inference presumption in Kansas

1964That courts are reluctant to infer negligence from the starting of fires and that the doctrine here sought to be applied requires a clear showing by evidence of the thing or instrumentality involved is fully demonstrated in Wehkamp v. City of Garden City, supra, to which we adhere. *697 In that case, quoting extensively from Emigh v. Andrews, 164 Kan. 732 , 191 P. 2d 901 , we stated and held: “In Emigh v. Andrews, ... it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and not of substantive law; that a mere presumption is not a tiling that ‘speaks for itself.’ and that th

1964That courts are reluctant to infer negligence from the starting of fires and that the doctrine here sought to be applied requires a clear showing by evidence of the thing or instrumentality involved is fully demonstrated in Wehkamp v. City of Garden City, supra, to which we adhere. *697 In that case, quoting extensively from Emigh v. Andrews, 164 Kan. 732 , 191 P. 2d 901 , we stated and held: “In Emigh v. Andrews, ... it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and not of substantive law; that a mere presumption is not a tiling that ‘speaks for itself.’ and that th

1950(Schmidt v. Twin City State Bank, 151 Kan. 667 , 100 P. 2d 652 ; 1 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, rev. ed., § 53, p. 139; De-Glopper v. Railway & Light Co., supra.) The inference arises only from established foundation facts.

1950(Schmidt v. Twin City State Bank, 151 Kan. 667 , 100 P. 2d 652 ; 1 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, rev. ed., § 53, p. 139; De-Glopper v. Railway & Light Co., supra.) The inference arises only from established foundation facts.

1997Williams restates the rule prohibiting the stacking of inferences in a way particularly appropriate to our discussion here: "`Another way, perhaps, of verbalizing the rule prohibiting an inference on an inference and a presumption on a presumption is the rule, as stated by some courts, that where reliance is placed upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.'" 229 Kan. at 649 (quoting 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed. 1972]).

1997Williams restates the rule prohibiting the stacking of inferences in a way particularly appropriate to our discussion here: “ ‘Another way, perhaps, of verbalizing the rule prohibiting an inference on an inference and a presumption on a presumption is the rule, as stated by some courts, that where reliance is placed upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.’ ” 229 Kan. at 649 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed. 1972]).

1976(Emigh v. Andrews, 164 Kan. 732 , 191 P. 2d 901 ; Duncan v. Railway Co., 82 Kan. 230 , 108 Pac. 101 .) In Virginia Surety Co. v. Schlegel, supra, this court held that what is meant by the rule forbidding the basing of one inference upon another is 'that an inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.

1976(Emigh v. Andrews, 164 Kan. 732 , 191 P. 2d 901 ; Duncan v. Railway Co., 82 Kan. 230 , 108 Pac. 101 .) In Virginia Surety Co. v. Schlegel, supra, this court held that what is meant by the rule forbidding the basing of one inference upon another is 'that an inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.

1976Thus the doctrine cannot be applied where the thing which actually caused the injury or damage is unknown; but when it is known and disclosed and relied upon as the basis of the damage or injury, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will infer negligence in the doing of the thing or in the commission of the act. . . .” (p. 486.) The application of this distinction was illustrated in the recent case of Querry v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 217 Kan. 104 , 535 P. 2d 928 .

1976Thus the doctrine cannot be applied where the thing which actually caused the injury or damage is unknown; but when it is known and disclosed and relied upon as the basis of the damage or injury, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will infer negligence in the doing of the thing or in the commission of the act. . . .” (p. 486.) The application of this distinction was illustrated in the recent case of Querry v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 217 Kan. 104 , 535 P. 2d 928 .

1975The fact that a publication is qualifiedly privileged does not change the actionable quality of the words published, although, as previously indicated, such a publication rebuts the inference or presumption of malice and falsity which would otherwise arise as a matter of law, still leaving, however, the party responsible if both falsehood and actual malice are affirmatively pleaded and proved; that is, actual malice is not inferred or presumed from the injurious character of a qualifiedly privileged communication, and the injured party must allege and prove that the statements were made with m

1975The fact that a publication is qualifiedly privileged does not change the actionable quality of the words published, although, as previously indicated, such a publication rebuts the inference or presumption of malice and falsity which would otherwise arise as a matter of law, still leaving, however, the party responsible if both falsehood and actual malice are affirmatively pleaded and proved; that is, actual malice is not inferred or presumed from the injurious character of a qualifiedly privileged communication, and the injured party must allege and prove that the statements were made with m

1959(Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, supra; Baker v. Haldeman-Julius, supra; Richardson v. Gunby, supra; Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 , 98 Pac. 281 , 20 L.

1959(Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, supra; Baker v. Haldeman-Julius, supra; Richardson v. Gunby, supra; Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 , 98 Pac. 281 , 20 L.

1959(Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, supra; Baker v. Haldeman-Julius, supra; Richardson v. Gunby, supra; Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 , 98 Pac. 281 , 20 L.

1956Co., 136 Kan. 159 , 12 P. 2d 715 ) as supporting his position We believe a careful analysis of that case discloses it is distinguishable.

1956Co., 136 Kan. 159 , 12 P. 2d 715 ) as supporting his position We believe a careful analysis of that case discloses it is distinguishable.

1947From all briefs filed we learn the parties agree the case referred to by the trial court was Sipe v. Helgerson, 159 Kan. 290 , 153 P. 2d 934 , the defendant there being one of the parties in the instant case.

1947From all briefs filed we learn the parties agree the case referred to by the trial court was Sipe v. Helgerson, 159 Kan. 290 , 153 P. 2d 934 , the defendant there being one of the parties in the instant case.

1942(See, e. g., Railway Co. v. Baumgartner, 74 Kan. 148 , 85 Pac. 822 ; and McKenzie v. New York Life Ins.

1942(See, e. g., Railway Co. v. Baumgartner, 74 Kan. 148 , 85 Pac. 822 ; and McKenzie v. New York Life Ins.

1934J. 542.)” (p. 561.) In the early case of State v. Maxwell, 42 Ia. 208 , which was also a case of burglary, the breaking and entering were not disputed, but it was contended that the intent to steal was not shown.