472 ) (2005) (same). 10 (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lee v. State, 280 Ga. App. 706, 707 ( 634 SE2d 837 ) (2006). 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 653 SE2d 823 ) (2007) (speeding). 12 See Jackson, supra. 13 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 472 (2) ( 687 SE2d 863 ) (2009). 14 See Alewine, supra (“the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance”) (citation	1	1
White v. Stategreen gactapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Yglesia v. Stategreen gactapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Marryott v. Stategreen gactapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Carswell-Danso v. Stategreen gactapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Duprel v. Stategreen gactapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Emmanuel v. Stategreen gactapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Conner v. Stategreen ga · 1983 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Varner v. Stategreen ga · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Lee v. Stategreen gactapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Fairbanks v. Stategreen gactapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
Findlay v. Griffingreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000	1	1
Bunn v. Landersgreen gactapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999	1	1
Taylor v. N. I. L., Inc.green gactapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	1
Brumbelow v. City of Romegreen gactapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	1
Shults v. Stategreen gactapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993	1	1
Lunz v. Stategreen gactapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992	1	1
Nash v. Stategreen gactapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984	1	1
Cuthbert v. Stategreen gactapp · 1908 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (30)

Case	Cited	Years
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1987In Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47 ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981), we recognized the following: The Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140 (99 SC 2213, 60 LE2d 777) (1979) more-likely-than-not test is the appropriate one to employ in determining the Due-Process validity of allowing the factfinder to presume or infer an `ultimate' or `essential element' fact from an `evidentiary' or `basic' fact; under this test, it is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of burglary based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only ev 1987In Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47 ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981), we recognized the following: The Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140 (99 SC 2213, 60 LE2d 777) (1979) more-likely-than-not test is the appropriate one to employ in determining the Due-Process validity of allowing the factfinder to presume or infer an ‘ultimate’ or ‘essential element’ fact from an ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ fact; under this test, it is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of burglary based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only ev	3	1983–1987
Williamson v. State green ga · 1981 2 sentences 1987In Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47 ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981), we recognized the following: The Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140 (99 SC 2213, 60 LE2d 777) (1979) more-likely-than-not test is the appropriate one to employ in determining the Due-Process validity of allowing the factfinder to presume or infer an `ultimate' or `essential element' fact from an `evidentiary' or `basic' fact; under this test, it is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of burglary based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only ev 1987In Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47 ( 281 SE2d 512 ) (1981), we recognized the following: The Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140 (99 SC 2213, 60 LE2d 777) (1979) more-likely-than-not test is the appropriate one to employ in determining the Due-Process validity of allowing the factfinder to presume or infer an `ultimate' or `essential element' fact from an `evidentiary' or `basic' fact; under this test, it is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of burglary based on proof of his recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods; however, if the only ev	3	1983–1987
Wright v. City of Cochran neutral gactapp · 2002 2 sentences 2018We reject a reading of Wright v. City of Cochran , 253 Ga. App. 314 , 558 S.E.2d 844 (2002) that suggests that the dicta therein may be read to support an inference that an exception to sovereign immunity, not anchored to any statutory or constitutional waiver, exists for nuisance actions resulting in personal injury. 2018We reject a reading of Wright v. City of Cochran , 253 Ga. App. 314 , 558 S.E.2d 844 (2002) that suggests that the dicta therein may be read to support an inference that an exception to sovereign immunity, not anchored to any statutory or constitutional waiver, exists for nuisance actions resulting in personal injury.	2	2018–2018
