7 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen2 sentences2003Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 , 318 (1976) ("the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment `does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause '") (quoting 8 J. 1983This rule has been recognized with apparent approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), in which Mr. Justice White observed on behalf of a majority of the Court: “Our conclusion is consistent with the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ 8 J. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Imbrugliagreen1 sentence2011See Imbruglia, 913 A.2d at 1030 ; Price, 706 A.2d at 934 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sensinggreen1 sentence2005See Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1355 (“With respect to the question of whether a defendant may offer evidence to rebut the inference that a BAC at the time of the testing was as great at the time of actual driving, * * * once the inference is drawn, competent evidence may be offered in rebuttal.”); see also State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn.1992) (“The breath test result merely creates a rebuttable presumption of intoxication.”). 15 With these principles in mind, we must now determine whether the trial justice abused her discretion in finding that the prosecution laid an adequate foundation fo | 1 | 1 |
Soares v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2005Fire Insurance Co., 692 A.2d 701, 701-02 (R.I.1997) (mem.)); see also Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 792 A.2d 50, 53 (R.I.2002). 14 Once a trial justice determines that particular breathalyzer test results are admissible and those results are admitted, a defendant may offer competent evidence to rebut the inference that the test result was accurate. | 1 | 1 |
Motor Vehicle Board v. El Paso Independent Automobile Dealers Ass'ngreen1 sentence2005See id.; see also Fend v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Iowa 2000); Motor Vehide Board of the Texas Department of Transportation v. El Paso Independent Automobile Dealers Assodation, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc.green1 sentence2005Fire Insurance Co., 692 A.2d 701, 701-02 (R.I.1997) (mem.)); see also Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 792 A.2d 50, 53 (R.I.2002). 14 Once a trial justice determines that particular breathalyzer test results are admissible and those results are admitted, a defendant may offer competent evidence to rebut the inference that the test result was accurate. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lusigreen1 sentence2005See Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1355 (“With respect to the question of whether a defendant may offer evidence to rebut the inference that a BAC at the time of the testing was as great at the time of actual driving, * * * once the inference is drawn, competent evidence may be offered in rebuttal.”); see also State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn.1992) (“The breath test result merely creates a rebuttable presumption of intoxication.”). 15 With these principles in mind, we must now determine whether the trial justice abused her discretion in finding that the prosecution laid an adequate foundation fo | 1 | 1 |
Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferrygreen1 sentence2005See id.; see also Fend v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Iowa 2000); Motor Vehide Board of the Texas Department of Transportation v. El Paso Independent Automobile Dealers Assodation, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex.1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haydon v. Stamas
green
1 sentence2024The party arguing that there has been a waiver bears the burden of showing clearly its existence, and, generally, the ultimate determination is one of fact.” Haydon, 900 A.2d at 1113 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Price
green
1 sentence2011See Imbruglia, 913 A.2d at 1030 ; Price, 706 A.2d at 934 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Importantly, as we noted in 1800 Smith Street Associates, L.P. v. Gencarelli, 888 A.2d 46, 54-55 , 55 n.4 (R.I.2005), and held in Sturbridge Home Builders, 890 A.2d at 65-66 , this Court will not lightly infer, to the extent that the record supports such an inference, the waiver of contractual provisions; evidence supporting an inference of waiver must be manifest and apparent. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
1800 Smith Street Associates, LP v. Gencarelli
green
1 sentence2006Importantly, as we noted in 1800 Smith Street Associates, L.P. v. Gencarelli, 888 A.2d 46, 54-55 , 55 n.4 (R.I.2005), and held in Sturbridge Home Builders, 890 A.2d at 65-66 , this Court will not lightly infer, to the extent that the record supports such an inference, the waiver of contractual provisions; evidence supporting an inference of waiver must be manifest and apparent. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Elio
green
1 sentence2003Wigmore, Evidence 439 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) (emphasis in original); FDIC v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239 , 1248 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that in a civil action "the district court was entitled to draw a negative inference from [the defendant's] refusal to testify"); Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 , 562 (R.I. 1984) (acknowledging that negative inferences may be drawn in civil cases as a result of a party's invocation of Fifth Amendment right); Pulawski v. Pulawski, 463 A.2d 151 , 157 (R.I. 1983) (referencing Baxter and other state and federal cases, and noting that "We are of the opinion that the impositi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pulawski v. Pulawski
green
1 sentence2003Wigmore, Evidence 439 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) (emphasis in original); FDIC v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239 , 1248 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that in a civil action "the district court was entitled to draw a negative inference from [the defendant's] refusal to testify"); Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 , 562 (R.I. 1984) (acknowledging that negative inferences may be drawn in civil cases as a result of a party's invocation of Fifth Amendment right); Pulawski v. Pulawski, 463 A.2d 151 , 157 (R.I. 1983) (referencing Baxter and other state and federal cases, and noting that "We are of the opinion that the impositi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Tarro v. Tarro
green
1 sentence2003Wigmore, Evidence 439 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) (emphasis in original); FDIC v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239 , 1248 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that in a civil action "the district court was entitled to draw a negative inference from [the defendant's] refusal to testify"); Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 , 562 (R.I. 1984) (acknowledging that negative inferences may be drawn in civil cases as a result of a party's invocation of Fifth Amendment right); Pulawski v. Pulawski, 463 A.2d 151 , 157 (R.I. 1983) (referencing Baxter and other state and federal cases, and noting that "We are of the opinion that the impositi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.