distinction between test (Kentucky) · Go Syfert
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distinction between test in Kentucky

9 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1888–2026 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Mondie v. Commonwealthgreen
ky · 2005 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022The Kentucky Supreme Court has clarified the critical distinction between the privilege to use deadly force in the protection of oneself and the privilege of protection against burglary: “KRS 503.080(2)(b)’s privilege of protection against burglary is broader than the privilege to use deadly force in the protection of [one]self [under KRS 503.050], in that under [KRS 503.080(2)(b)] a defendant need not believe such force necessary to protect against death or serious physical injury[.]” Id. at 209-10 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp. green
ky · 2009
1 sentence

2026Id.

12026–2026
Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc. green
ky · 2014
1 sentence

2024The language of KRS 311.6191 clearly indicates that the General Assembly intended to provide qualified protection from liability to parties who furnish information to the Foundation unless a plaintiff affirmatively shows both bad faith and actual malice.4 Toler, 458 S.W.3d at 283 . 4 We recognize that the term “qualified immunity” often refers to the doctrine of “qualified official immunity,” which is the immunity from tort liability afforded to public officers and -20- In its March 6, 2023, order denying Baptist Health’s motion for summary judgment, the Trial Court recognized that Dr. Farmer

12024–2024
New York v. Ferber green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

2004In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), the United States Supreme Court drew a distinction between the test for obscenity defined in Miller v. California, supra, which did not involve sexual exploitation of children, and the test for child pornography: The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller , but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity.

2004In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), the United States Supreme Court drew a distinction between the test for obscenity defined in Miller v. California, supra, which did not involve sexual exploitation of children, and the test for child pornography: The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller , but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity.

12004–2004
Ex parte Spurling's Guardian neutral
kyctapp · 1915
1 sentence

1932Co. v. Roberts, 165 Ky. 299 , 176 S. W. 1139 , the subject was thoroughly considered by this court, and the distinction between waiver and estoppel was compared and clearly made.

11932–1932
Martin v. Cook green
mich · 1894
1 sentence

1919J. 348; Martin v. Cook, supra, 8 R.

11919–1919
Kiernan v. Dutchess County Mutual Insurance green
ny · 1896
2 sentences

1915In Kiernon v. Duchess County Mutual Life Insurance Co., 150 N. Y., 190 , it is said: “The distinction between waiver and estoppel, as applied to the law of insurance, is not in all respects clearly defined.

1915In Kiernon v. Duchess County Mutual Life Insurance Co., 150 N. Y., 190 , it is said: “The distinction between waiver and estoppel, as applied to the law of insurance, is not in all respects clearly defined.

11915–1915
Renoud v. Daskam neutral
conn · 1868
1 sentence

1914The rule that a renewal of the lease is necessary under such a clause is also supported by the following cases: Shamps v. White, 106 Cal., 220 ; Renoud v. Daskam, 34 Conn., 512 ; and the distinction between such a clause and one providing for an extension of the lease is pointed out in Delasham v. Berry, 20 Mich., 292 .

11914–1914
Delashman v. Berry green
mich · 1870
1 sentence

1914The rule that a renewal of the lease is necessary under such a clause is also supported by the following cases: Shamps v. White, 106 Cal., 220 ; Renoud v. Daskam, 34 Conn., 512 ; and the distinction between such a clause and one providing for an extension of the lease is pointed out in Delasham v. Berry, 20 Mich., 292 .

11914–1914
Shamp v. White green
cal · 1895
1 sentence

1914The rule that a renewal of the lease is necessary under such a clause is also supported by the following cases: Shamps v. White, 106 Cal., 220 ; Renoud v. Daskam, 34 Conn., 512 ; and the distinction between such a clause and one providing for an extension of the lease is pointed out in Delasham v. Berry, 20 Mich., 292 .

11914–1914
Hart v. Commonwealth neutral
kyctapp · 1887
1 sentence

1888The competency of such evidence has been expressly recognized by this court in Hart v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky., 77 .

11888–1888

Where else courts name it

IL 64 (1889–2025) PA 60 (1902–2026) TX 54 (1913–2025) CA 42 (1921–2023) NY 37 (1852–2024) MI 28 (1912–2024) MD 23 (1947–2020) FL 20 (1963–2025) NJ 20 (1933–2022) MO 20 (1907–2022) CT 20 (1895–2021) WA 17 (1900–2026) WI 16 (1905–2023) IA 15 (1901–2014) AL 15 (1912–2017) CO 15 (1915–2026) GA 15 (1909–2018) LA 15 (1934–2017) MN 14 (1900–2017) KS 14 (1905–2018) SC 13 (1919–2019) OR 12 (1915–2022) AR 12 (1911–2008) IN 12 (1902–2010) NM 11 (1941–2021) OH 10 (1939–2026) NC 10 (1903–2024) UT 10 (1934–2025) WV 9 (1950–2024) KY 9 (1888–2026) WY 9 (1927–2019) AZ 8 (1965–2026) TN 8 (1930–2017) MA 8 (1851–2010) DC 8 (1975–2026) MS 8 (1962–2016) NE 8 (1943–2024) DE 7 (2013–2026) ME 6 (1905–2020) AK 6 (1978–2024) HI 6 (1996–2024) ND 5 (1966–2009) OK 4 (1962–2000) NV 4 (1968–2014) VT 4 (1930–2025) MT 3 (1899–2008) NH 3 (1990–2018) RI 3 (1918–1983) ID 2 (1933–1986) VA 2 (1996–2010) SD 2 (1934–1934) VI 2 (2015–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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