Wessels v. State green gactapp · 1983 2 sentences 1990OCGA § 40-6-392 (c); Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246 ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983)." In addition, the officer's conclusion that defendant was under the influence of drugs was based upon more than the two specific tests to which defendant objected. 1990OCGA § 40-6-392 (c); Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246 ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983)." In addition, the officer's conclusion that defendant was under the influence of drugs was based upon more than the two specific tests to which defendant objected.	2	1988–1990
Hill v. Lundy green ga · 1903 1 sentence 2018“A municipal corporation has a dual character, the one public and the other private, and exercises correspondingly two-fold functions, the one governmental and legislative, and the other private and ministerial.” Mayor and Council of Dalton v. Wilson, 118 Ga. 100, 102 ( 44 SE 830 ) (1903) (citation omitted).	1	2018–2018
City of Atlanta v. Chambers green gactapp · 1992 2 sentences 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r	1	2018–2018
Gooden v. City of Atlanta green gactapp · 2000 2 sentences 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r	1	2018–2018
Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips green ga · 1968 2 sentences 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r	1	2018–2018
Sinkfield v. Pike green gactapp · 1991 2 sentences 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r 2018See, e.g. , Mitcham , 296 Ga. at 580 , 769 S.E.2d 320 ("the operation of a jail and the care and treatment of individuals in police custody are purely governmental functions related to the governmental duty to ensure public safety and maintain order for the benefit of all citizens"); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips , 224 Ga. 834 , 835-836, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968) (maintenance and operation of traffic light is a governmental function); Gooden v. City of Atlanta , 242 Ga. App. 786 , 788, 531 S.E.2d 364 (2000) (operation of public recreational swimming facilities, primarily for public benefit r	1	2018–2018
Naraine v. City of Atlanta green gactapp · 2010 2 sentences 2014If no issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper.2 2 Naraine v. City of Atlanta, 306 Ga. App. 561 ( 703 SE2d 31 ) (2010) (citations omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). 4 Richards cites no authority for the proposition that the absence of a “waiver of borrower’s rights” instrument renders an otherwise valid power of sale in a security deed unenforceable. 2014If no issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper.2 2 Naraine v. City of Atlanta, 306 Ga. App. 561 ( 703 SE2d 31 ) (2010) (citations omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). 4 Richards cites no authority for the proposition that the absence of a “waiver of borrower’s rights” instrument renders an otherwise valid power of sale in a security deed unenforceable.	1	2014–2014
Bankston v. State green ga · 1983 2 sentences 2011Bankston v. State, 251 Ga. 730 -731, 309 S.E.2d 369 (1983). 2011Bankston v. State, 251 Ga. 730 -731, 309 S.E.2d 369 (1983).	1	2011–2011
Bravo v. State green gactapp · 2001	1	2010–2010
Ricks v. State green gactapp · 2002	1	2005–2005
Bartnick v. State green gactapp · 1992	1	1999–1999
Givens v. State neutral gactapp · 1991	1	1993–1993
Burge v. State green gactapp · 1961	1	1986–1986
Williams v. State green ga · 1984	1	1984–1984
Lee v. State green gactapp · 1972	1	1984–1984
Tot v. United States green scotus · 1943	1	1981–1981
United States v. Gainey green scotus · 1965	1	1981–1981
King v. Brice green gactapp · 1916	1	1961–1961
White v. State green gactapp · 1916	1	1961–1961
Stebbins v. State green gactapp · 1949	1	1961–1961
Garner v. State green gactapp · 1945	1	1961–1961
Middleton v. State green gactapp · 1945	1	1961–1961
Ogletree v. Ellington green ga · 1914	1	1934–1934
Griffin v. State green · 1914	1	1934–1934
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co. green scotus · 1916	1	1928–1928
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Whitaker neutral · 1911	1	1913–1913
Stewart v. State neutral gactapp · 1911	1	1913–1913

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 40-6-391 (12) GA § 40-6-392 (9) GA § 40-5-55 (4) GA § 40-5-67.1 (4) GA § 16-7-1 (3) GA § 24-4-401 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 101 (1887–2025) CA 93 (1897–2025) PA 63 (1869–2025) LA 62 (1943–2019) NY 57 (1894–2021) IL 55 (1870–2026) GA 48 (1913–2024) MI 36 (1910–2026) AL 31 (1894–2011) OH 29 (1926–2024) OR 28 (1899–2026) MD 27 (1913–2020) IN 26 (1914–2020) NC 26 (1931–2021) VA 23 (1918–2014) MO 23 (1904–2024) MA 23 (1902–2013) MN 22 (1902–2017) WA 21 (1914–2024) TN 18 (1927–2015) CT 17 (1953–2022) FL 17 (1939–2019) NJ 15 (1957–2026) OK 14 (1915–1995) KS 14 (1934–2013) IA 13 (1913–2021) CO 13 (1946–2018) WV 12 (1887–2019) AZ 11 (1949–2017) MT 11 (1902–2025) DE 11 (1950–2026) ID 11 (1959–2022) UT 8 (1913–2026) SD 8 (1971–2003) KY 7 (1940–2025) RI 7 (1983–2024) AR 7 (1939–1998) HI 6 (1990–2024) WY 6 (1978–2007) NE 6 (1931–2015) NM 5 (1995–2023) MS 5 (1970–2008) SC 5 (1926–1986) VT 5 (1992–2013) WI 4 (1910–2024) DC 4 (1987–2011) NH 3 (1962–2014) NV 3 (1969–1988) ND 3 (1969–2014) ME 2 (2003–2014) AK 2 (2016–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check