inference presumption in Indiana

26 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

Case	Followed	Cited
Barger v. Bargergreen indctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015This court has noted “the significant ramifications of an improperly granted protective order.” Barger v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 2015This court has noted “the significant ramifications of an improperly granted protective order.” Barger v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ind.Ct.App.2008).	2	2
Brooks v. Allengreen · 1878 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1914–1914	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (30)

Case	Cited	Years
Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark green ind · 1922 2 sentences 1969Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, Admx. (1922), 191 Ind. 470 , 133 N. E. 588 . 1969Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, Admx. (1922), 191 Ind. 470 , 133 N. E. 588 .	5	1946–1969
Mayes v. Mayes neutral indctapp · 1925 2 sentences 1956Under such cir 120 cumstances there must be a holding out by the parties of their marriage status to at least such part of the public in the community in which they live as is made up of their acquaintances, neighbors and relatives.’ (Our emphasis) [p. 202] “In the case of Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 , the court said: “ ‘ “A cohabitation illicit in its origin is presumed to be of that character, unless the contrary be proved, and cannot be transformed into matrimony by evidence which falls short of establishing the fact of an actual contract of marriage.” ’ (Our emp 1956Under such cir 120 cumstances there must be a holding out by the parties of their marriage status to at least such part of the public in the community in which they live as is made up of their acquaintances, neighbors and relatives.’ (Our emphasis) [p. 202] “In the case of Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 , the court said: “ ‘ “A cohabitation illicit in its origin is presumed to be of that character, unless the contrary be proved, and cannot be transformed into matrimony by evidence which falls short of establishing the fact of an actual contract of marriage.” ’ (Our emp	3	1949–1956
In the Matter of the Petition for Temporary Protective Order: A.N. v. K.G. green indctapp · 2014 2 sentences 2020“The fact that an order for protection is issued under this chapter does not raise an inference or presumption in a subsequent case or hearings between the parties.” Id. § 34-26-5-9(h). 2020“The fact that an order for protection is issued under this chapter does not raise an inference or presumption in a subsequent case or hearings between the parties.” Id. § 34-26-5-9(h).	2	2020–2020
Cope v. LYNCH green indctapp · 1961 2 sentences 1990In reply to Gee's argument that a lost will last seen in the possession of the testator raises a presumption of destruction with intent to revoke, Stephens points to the following language in the case of Cope v. Lynch (1961), 132 Ind.App. 673 , 176 N.E.2d 897 , transfer denied, where the court stated: It has been held that where a testator retains possession or control of his will and it is not found at or after his death, an "inference" arises that he destroyed it or mutilated it for the purpose of revoking it. 1990In reply to Gee's argument that a lost will last seen in the possession of the testator raises a presumption of destruction with intent to revoke, Stephens points to the following language in the case of Cope v. Lynch (1961), 132 Ind.App. 673 , 176 N.E.2d 897 , transfer denied, where the court stated: It has been held that where a testator retains possession or control of his will and it is not found at or after his death, an "inference" arises that he destroyed it or mutilated it for the purpose of revoking it.	2	1990–1990
State v. Smithers green ind · 1971 2 sentences 1986United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Smithers, (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 . 1986United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Smithers, (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .	2	1981–1986
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce green scotus · 1975 2 sentences 1986United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Smithers, (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 . 1986United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 ; State v. Smithers, (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .	2	1981–1986
Sebree v. Sebree neutral ill · 1920 2 sentences 1956Gorden v. Gorden, supra; Sebree v. Sebree (1920), 293 Ill. 228 , 127 N. E. 392 .” Lowrance v. Lowrance (1932), 95 Ind. App. 345, 355 , 182 N. E. 273 . 1956Gorden v. Gorden, supra; Sebree v. Sebree (1920), 293 Ill. 228 , 127 N. E. 392 .” Lowrance v. Lowrance (1932), 95 Ind. App. 345, 355 , 182 N. E. 273 .	2	1932–1956
Thorne v. State neutral ind · 1988 1 sentence 1990Id.	1	1990–1990
Torrence v. State neutral ind · 1971 2 sentences 1986Belcher v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 214 ; Boone v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 493 , 371 N.E.2d 708 ; Torrence v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 618 , 266 N.E.2d 1 . 1986Belcher v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 214 ; Boone v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 493 , 371 N.E.2d 708 ; Torrence v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 618 , 266 N.E.2d 1 .	1	1986–1986
Belcher v. State green ind · 1983 1 sentence 1986Belcher v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 214 ; Boone v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 493 , 371 N.E.2d 708 ; Torrence v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 618 , 266 N.E.2d 1 .	1	1986–1986
Boone v. State green ind · 1978 2 sentences 1986Belcher v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 214 ; Boone v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 493 , 371 N.E.2d 708 ; Torrence v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 618 , 266 N.E.2d 1 . 1986Belcher v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 214 ; Boone v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 493 , 371 N.E.2d 708 ; Torrence v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 618 , 266 N.E.2d 1 .	1	1986–1986
Arthur v. State green ind · 1949 2 sentences 1981The question must be submitted to the jury for its determination. . . . ” Arthur, supra, 227 Ind. at 497 , 86 N.E.2d at 700 . 1981The question must be submitted to the jury for its determination. . . . ” Arthur, supra, 227 Ind. at 497 , 86 N.E.2d at 700 .	1	1981–1981
Hummel v. New York Central Railroad neutral indctapp · 1946 2 sentences 1974Hummel v. New York Central Railroad Co. (1946), 117 Ind. App. 22 , 66 N.E.2d 901 , affirms the general rule that the testimony of one who was near a crossing and in a situation to have heard the whistle, that he did not hear it, is sufficient to support an inference that a warning was not given. 1974Hummel v. New York Central Railroad Co. (1946), 117 Ind. App. 22 , 66 N.E.2d 901 , affirms the general rule that the testimony of one who was near a crossing and in a situation to have heard the whistle, that he did not hear it, is sufficient to support an inference that a warning was not given.	1	1974–1974
Dimmick v. Follis green indctapp · 1953 2 sentences 1969“Like any other admission its probative value may be destroyed by the circumstances under which it was given or by satisfactory explanation.” Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 704 , 111 N. E. 2d 486 (1953). 3 . . the testimony of one who was near a crossing and in a situation to have heard the whistle, that he did not hear it, is generally sufficient to support the inference that such a warning signal was not given. 1969“Like any other admission its probative value may be destroyed by the circumstances under which it was given or by satisfactory explanation.” Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 704 , 111 N. E. 2d 486 (1953). 3 . . the testimony of one who was near a crossing and in a situation to have heard the whistle, that he did not hear it, is generally sufficient to support the inference that such a warning signal was not given.	1	1969–1969
Worster v. Caylor green ind · 1953 2 sentences 1957In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” Worster v. Caylor (1953), 231 Ind. 625, 632 , 110 N. E. 2d 337 . 1957In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” Worster v. Caylor (1953), 231 Ind. 625, 632 , 110 N. E. 2d 337 .	1	1957–1957
Lowrance v. Lowrance green indctapp · 1932 2 sentences 1956Gorden v. Gorden, supra; Sebree v. Sebree (1920), 293 Ill. 228 , 127 N. E. 392 .” Lowrance v. Lowrance (1932), 95 Ind. App. 345, 355 , 182 N. E. 273 . 1956Gorden v. Gorden, supra; Sebree v. Sebree (1920), 293 Ill. 228 , 127 N. E. 392 .” Lowrance v. Lowrance (1932), 95 Ind. App. 345, 355 , 182 N. E. 273 .	1	1956–1956
Balanti v. Stineman Coal & Coke Co. green pasuperct · 1938 2 sentences 1956Balanti v. Stineman Coal & Coke Co. 1938, 131 Pa. Super. 344 , 200 A. 236 . 121 120 “Common-law marriages are recognized in Indiana, but since they are a fruitful source of perjury and 121 fraud, they are merely tolerated and are not en-couraged. 1956Balanti v. Stineman Coal & Coke Co. 1938, 131 Pa. Super. 344 , 200 A. 236 . 121 120 “Common-law marriages are recognized in Indiana, but since they are a fruitful source of perjury and 121 fraud, they are merely tolerated and are not en-couraged.	1	1956–1956
