inference presumption in Illinois

1958The rule is that to authorize a reversal of a decree it must not only appear that an error intervened, but the record must contain enough to raise and justify the inference that the error was prejudicial, or probably prejudicial, to the party who asks reversal.” Citing Bettis v. Green, 171 Ill. 495 .

1909He quotes from Bettis v. Green, 171 Ill. 495 , the language : “It is well settled that to authorize a reversal of a decree, it must appear not only that an error intervened, but the record must contain enough to raise and justify the inference that the error was prejudicial or probably prejudicial to the party who asks reversal.” The argument of appellee then proceeds: •* ‘ The only result unfavorable tq the appellant to which this instruction might have contributed, was the finding by the jury that the profits of the Wabash Avenue Lease were a part of the appellant’s earnings for the year 190

1904In Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401 , a similar question arose, and it was held that evidence tending to prove a similar, but distinct offense from that, for which one is being tried, is not admissible for the purpose of raising an inference or presumption that the prisoner committed the particular act, for which he is on trial. ’ (See also Turley v. People, 188 Ill.. 628.) It is not claimed, and could not be, that the foregoing evidence falls within any exception to the general rule, as above stated.” So, in the case at bar, this jewelry not being any part of the stolen goods, which plaintif

1902In Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401 , a similar question arose, and it was held that evidence tending to prove a similar but distinct offense from that for which one is being tried is not admissible for the purpose of raising an inference or presumption that the prisoner committed the particular act for which he is on trial.” (See, also, Turley v. People, 188 Ill. 628 .) It is not claimed, and could not be, that the foregoing evidence falls within any exception to the g'eneral rule as above stated.

2011Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill.App.3d 347, 349 , 247 Ill.

2011Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill.App.3d 347, 349 , 247 Ill.

1996Kaibab Industries, Inc. v. Family Ready Homes, Inc., 80 Ill.

1983App. 3d 782 , 372 N.E.2d 139 ) discussed “badges of fraud” giving rise to an inference of presumption of fraud which shifts the burden of proof to the defendants.

1982In People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415 , 420 N.E.2d 151 , the supreme court stated the inference may properly be applied if: (1) there is a rational connection between the accused’s recent possession of property stolen in the burglary; (2) his guilt of burglary is more likely than not to flow from his recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of burglary proceeds; and (3) there is evidence corroborating the accused’s guilt.

1982In People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415 , 420 N.E.2d 151 , the supreme court stated the inference may properly be applied if: (1) there is a rational connection between the accused’s recent possession of property stolen in the burglary; (2) his guilt of burglary is more likely than not to flow from his recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of burglary proceeds; and (3) there is evidence corroborating the accused’s guilt.

1981Jur. 2d Negligence §475, 516 (1971); Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-50 , 207 N.E.2d 305 ; Rinck v. Palos Hills Consolidated High School District No. 230 (1979), 82 Ill.

1981Jur. 2d Negligence §475, 516 (1971); Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-50 , 207 N.E.2d 305 ; Rinck v. Palos Hills Consolidated High School District No. 230 (1979), 82 Ill.

1904In Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401 , a similar question arose, and it was held that evidence tending to prove a similar, but distinct offense from that, for which one is being tried, is not admissible for the purpose of raising an inference or presumption that the prisoner committed the particular act, for which he is on trial. ’ (See also Turley v. People, 188 Ill.. 628.) It is not claimed, and could not be, that the foregoing evidence falls within any exception to the general rule, as above stated.” So, in the case at bar, this jewelry not being any part of the stolen goods, which plaintif

1902In Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401 , a similar question arose, and it was held that evidence tending to prove a similar but distinct offense from that for which one is being tried is not admissible for the purpose of raising an inference or presumption that the prisoner committed the particular act for which he is on trial.” (See, also, Turley v. People, 188 Ill. 628 .) It is not claimed, and could not be, that the foregoing evidence falls within any exception to the g'eneral rule as above stated.

2021Nevertheless, “ ‘[w]here it appears that the comments do not constitute a material factor in the conviction, or that prejudice to the defendant is not the probable result, the verdict will not be disturbed.’ ” Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶ 57 (quoting Williams, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19 ). ¶ 66 In the case at bar, after examining the entirety of the trial court’s comments in the context of the proceeding as a whole, we cannot find that the comments resulted in prejudice to defendant, depriving him of a fair trial.

2021As we have explained, in such circumstances “[a]bsent some reasonable ground, apparent on the record, for exercising a peremptory challenge, the record raises an inference that the challenge was exercised for a racially discriminatory purpose.” Davis, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 908 .

1997The burden then rests upon Respondent to rebut tire presumption of negligence arising from the facts of the case.” Weigers v. State (1988), 40 Ill.

1993App. 3d 49 , 574 N.E.2d 272 .) Here, the court stated on the record that the presumption arose in the case sub judice, and in the court’s docket order, it states only that the presumption was rebutted, leading to the inference that the presumption had been raised.

1991“Res ipsa loquitur is not a separate theory of recovery; rather, it is a rule of evidence which gives use to an inference or presumption of negligence by circumstantial evidence.” (National Tea Co. v. Gaylord Discount Department Stores, Inc. (1981), 100 Ill.

1990(People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497 .) As the prosecutor’s comments raise an inference that defense counsel suborned perjury, and there is no evidence that defense counsel suborned perjury, the comments are improper.

1988(Dyback v. Weber (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 232, 238 ; Prado v. Evanston Hospital (1979), 72 Ill.

1988(People v. Marino (1953), 414 Ill. 445, 451 ; see also People v. Ferguson (1973), 11 Ill.

1988(See People v. Lewerenz (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 295 .) A hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an inference that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous.