63 Pennsylvania opinions name it 13 courts 1869–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bata v. Central-Penn Nat. Bank of Phila.green2 sentences2025Bank of Philadelphia, 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966) (“Averments of fraud are meaningless epithets unless sufficient facts are set forth which will permit an inference that the claim is not without foundation nor offered simply to harass the opposing party and to delay the pleader’s own obligations”). 2018Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]verments of fraud are ‘meaningless epithets unless sufficient facts are set forth which will permit an inference that the claim is not without foundation or offered simply to harass the opposing party and to delay the pleader’s own obligation.’” Schofield, 477 A.2d at 477 (quoting Bata v. Central- Penn Nat’l Bank of Phila., 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)). | 5 | 9 |
Amon v. Shemakagreen2 sentences2016The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the following pertinent principles of law in Amon v. Shemaka, 214 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1965): (1) In order to recover, a plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; (2) Moreover, the mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence[.] Id. at 239 . 2016The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the following pertinent principles of law in Amon v. Shemaka, 214 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1965): (1) In order to recover, a plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; (2) Moreover, the mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence[.] Id. at 239 . | 3 | 4 |
Engle v. Spinogreen2 sentences2004In support of its demurrer argument on the negligence count, defendant Strongwell argues that plaintiff will attempt to prove negligence through the principle of res ipsa loquitur, but notes “that the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence, nor does it make a prima facia [sic] case of negligence.” Brief for defendant at 3, citing Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254, 257 , 228 A.2d 745, 746 (1967). 2004In support of its demurrer argument on the negligence count, defendant Strongwell argues that plaintiff will attempt to prove negligence through the principle of res ipsa loquitur, but notes “that the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence, nor does it make a prima facia [sic] case of negligence.” Brief for defendant at 3, citing Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254, 257 , 228 A.2d 745, 746 (1967). | 2 | 4 |
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen2 sentences1997See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (“Our conclusion is consistent with the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ 8. 1997See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (“Our conclusion is consistent with the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ 8. | 2 | 4 |
Churilla v. Barnergreen2 sentences2025The “mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence, nor even make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Churilla v. Barner, 409 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citations omitted). 2025“Rather, a plaintiff must produce evidence to support his version of the incident; theories as to what may have transpired … may not be employed as a substitute for such evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
Deaver v. Millergreen2 sentences2014“Although a jury may not be permitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture, but must have evidence upon which logically its conclusion may be based, circumstantial evidence may be adequate to prove a plaintiff’s case.” Deaver v. Miller, 260 Pa. Super. 173, 177-178 , 393 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1978). 2014“Although a jury may not be permitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture, but must have evidence upon which logically its conclusion may be based, circumstantial evidence may be adequate to prove a plaintiff’s case.” Deaver v. Miller, 260 Pa. Super. 173, 177-178 , 393 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Satler v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen2 sentences2012The Department maintains that Licensee’s failure to testify entitled the Department to an inference or a presumption that Licensee remained medically incompetent to drive, pursuant to Satler v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 670 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that the failure to call an available witness who is within one party’s control and has knowledge pertaining to a material issue may, if not explained, raise an inference or presumption that the absent witness’ testimony would have been adverse to that party”). 2012The Department maintains that Licensee's failure to testify entitled the Department to an inference or a presumption that Licensee remained medically incompetent to drive, pursuant to Satler v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 670 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Pa. Cmwlth.1996) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the failure to call an available witness who is within one party's control and has knowledge pertaining to a material issue may, if not explained, raise an inference or presumption that the absent witness' testimony would have been adverse to that party"). | 2 | 2 |
Flagiello v. Crillygreen2 sentences2022As our Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he mere happening of an accident…does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Flagiello v. Crilly, 409 Pa. 389 , 187 A.2d 289, 290 (1963) (citations omitted). 2022As our Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he mere happening of an accident…does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Flagiello v. Crilly, 409 Pa. 389 , 187 A.2d 289, 290 (1963) (citations omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Hamil v. Bashlinegreen2 sentences2010Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978) (“the mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence”); Commonwealth v. King, 298 Pa.Super. 499 , 444 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1982) (“the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence”). 2010Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978) (“the mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence”); Commonwealth v. King, 298 Pa.Super. 499 , 444 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1982) (“the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence”). | 1 | 3 |
In Re Estate of Schofieldgreen2 sentences2018Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]verments of fraud are ‘meaningless epithets unless sufficient facts are set forth which will permit an inference that the claim is not without foundation or offered simply to harass the opposing party and to delay the pleader’s own obligation.’” Schofield, 477 A.2d at 477 (quoting Bata v. Central- Penn Nat’l Bank of Phila., 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)). 2009In satisfaction of the particularity requirement, [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” In re Estate of Schofield, 505 Pa. 95, 103 , 477 A.2d 473, 477 (1984) (quoting Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 423 Pa. 373, 379 , 224 A.2d 174, 179 (1966)). | 1 | 2 |
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.green2 sentences2019Corp., 387 Pa.Super. 537 , 564 A.2d 919, 927 (1989) (quoting Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia1 423 Pa. 373, 379-80 , 224 A.2d 174 (1966). 2019Corp., 387 Pa.Super. 537 , 564 A.2d 919, 927 (1989) (quoting Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia1 423 Pa. 373, 379-80 , 224 A.2d 174 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass'ngreen1 sentence2016In order to establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: “(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) actual loss suffered by the plaintiff.” Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass’n, 866 A.2d 1115, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Presbyterian Medical Center v. Buddgreen1 sentence2011Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing Bata v. Central Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 423 Pa. 373 , 224 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1966)). . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kinggreen2 sentences2010Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978) (“the mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence”); Commonwealth v. King, 298 Pa.Super. 499 , 444 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1982) (“the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence”). 2010Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978) (“the mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence”); Commonwealth v. King, 298 Pa.Super. 499 , 444 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1982) (“the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference or presumption of negligence”). | 1 | 1 |
Janicik v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2002Co. of Am., 305 Pa.Super. 120 , 451 A.2d 451, 454 (1982) (quotation marks omitted). 2002Co. of Am., 305 Pa.Super. 120 , 451 A.2d 451, 454 (1982) (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Moultrey v. Great a & P Tea Co.green2 sentences1999See Moultrey v. Great A & P Tea Co., 281 Pa. Super. 525, 529-30 , 422 A.2d 593, 595 (1980). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 239 (1965). 1999See Moultrey v. Great A & P Tea Co., 281 Pa. Super. 525, 529-30 , 422 A.2d 593, 595 (1980). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 239 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
| McElhinny v. Iliffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ravenellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Petrucelligreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlson v. Sherwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charnogursky v. Price-Pancoast Coal Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wenhold v. O'Deagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993(Tr. trial pp. 21, 22, 79.) “The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with a pedestrian does not establish negligence, nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence, nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A.2d 864 (1961). 1993(Tr. trial pp. 21, 22, 79.) “The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with a pedestrian does not establish negligence, nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence, nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A.2d 864 (1961). | 5 | 1963–1993 |
Gatens v. Vrabel
green
2 sentences1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek 1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek | 4 | 1963–1970 |
Ebersole v. Beistline
green
2 sentences1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek 1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek | 4 | 1963–1970 |
Niziolek v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek 1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek | 4 | 1963–1970 |
Hulmes v. Keel
neutral
2 sentences1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek 1970In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court said (page 257) : “‘The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moving vehicle collides with . . . another vehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek | 4 | 1963–1970 |
Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.