Lincoln v. French green · 1882 2 sentences 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L. 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L.	1	1953–1953
Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. Reyher, Admx. green ind · 1939 2 sentences 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L. 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L.	1	1953–1953
Kaiser v. Happel neutral ind · 1941 2 sentences 1953In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1 Kilgore v. Gannon (1916), 185 633 Ind. 682, 683 et seq., 114 N. E. 446 and authorities there cited; Kaiser v. Happel (1941), 219 Ind. 28, 31 , 36 N. E. 2d 784 ; Baltimore and Ohio R. 1953In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1 Kilgore v. Gannon (1916), 185 633 Ind. 682, 683 et seq., 114 N. E. 446 and authorities there cited; Kaiser v. Happel (1941), 219 Ind. 28, 31 , 36 N. E. 2d 784 ; Baltimore and Ohio R.	1	1953–1953
Kickels v. Fein green indctapp · 1937 2 sentences 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L. 1953Co. v. Reyher, Admx. (1939), 216 Ind. 545, 549 , 24 N. E. 2d 284 ; Kickels v. Fein (1937), 104 Ind. App. 606, 616 , 10 N. E. 2d 297 ; Lincoln et al. v. French (1882), 105 U. S. 614, 617 , 26 L.	1	1953–1953
Teter v. Teter green ind · 1885 1 sentence 1953Appellee cites the case of Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129 , in which case Mr. Clayton and Mrs. Teter entered into a marriage contract on May 18, 1871, obtained a license and marriage solemnized.	1	1953–1953
Kilgore v. Gannon green ind · 1916 1 sentence 1953In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1 Kilgore v. Gannon (1916), 185 *633 Ind. 682, 683 et seq., 114 N. E. 446 and authorities there cited; Kaiser v. Happel (1941), 219 Ind. 28, 31 , 36 N. E. 2d 784 ; Baltimore and Ohio R.	1	1953–1953
Cossell v. Cossell neutral ind · 1945 2 sentences 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54	1	1949–1949
Dunlop v. Dunlop green indctapp · 1935 2 sentences 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54	1	1949–1949
Minardo v. State green ind · 1932 2 sentences 1949Minardo v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 422, 427 , 183 N. E. 548 , and cases cited. 1949Minardo v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 422, 427 , 183 N. E. 548 , and cases cited.	1	1949–1949
Young v. General Baking Co. neutral indctapp · 1938 2 sentences 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54	1	1949–1949
Meehan v. Valve neutral indctapp · 1917 1 sentence 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54	1	1949–1949
Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Griswold neutral indctapp · 1917 1 sentence 1949Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent.’ ” See also: Meehan v. Edward Valve etc. Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 344 , 117 N. E. 265 ; Mayes v. Mayes (1925), 84 Ind. App. 90 , 147 N. E. 630 ; Dunlop v. Dunlop (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 50 , 198 N. E. 95 ; Young v. General Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 658, 661 , 12 N. E. 2d 1016 ; Cossell v. Cossell (1945), 223 Ind. 603, 605 , 63 N. E. 2d 54	1	1949–1949
Mason v. State neutral ind · 1908	1	1936–1936

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 34-26-5-10 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 34-26-5-13 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 34-26-5-3 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 (4) USC § 18u.s.c.922 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 101 (1887–2025) CA 93 (1897–2025) PA 63 (1869–2025) LA 62 (1943–2019) NY 57 (1894–2021) IL 55 (1870–2026) GA 48 (1913–2024) MI 36 (1910–2026) AL 31 (1894–2011) OH 29 (1926–2024) OR 28 (1899–2026) MD 27 (1913–2020) IN 26 (1914–2020) NC 26 (1931–2021) VA 23 (1918–2014) MO 23 (1904–2024) MA 23 (1902–2013) MN 22 (1902–2017) WA 21 (1914–2024) TN 18 (1927–2015) CT 17 (1953–2022) FL 17 (1939–2019) NJ 15 (1957–2026) OK 14 (1915–1995) KS 14 (1934–2013) IA 13 (1913–2021) CO 13 (1946–2018) WV 12 (1887–2019) AZ 11 (1949–2017) MT 11 (1902–2025) DE 11 (1950–2026) ID 11 (1959–2022) UT 8 (1913–2026) SD 8 (1971–2003) KY 7 (1940–2025) RI 7 (1983–2024) AR 7 (1939–1998) HI 6 (1990–2024) WY 6 (1978–2007) NE 6 (1931–2015) NM 5 (1995–2023) MS 5 (1970–2008) SC 5 (1926–1986) VT 5 (1992–2013) WI 4 (1910–2024) DC 4 (1987–2011) NH 3 (1962–2014) NV 3 (1969–1988) ND 3 (1969–2014) ME 2 (2003–2014) AK 2 (2016–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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