10 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1903–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2020Compare id. at 329 , 747 S.E.2d at 655 (noting that a motion to dismiss based on perfect self-defense requires the trial court to consider “whether the State has presented substantial evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, would be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant did not act in [perfect] self-defense”), and State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79 , 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”), with Mumma, 372 N.C. at 241 , 827 S.E.2 2020Compare id. at 329 , 747 S.E.2d at 655 (noting that a motion to dismiss based on perfect self-defense requires the trial court to consider “whether the State has presented substantial evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, would be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant did not act in [perfect] self-defense”), and State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79 , 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”), with Mumma, 372 N.C. at 241 , 827 S.E.2 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mummagreen2 sentences2020Compare id. at 329 , 747 S.E.2d at 655 (noting that a motion to dismiss based on perfect self-defense requires the trial court to consider “whether the State has presented substantial evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, would be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant did not act in [perfect] self-defense”), and State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79 , 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”), with Mumma, 372 N.C. at 241 , 827 S.E.2 2020Compare id. at 329 , 747 S.E.2d at 655 (noting that a motion to dismiss based on perfect self-defense requires the trial court to consider “whether the State has presented substantial evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, would be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant did not act in [perfect] self-defense”), and State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79 , 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”), with Mumma, 372 N.C. at 241 , 827 S.E.2 | 2 | 2 |
St. Augustine School v. Jill Underlygreen1 sentence2024Often it will be, as a claim and its corresponding causes of action will typically accrue at the same time: A claim must support a cause of action in order to provide a remedy, see id. at 352, and the accrual date is generally the date of the alleged injury, see Arendas, 217 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc.green2 sentences2024We often refer to res judicata as “claim preclusion.” See Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 , 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004). 2024We often refer to res judicata as “claim preclusion.” See Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 , 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. . Austin
neutral
2 sentences1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, "if you believe all the evidence," might be open to criticism ( S. v. Loftin , 186 N.C. 205 , 119 S.E. 209 ; S. v. Green , 134 N.C. 658 , 46 S.E. 761 ; S. v. Barrett , 123 N.C. 753 , 31 S.E. 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. 1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
State v. . Barrett
neutral
2 sentences1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, "if you believe all the evidence," might be open to criticism ( S. v. Loftin , 186 N.C. 205 , 119 S.E. 209 ; S. v. Green , 134 N.C. 658 , 46 S.E. 761 ; S. v. Barrett , 123 N.C. 753 , 31 S.E. 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. 1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
State v. Green.
neutral
2 sentences1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. 1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
State v. . Loftin
neutral
2 sentences1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. 1939While the words used by the judge in charging the jury, “if you believe all the evidence,” might be open to criticism (S. v. Loftin, 186 N. C., 205 , 119 S. E., 209 ; S. v. Green, 134 N. C., 658 , 46 S. E., 761 ; S. v. Barrett, 123 N. C., 753 , 31 S. E., 731 ), this inadvertence was not prejudicial. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
Arendas Ex Rel. Arendas v. Nc High School Athletic Ass'n
green
1 sentence2024Often it will be, as a claim and its corresponding causes of action will typically accrue at the same time: A claim must support a cause of action in order to provide a remedy, see id. at 352, and the accrual date is generally the date of the alleged injury, see Arendas, 217 N.C. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gause v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr.
green
1 sentence2017Ctr. , --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 795 S.E.2d 411 , 415 (2016) (citing N.C. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Meads v. North Carolina Department of Agriculture
green
2 sentences2014IR 94-128, IR94- 151, IR94-155, 349 N.C. 656 , 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998) [hereinafter Meads]; (LegalZoom’s Reply Br. 10.) There is a distinction between a challenge that an agency has applied a statute in an unconstitutional manner and a facial constitutional challenge to the statute itself. 2014IR 94-128, IR94- 151, IR94-155, 349 N.C. 656 , 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998) [hereinafter Meads]; (LegalZoom’s Reply Br. 10.) There is a distinction between a challenge that an agency has applied a statute in an unconstitutional manner and a facial constitutional challenge to the statute itself. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cobia v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
green
2 sentences1967R., 188 N.C. 487, 125 S.E. 18 , and in Horton v. R. 1967R., 188 N.C. 487, 125 S.E. 18 , and in Horton v. R. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Gill v. . Weaver
neutral
2 sentences1928In Gill v. Weaver, 21 N. C., 41 , the facts were that the testator had given his property to his wife for her sole use until his youngest living child should be of age, provided his wife lived. 1928In Gill v. Weaver , 21 N.C. 41 , the facts were that the testator had given his property to his wife for her sole use until his youngest living child should be of age, provided his wife lived. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Cogdell v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad
green
1 sentence1903The distinction between a presumption of law and an inference of fact is clearly pointed out by Walker J., in Cogdell v. Railroad, 132 N. C., 852 . | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.