13 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tierce v. Gilliamgreen2 sentences1997See In re Horton’s Estate, 5 N.J.Super. 518 , 68 A.2d 658, 658 (Ch.Div.1949), (the Superior Court of New Jersey construed a will leaving the residue of the testator’s property to “such of my nieces and nephews that shall survive me” as including grandnieces and grandnephews because extrinsic evidence showed testator did not draw a distinction between nieces and nephews and grandnieces and grandnephews; therefore her true intent was to include them as residuary beneficiaries.) See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2458 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (drawing a distinction between the standard for construction 1997Div.1949), (the Superior Court of New Jersey construed a will leaving the residue of the testator's property to "such of my nieces and nephews that shall survive me" as including grandnieces and grandnephews because extrinsic evidence showed testator did not draw a distinction between nieces and nephews and grandnieces and grandnephews; therefore her true intent was to include them as residuary beneficiaries.) See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2458 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (drawing a distinction between the standard for construction of contracts, that is, the "mutual standard of parties to a bilater | 2 | 2 |
Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas Horizontal Property Regimegreen2 sentences2019"Where an implied waiver is involved, the distinction between waiver and estoppel is close, and sometimes the doctrines merge into each other with almost imperceptible gradations, so that it is difficult to determine the exact point where one doctrine ends and the other begins." Janasik , 307 S.C. at 344 , 415 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting 28 Am. 2019"Where an implied waiver is involved, the distinction between waiver and estoppel is close, and sometimes the doctrines merge into each other with almost imperceptible gradations, so that it is difficult to determine the exact point where one doctrine ends and the other begins." Janasik , 307 S.C. at 344 , 415 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting 28 Am. | 1 | 4 |
In Re Hortongreen2 sentences1997See In re Horton’s Estate, 5 N.J.Super. 518 , 68 A.2d 658, 658 (Ch.Div.1949), (the Superior Court of New Jersey construed a will leaving the residue of the testator’s property to “such of my nieces and nephews that shall survive me” as including grandnieces and grandnephews because extrinsic evidence showed testator did not draw a distinction between nieces and nephews and grandnieces and grandnephews; therefore her true intent was to include them as residuary beneficiaries.) See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2458 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (drawing a distinction between the standard for construction 1997See In re Horton’s Estate, 5 N.J.Super. 518 , 68 A.2d 658, 658 (Ch.Div.1949), (the Superior Court of New Jersey construed a will leaving the residue of the testator’s property to “such of my nieces and nephews that shall survive me” as including grandnieces and grandnephews because extrinsic evidence showed testator did not draw a distinction between nieces and nephews and grandnieces and grandnephews; therefore her true intent was to include them as residuary beneficiaries.) See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2458 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (drawing a distinction between the standard for construction | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parker v. Parker
green
2 sentences2009This Court has recognized that “the distinction between waiver and estoppel is close, and sometimes the doctrines merge into each other with almost imperceptible gradations.” Id. (citation omitted); Strickland, supra. We find the Agreement here constitutes a waiver of the right to use adultery as a bar to alimony. 2007Nevertheless, this Court has acknowledged that "the distinction between waiver and estoppel is close, and sometimes the doctrines merge into each other with almost imperceptible gradations." Parker, 313 S.C. at 487 , 443 S.E.2d at 391 (quoting Janasik, 307 S.C. at 344 , 415 S.E.2d at 388 ). | 2 | 2007–2009 |
State v. Littlejohn
green
2 sentences1979The distinction between the test to be applied by a court and that to be applied by a jury in measuring the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is stated in State v. Littlejohn, 228 S. C. 324, 89 S. E. (2d) 924 (1955). 1974The distinction between the test to be applied by a court and that to be applied by a jury in measuring the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case is well stated in State v. Littlejohn, 228 S. C. 324, 89 S. E. (2d) 924 , and need not be restated here. | 2 | 1974–1979 |
Town of Duncan v. State Budget & Control Board, Division of Insurance Services
green
2 sentences2001Rather, pursuant to Town of Duncan, 326 S.C. 6 , 482 S.E.2d 768 and McPherson, 310 S.C. 316 , 426 S.E.2d 770 , we look to the terms of the policy itself to determine coverage. 2001Rather, pursuant to Town of Duncan, 326 S.C. 6 , 482 S.E.2d 768 and McPherson, 310 S.C. 316 , 426 S.E.2d 770 , we look to the terms of the policy itself to determine coverage. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McPherson Ex Rel. McPherson v. Michigan Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2001Rather, pursuant to Town of Duncan, 326 S.C. 6 , 482 S.E.2d 768 and McPherson, 310 S.C. 316 , 426 S.E.2d 770 , we look to the terms of the policy itself to determine coverage. 2001Rather, pursuant to Town of Duncan, 326 S.C. 6 , 482 S.E.2d 768 and McPherson, 310 S.C. 316 , 426 S.E.2d 770 , we look to the terms of the policy itself to determine coverage. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Edwards
red
2 sentences1996In State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272 , 379 S.E. (2d) 888 (1989), our Supreme Court noted the distinction between the test a judge must use in deciding a motion for directed verdict versus the standard to be charged the jury for use in its deliberation. 1996In State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272 , 379 S.E. (2d) 888 (1989), our Supreme Court noted the distinction between the test a judge must use in deciding a motion for directed verdict versus the standard to be charged the jury for use in its deliberation. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Godinez v. Moran
green
2 sentences1993In addition ... a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutional rights is know *424 ing and voluntary.” Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2687 . 2 While there is no distinction in levels of competency throughout the trial process, there is a distinction between the standard for competency and the standard to determine a knowing and voluntary waiver. 1993In addition ... a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutional rights is know *424 ing and voluntary.” Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2687 . 2 While there is no distinction in levels of competency throughout the trial process, there is a distinction between the standard for competency and the standard to determine a knowing and voluntary waiver. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lewis v. Pope
green
1 sentence1919The distinction between presumption of law and of fact is pointed out in the case of Lewis v. Pope, 86 S. C. 285, 68 S. E. 680 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.