distinction between rule in California

1948(Emphasis added.) “In the ease of Karry v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. 281, 284-286 [ 122 P. 475 , 128 P. 760 ], the distinction between error in the exercise of jurisdiction and a judgment rendered in excess of jurisdiction is discussed.

1948(Emphasis added.) “In the ease of Karry v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. 281, 284-286 [ 122 P. 475 , 128 P. 760 ], the distinction between error in the exercise of jurisdiction and a judgment rendered in excess of jurisdiction is discussed.

2018To hold otherwise would fail "to recognize a distinction between a requirement for a reference to the instrument creating the power and a reference to the power itself, a distinction expressly made in the statutory provisions." ( Eddy , supra , 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 299 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 521 .) The Legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that specific reference to the power or to the instrument are independent means by which a donor can restrict a donee's exercise. ( Rubio v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 [" ' "The plain and ordinary meaning of t

2018To hold otherwise would fail "to recognize a distinction between a requirement for a reference to the instrument creating the power and a reference to the power itself, a distinction expressly made in the statutory provisions." ( Eddy , supra , 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 299 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 521 .) The Legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that specific reference to the power or to the instrument are independent means by which a donor can restrict a donee's exercise. ( Rubio v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 [" ' "The plain and ordinary meaning of t

2023Code, § 2778, subd. 2; Alberts, supra, at p. 899 [“[L]iability for the loss does not arise until the debt has been paid and the indemnitee has thus suffered a loss”].) In sum, there is a distinction between when a claim begins to accrue for what the Civil Code calls “an indemnity against liability” (Civ.

2020(See, e.g., Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 43 [“The NOD plays a crucial role in determining the period during which CEQA challenges may be brought.”]; Stockton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 505 [a properly filed and facially valid NOE triggers the 35-day period for challenging agency action].) 12 Cal.4th at p. 48; see also Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1591 .) In Stockton, the Court described the distinction between a challenge to a decision under CEQA and a challenge to the validity of an NOE: “Here we must decide

2020(See, e.g., Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 43 [“The NOD plays a crucial role in determining the period during which CEQA challenges may be brought.”]; Stockton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 505 [a properly filed and facially valid NOE triggers the 35-day period for challenging agency action].) 12 Cal.4th at p. 48; see also Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1591 .) In Stockton, the Court described the distinction between a challenge to a decision under CEQA and a challenge to the validity of an NOE: “Here we must decide

2020(See, e.g., Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 43 [“The NOD plays a crucial role in determining the period during which CEQA challenges may be brought.”]; Stockton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 505 [a properly filed and facially valid NOE triggers the 35-day period for challenging agency action].) 12 Cal.4th at p. 48; see also Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1591 .) In Stockton, the Court described the distinction between a challenge to a decision under CEQA and a challenge to the validity of an NOE: “Here we must decide

2020(See, e.g., Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 43 [“The NOD plays a crucial role in determining the period during which CEQA challenges may be brought.”]; Stockton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 505 [a properly filed and facially valid NOE triggers the 35-day period for challenging agency action].) 12 Cal.4th at p. 48; see also Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1591 .) In Stockton, the Court described the distinction between a challenge to a decision under CEQA and a challenge to the validity of an NOE: “Here we must decide

2018When used in a statute the word 'or' indicates an intention to designate separate, disjunctive categories" ' "]; see also *530 Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 319 , 327, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 ; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987 , 1008, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 403 .) Hildis's subtrust itself does not define the phrase "specifically referring to ... this ... power of appointment," and the parties do not point to evidence of Hildis's intent on the matter. 8 Nor did the Legislature define the term "specific reference" or the word "specific" in section 632.

2018When used in a statute the word 'or' indicates an intention to designate separate, disjunctive categories" ' "]; see also *530 Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 319 , 327, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 ; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987 , 1008, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 403 .) Hildis's subtrust itself does not define the phrase "specifically referring to ... this ... power of appointment," and the parties do not point to evidence of Hildis's intent on the matter. 8 Nor did the Legislature define the term "specific reference" or the word "specific" in section 632.

2016No Genuine Issue of Material Fact To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. [Citation.]” (Furtado, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 744 .) An important distinction between this claim and a discrimination claim is that “‘the plaintiff proves he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sough

2016Code,] § 12926, subd. (o); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7293.9, subd. (a) . . . .)” (Furtado, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 , italics omitted.) When an employee is unable to return to his or her existing job, the employer has an affirmative duty to determine if it has another available position for which the employee is qualified.

2015(Id. at p. 577.) The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party cannot “impliedly waive mediation confidentiality through litigation conduct” and therefore that “mediation confidentiality is to be strictly enforced” absent “express waiver or where due process is implicated.” (Id. at pp. 582, 585-588.) In attempting to apply Simmons to the instant case, Grasshopper blurs the distinction between waiver, referring to “a party’s intentional relinquishment or 16 abandonment of a known right or privilege,” and forfeiture, referring to “the loss of a right resulting from the failure to assert it in

2015Summarizing O’Bryan , we said that “generally” a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that “ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.” ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835, italics added.) At the same time, we said that “certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,” and that “the distinction between reversible and non-reversibl

2015Summarizing O’Bryan , we said that “generally” a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that “ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.” ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835, italics added.) At the same time, we said that “certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,” and that “the distinction between reversible and non-reversibl

2015Summarizing O’Bryan, we said that ―generally‖ a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that ―ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.‖ (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835 , italics added.) At the same time, we said that ―certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,‖ and 5 that ―the distinction between reversible and nonreversibl

2015Summarizing O’Bryan , we said that “generally” a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that “ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.” ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835, italics added.) At the same time, we said that “certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,” and that “the distinction between reversible and non-reversibl

2015Summarizing O’Bryan , we said that “generally” a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that “ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.” ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835, italics added.) At the same time, we said that “certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,” and that “the distinction between reversible and non-reversibl

2015Summarizing O’Bryan , we said that “generally” a showing of prejudice is required for reversal and that “ordinarily where the result appears just, and it further appears that such result would have been reached if the error had not been committed, a reversal will not be ordered.” ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835, italics added.) At the same time, we said that “certain fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial,” and that “the distinction between reversible and non-reversibl

2011(Battuello, at p. 847, superseded by statute as stated in Stewart, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1522, fn. 6 .) In Battuello , which preceded the enactment of section 366.3 and relied on section 366.2, the court held that there is a distinction between the doctrine of equitable estoppel, on the one hand, and the tolling or extension of the statute of limitations, on the other hand.

2008(Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 989, fn. 9 [“In any event, the issue of entity immunity is not before us in this case, and we do not decide it.”].) However, as DeJung points out, the Caldwell court emphasized, in dictum, the distinction between the immunity provided for by section 820.2, which eliminates any potential vicarious liability of a public entity, and the potential for direct liability of the employer as an entity.

2007Absent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution"]; Garner v. United States (1976) 424 U.S. 648, 653 , 96 S.Ct. 1178 , 47 L.Ed.2d 370 , italics added ["the [Fifth Amendment] privilege protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the right to remain silent absent immunity "].) The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the two principles are in some respects "coextensive." ( Chavez v. Martinez, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 769-770, 123 S.Ct. 1994 .) However, it has steadfastly refused to