6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlsongreen1 sentence2024Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 760 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2009)). 31 Strong I, 435 P.3d at 875 . 32 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (2006) (citing Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997)). 33 Strong initially claimed that the superior court “mistakenly held that settlement and stipulation dismissing the 2010 lawsuit with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits.” But he later conceded that the settlement agreement “was a final judgment as to the [Williamses].” Therefore we do not address th | 1 | 1 |
Beal v. Bealgreen1 sentence2024Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 760 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2009)). 31 Strong I, 435 P.3d at 875 . 32 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (2006) (citing Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997)). 33 Strong initially claimed that the superior court “mistakenly held that settlement and stipulation dismissing the 2010 lawsuit with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits.” But he later conceded that the settlement agreement “was a final judgment as to the [Williamses].” Therefore we do not address th | 1 | 1 |
Plumber v. University of Alaska Anchoragegreen1 sentence2024Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 760 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2009)). 31 Strong I, 435 P.3d at 875 . 32 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (2006) (citing Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997)). 33 Strong initially claimed that the superior court “mistakenly held that settlement and stipulation dismissing the 2010 lawsuit with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits.” But he later conceded that the settlement agreement “was a final judgment as to the [Williamses].” Therefore we do not address th | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.green1 sentence2024Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 760 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2009)). 31 Strong I, 435 P.3d at 875 . 32 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (2006) (citing Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997)). 33 Strong initially claimed that the superior court “mistakenly held that settlement and stipulation dismissing the 2010 lawsuit with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits.” But he later conceded that the settlement agreement “was a final judgment as to the [Williamses].” Therefore we do not address th | 1 | 1 |
Andrew v. Stategreen1 sentence1986The distinction between waiver and forfeiture, in the context of Alaska R.Crim.P. 45, is discussed at length in Andrew v. State, 694 P.2d 168, 172-80 (Alaska App.1985) (Singleton, J., concurring), petition for hearing granted (Alaska, May 6, 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Engle v. Isaacgreen2 sentences1982See also Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801 (1982) (extending the "cause and prejudice" requirement to post-conviction relief applications raising issues of constitutional error that affect the truth-finding function of trial). [2] See United States v. Frady, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding plain error inapplicable in post-conviction relief proceedings under federal law). 1982See also Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801 (1982) (extending the "cause and prejudice" requirement to post-conviction relief applications raising issues of constitutional error that affect the truth-finding function of trial). [2] See United States v. Frady, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding plain error inapplicable in post-conviction relief proceedings under federal law). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fradygreen2 sentences1982See also Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801 (1982) (extending the "cause and prejudice" requirement to post-conviction relief applications raising issues of constitutional error that affect the truth-finding function of trial). [2] See United States v. Frady, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding plain error inapplicable in post-conviction relief proceedings under federal law). 1982See also Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801 (1982) (extending the "cause and prejudice" requirement to post-conviction relief applications raising issues of constitutional error that affect the truth-finding function of trial). [2] See United States v. Frady, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding plain error inapplicable in post-conviction relief proceedings under federal law). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1978"The diminished capacity doctrine is based on the theory that while an accused may not have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of his offense, sufficient to absolve him totally of criminal responsibility, the accused's mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease to such an extent that he did not possess a specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense." (footnote omitted) Johnson v. State, 511 P.2d 118, 124 (Alaska 1973). 1978“The diminished capacity doctrine is based on the theory that while an accused may not have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of his offense, sufficient to absolve him totally of criminal responsibility, the accused’s mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease to such an extent that he did not possess a specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense.” (footnote omitted) Johnson v. State, 511 P.2d 118, 124 (Alaska 1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strong v. Williams
green
1 sentence2024Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 760 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2009)). 31 Strong I, 435 P.3d at 875 . 32 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 821 (2006) (citing Plumber v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 936 P.2d 163, 166 (Alaska 1997)). 33 Strong initially claimed that the superior court “mistakenly held that settlement and stipulation dismissing the 2010 lawsuit with prejudice was a final judgment on the merits.” But he later conceded that the settlement agreement “was a final judgment as to the [Williamses].” Therefore we do not address th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1988A true waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 1988A true waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Lemon v. State
green
2 sentences1982The distinction between waiver and forfeiture is discussed in Lemon v. State, 654 P.2d 277 (Alaska App., October 29, 1982). 1982The distinction between waiver and forfeiture is discussed in Lemon v. State, 654 P.2d 277 (Alaska App., October 29, 1982). [1] See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Wainwright v. Sykes
green
2 sentences1982The distinction between waiver and forfeiture is discussed in Lemon v. State, 654 P.2d 277 (Alaska App., October 29, 1982). [1] See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 1982The distinction between waiver and forfeiture is discussed in Lemon v. State, 654 P.2d 277 (Alaska App., October 29, 1982). [1] See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Collison v. State
green
2 sentences1979Green, 2 A.2d 97 (Del. 1938), wherein it was held that a provision authorizing the governor to remove members of the State Industrial Accident Board "with or without cause" was upheld because of the absence of a constitutional requirement that a "term" be prescribed for the office. 1979Green, 2 A.2d 97 (Del.1938), wherein it was held that a provision authorizing the governor to remove members of the State Industrial Accident Board “with or without cause” was upheld because of the absence of a constitutional requirement that a “term” be prescribed for the office. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.