15 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jefferson County v. Reachgreen2 sentences2011In Jefferson County v. Reach, 368 So.2d 250, 252 (Ala.1978), the supreme court stated: “The distinction between a claim ex contractu and one ex delicto is found in the nature of the grievance. 1998In Jefferson County v. Reach , 368 So.2d 250 , 252 (Ala. 1978), this Court explained: "The distinction between a claim ex contractu and one ex delicto is found in the nature of the grievance. | 2 | 3 |
Ex Parte GCgreen2 sentences2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E 2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte JPgreen2 sentences2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E 2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex | 2 | 2 |
Matter of F.W.green2 sentences2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E 2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex | 2 | 2 |
Llm v. Sfgreen2 sentences2005This court has consistently recognized that trial courts must observe a distinction between the standard to be applied in dependency proceedings (the best-interest standard) ( see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-71(a)(4); and L.L.M. v. S.F., 919 So.2d 307, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) ("Because this is a dependency case, the juvenile court needed to determine only if transferring legal custody of the child to the father was in the best interest of the child. . . . 2005This court has consistently recognized that trial courts must observe a distinction between the standard to be applied in dependency proceedings (the best-interest standard) (see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-71(a)(4); and L.L.M. v. S.F., 919 So.2d 307, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (“Because this is a dependency case, the juvenile court needed to determine only if transferring legal custody of the child to the father was in the best interest of the child.... | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Piercegreen1 sentence2013In Ex parte Pierce, 851 So.2d 606, 613 (Ala.2000), this Court confirmed the distinction between a claim for relief under Rule 32.1(e) and one under Rule 3 2.1 (a): “Pierce was not required to prove that this information meets the elements of ‘newly discovered material facts’ under Rule 32.1(e). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw. Net Corp.
green
1 sentence2017This Court has discussed the distinction between the standard of review for a ruling based on Rule 12(c) and one based on Rule 12(b)(6) as follows: "In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp. , 269 F.Supp.2d 942 , 947 (S.D. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Westbrook v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1986In Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966), the Supreme Court implied that there is a distinction between the test for competence to stand trial and the test for competence to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, with the latter standard being more stringent. 1986In Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966), the Supreme Court implied that there is a distinction between the test for competence to stand trial and the test for competence to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, with the latter standard being more stringent. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Odom v. State
neutral
2 sentences1971We respectfully urge that appellant’s failure to except to the trial court’s reversibly erroneous oral charge should not constitute a waiver chargeable to appellant.” We do not consider that Odom v. State, 44 Ala.App. 534 , 215 So.2d 596 , announced a novel principle. 1971We respectfully urge that appellant’s failure to except to the trial court’s reversibly erroneous oral charge should not constitute a waiver chargeable to appellant.” We do not consider that Odom v. State, 44 Ala.App. 534 , 215 So.2d 596 , announced a novel principle. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Belt Automobile Indemnity Ass'n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1962This distinction appears in Belt Automobile Indemnity Ass’n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply Co., 211 Ala. 84 , 99 So. 787 , in an action on an automobile liability policy. 1962This distinction appears in Belt Automobile Indemnity Ass’n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply Co., 211 Ala. 84 , 99 So. 787 , in an action on an automobile liability policy. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Crowder v. Doe ex dem. Tennessee C. I. & R. R. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1942As pointed out in Crowder v. Doe, 162 Ala. 151 , 50 So. 230 , 136 Am.St.Rep. 17 , there is a distinction between a claim of title, and color of title. 1942As pointed out in Crowder v. Doe, 162 Ala. 151 , 50 So. 230 , 136 Am.St.Rep. 17 , there is a distinction between a claim of title, and color of title. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Commissioner
neutral
2 sentences1938Of course, as to any such statutory regulation there may be shown a wilful violation by a showing that *576 the employee was informed and knew of the statute, as illustrated by the case of Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Com’r, 112 W.Va. 203 , 164 S.E. 27 . 1938Of course, as to any such statutory regulation there may be shown a wilful violation by a showing that *576 the employee was informed and knew of the statute, as illustrated by the case of Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Com’r, 112 W.Va. 203 , 164 S.E. 27 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co.
green
2 sentences1938In the King Case, supra, as well as other authorities (Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co., 217 Mich. 508 , 187 N.W. 352 , 23 A.L.R. 1153 ), there appears to be made a distinction between the violation of a statutory regulation as to the operation of a mine and conduct involving moral blame and of a criminal nature. 1938In the King Case, supra, as well as other authorities (Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co., 217 Mich. 508 , 187 N.W. 352 , 23 A.L.R. 1153 ), there appears to be made a distinction between the violation of a statutory regulation as to the operation of a mine and conduct involving moral blame and of a criminal nature. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
State v. Conner
neutral
1 sentence1921I wish to conclude by a reference to State v. Conner, supra, wherein Judge Stone makes the distinction between the defense of bona fide purchase without notice and that of adverse possession. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Stubbs v. Houston
green
1 sentence1916Treating an instruction to the jury on the trial of the contest of a will this court, in Stubbs v. Houston, supra, condemned the proposal that capacity to transact ordinary business was a standard of mental capacity to execute a will, and concluded the discussion with this manifestly sound expression: “Certainly an incapacity to transact the ordinary business of life would afford ground for an argument to the jury, hut it cannot, consistently with reason or law, be made the standard of testamentary capacity.” This distinction between a standard fixed by law and evidence tending to prove that t | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Paris v. State
green
1 sentence1912The distinction between the principle settled here, and that in Paris’s Case, 36 Ala. 232 , is fully pointed out in Spicer v. State, and nothing need be added on that point. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.