distinction between claim in Ohio

2026State v. Findler, 2021-Ohio-449, ¶ 20 ; State v. Loudermilk, 2017- Ohio-7378, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.).

2021However, this court has recognized a distinction between a claim of judicial bias relating to “the formal process used to remove a judge from hearing a case because the judge has an interest in the matter or is prejudiced in favor of one party,” and a claim relating to “when a judge’s conduct in overseeing a case prevents a party from receiving a fair trial.” See State v. Loudermilk, 2017-Ohio-7378 , 96 N.E.3d 1037 , ¶ 17 7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (1st Dist.).

2021However, this court has recognized a distinction between a claim of judicial bias relating to “the formal process used to remove a judge from hearing a case because the judge has an interest in the matter or is prejudiced in favor of one party,” and a claim relating to “when a judge’s conduct in overseeing a case prevents a party from receiving a fair trial.” See State v. Loudermilk, 2017-Ohio-7378 , 96 N.E.3d 1037 , ¶ 17 7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (1st Dist.).

2018Thus, in Argabrite v. Neer , 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374 , 75 N.E.3d 161 , the Ohio Supreme Court articulated the distinction between immunity and non-liability.

2018Thus, in Argabrite v. Neer , 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374 , 75 N.E.3d 161 , the Ohio Supreme Court articulated the distinction between immunity and non-liability.

2016(Emphasis added.) 2015-Ohio-125 , 26 N.E.3d 879 , ¶ 4 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} The majority chides that it has not blurred the distinction between immunity and proximate cause but that the no-proximate-cause rule “blurs those distinctions by incorporating concepts related to duty and breach * * * into the question of proximate cause.” Majority opinion at ¶ 10.

2008By contrast, an equitable restitution claim was one in which “money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” Id. {¶ 9} The Supreme Court in Great-West recognized a distinction between a claim for hinds due under a contract and a claim for funds to which a party is statutorily entitled.

2008In particular, the court noted that “ ‘[a] claim for money due and owing under a contract is “quintessentially an action at law.” ’ ” 534 U.S. at 210 , 122 S.Ct. 708 , 151 L.Ed.2d 635 , quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells (C.A.7, 2000), 213 F.3d 398, 401 , quoting Hudson View II Assoc. v. Gooden (1996), 222 A.D.2d 163, 168 , 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 .

2008In particular, the court noted that “ ‘[a] claim for money due and owing under a contract is “quintessentially an action at law.” ’ ” 534 U.S. at 210 , 122 S.Ct. 708 , 151 L.Ed.2d 635 , quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells (C.A.7, 2000), 213 F.3d 398, 401 , quoting Hudson View II Assoc. v. Gooden (1996), 222 A.D.2d 163, 168 , 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 .

2008In particular, the court noted that “ ‘[a] claim for money due and owing under a contract is “quintessentially an action at law.” ’ ” 534 U.S. at 210 , 122 S.Ct. 708 , 151 L.Ed.2d 635 , quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells (C.A.7, 2000), 213 F.3d 398, 401 , quoting Hudson View II Assoc. v. Gooden (1996), 222 A.D.2d 163, 168 , 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 .

2008In particular, the court noted that “ ‘[a] claim for money due and owing under a contract is “quintessentially an action at law.” ’ ” 534 U.S. at 210 , 122 S.Ct. 708 , 151 L.Ed.2d 635 , quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells (C.A.7, 2000), 213 F.3d 398, 401 , quoting Hudson View II Assoc. v. Gooden (1996), 222 A.D.2d 163, 168 , 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 .

1999In Salem, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Regulation 52 is not unconstitutionally vague, and that interpreting Regulation 52 to prohibit liquor permit holders from allowing females to dance topless, with only pasties covering the nipple and areola portion of their breasts, did not violate the right to free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.

1991Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 , 102 S.Ct. at 2488 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 80-81 , discussing the presumption of vindictiveness, states: “ * * * Motives are complex and difficult to prove.

1991Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 , 102 S.Ct. at 2488 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 80-81 , discussing the presumption of vindictiveness, states: “ * * * Motives are complex and difficult to prove.

1985Penney Outlet Store (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 463, at 463-464 , stated: “At the outset, from the arguments of counsel, the distinction between the test to be applied upon a motion for a directed verdict and that to be applied upon a motion for summary judgment must be made clear.

1939We think the language used in State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St., 489 , 83 N. E., 904 , and subsequently quoted in Neiswander v. Brickner, 116 Ohio St., 249 , 156 N. E., 138 , is persuasive, and, although not there applied to the *364 wrongful death statute, is applicable to the wrongful death statute under consideration in this case.

1939We think the language used in State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St., 489 , 83 N. E., 904 , and subsequently quoted in Neiswander v. Brickner, 116 Ohio St., 249 , 156 N. E., 138 , is persuasive, and, although not there applied to the *364 wrongful death statute, is applicable to the wrongful death statute under consideration in this case.