neutral
2 sentences2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). 2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). | 3 | 1965–2014 |
Harding v. McConnell
neutral
2 sentences2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). 2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). | 3 | 1965–2014 |
Smith v. Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1963The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moring rehicle collides with a pedestrian or with another rehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 322 Pa. 29 , 185 A. 581 . *391 I 1963The mere happening of an accident or the mere fact that a moring rehicle collides with a pedestrian or with another rehicle does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463 , 175 A. 2d 864 ; Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155 , 142 A. 2d 287 ; Schofield v. King, 388 Pa., supra; Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12 , 82 A. 2d 11 ; Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 117 , 6 A. 2d 64 ; Niziolek v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 322 Pa. 29 , 185 A. 581 . *391 I | 3 | 1963–1967 |
Keenheel v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Securities Commission
green
2 sentences2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). 2014Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 143 Pa. Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 (1990). “[T]he mere happening of an accident or an injury does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence.” Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317 , 214 A.2d 238, 240 (1965) (citing Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways, Co., 415 Pa. 549 , 204 A.2d 254 (1964). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Kahley
green
2 sentences1987Commonwealth v. Kahley, 467 Pa. 272 , 356 A.2d 745 (1976). 1987Commonwealth v. Kahley, 467 Pa. 272 , 356 A.2d 745 (1976). | 2 | 1982–1987 |
Laubach v. Haigh
green
2 sentences1978Laubach v. Haigh, 433 Pa. 487 , 252 A.2d 682 (1969).” 227 Pa.Super. at 607 , 323 A.2d at 220 . 1978Laubach v. Haigh, 433 Pa. 487 , 252 A.2d 682 (1969).” 227 Pa.Super. at 607 , 323 A.2d at 220 . | 2 | 1974–1978 |
Fegely v. Costello
neutral
2 sentences1978See Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A.2d 745 ; Fegely v. Costello, 417 Pa. 448 , 208 A.2d 243 . 1978See Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A.2d 745 ; Fegely v. Costello, 417 Pa. 448 , 208 A.2d 243 . | 2 | 1969–1978 |
Izzi v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.
green
2 sentences1968In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court pertinently said (page 257): “‘The mere happening of an accident . . . does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: [citing 7 supporting decisions of this Court].’ ” The Court further stated (page 257) : “ ‘The law is likewise clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negr ligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Schofie 1968In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court pertinently said (page 257): “‘The mere happening of an accident . . . does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: [citing 7 supporting decisions of this Court].’ ” The Court further stated (page 257) : “ ‘The law is likewise clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negr ligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Schofie | 2 | 1964–1968 |
Schofield v. King
green
2 sentences1968In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court pertinently said (page 257): “‘The mere happening of an accident . . . does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: [citing 7 supporting decisions of this Court].’ ” The Court further stated (page 257) : “ ‘The law is likewise clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negr ligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Schofie 1968In Engle v. Spino, 425 Pa. 254 , 228 A. 2d 745 , the Court pertinently said (page 257): “‘The mere happening of an accident . . . does not establish negligence nor raise an inference or a presumption of negligence nor make out a prima facie case of negligence: [citing 7 supporting decisions of this Court].’ ” The Court further stated (page 257) : “ ‘The law is likewise clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negr ligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Stimac v. Barkey, 405 Pa., supra; Schofie | 2 | 1965–1968 |
| Bentivoglio v. Ralston green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Kmetz v. Lochiatto green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Commonwealth v. Johnson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Dwyer v. Rothman green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Temple University, Etc. v. Pa. Dept. Etc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Agostino v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Lavely v. Wolota green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Turner green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Shaffer green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Kolb v. Hess green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Weber green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Heffernan v. Rosser green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Miller v. Delaware County Memorial Hospital green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Lescznski v. Pittsburgh Railways Co. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Hardy v. Clover Leaf Mills green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Markle v. Robert Hall Clothes green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Horn v. Witherspoon green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Lewis v. Quinn green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Neely v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Thompson v. Gorman green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Albrecht v. Erie City neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Lanni v. Pennsylvania Railroad green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Byrne v. Schultz (Stone) green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.