distinction between standard in Florida

2024The statute provides that in order for the trial court to permit a claim, the claimant must demonstrate “a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a 4 reasonable basis for recovery of such damages,” while in order to award punitive damages, the trier of fact must find “based on clear and convincing evidence[ ] that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.” Id.

2012Id. at 759 .

2011We reached the conclusion that the error at issue in Jackson could not be preserved under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) because that error was “an error in the sentencing process, not an error in the sentencing order.” 983 So.2d at 574 .

2011We reached the conclusion that the error at issue in Jackson could not be preserved under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) because that error was "an error in the sentencing process, not an error in the sentencing order." 983 So.2d at 574 .

2007Id. at 542 .

2005Id. at 582 .

1998Importantly, unlike the taxpayer in Stafford , Sartori never contended that the County's assessment was "unjust," "arbitrary," "capricious," or "illegal." In State, Department of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A., 654 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the first district also recognized the distinction between a claim of error regarding the classification of property for taxation purposes and a claim of error regarding the exercise of judgment in assessing the value of certain property.

1997In the context of criminal cases, the former "means that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 16 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 2150 n. 10, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [, 12 n. 10] (1978)), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

1997In the context of criminal cases, the former "means that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 16 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 2150 n. 10, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [, 12 n. 10] (1978)), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

1997In the context of criminal cases, the former "means that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 16 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 2150 n. 10, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [, 12 n. 10] (1978)), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

1997In the context of criminal cases, the former "means that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 16 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 2150 n. 10, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [, 12 n. 10] (1978)), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

1994In so ruling, we necessarily reject Bailey's contention that the conduct of Strauss falls within the ambit of cases such as Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169 , 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (all those who, by direct act or by indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the false imprisonment and unlawful detention are liable therefor), Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1969) and Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), so as to render him liable for false arrest.

1994In so ruling, we necessarily reject Bailey's contention that the conduct of Strauss falls within the ambit of cases such as Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169 , 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (all those who, by direct act or by indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the false imprisonment and unlawful detention are liable therefor), Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1969) and Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), so as to render him liable for false arrest.

1994In so ruling, we necessarily reject Bailey's contention that the conduct of Strauss falls within the ambit of cases such as Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169 , 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (all those who, by direct act or by indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the false imprisonment and unlawful detention are liable therefor), Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1969) and Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), so as to render him liable for false arrest.

1994In so ruling, we necessarily reject Bailey's contention that the conduct of Strauss falls within the ambit of cases such as Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169 , 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (all those who, by direct act or by indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the false imprisonment and unlawful detention are liable therefor), Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1969) and Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), so as to render him liable for false arrest.

1994In so ruling, we necessarily reject Bailey's contention that the conduct of Strauss falls within the ambit of cases such as Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169 , 19 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (all those who, by direct act or by indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the false imprisonment and unlawful detention are liable therefor), Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1969) and Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), so as to render him liable for false arrest.

1976Com' n., supra, at 415 n. 2, the following distinction should be noted: "There is a distinction between the standard by which an administrative tribunal measures the proof presented to it, i.e., preponderance of the evidence, and the standard by which a reviewing court measures the correctness of an administrative order under, i.e., competent substantial evidence.

1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim.

1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim.

1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim.

1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim.