distinction between claim in Kansas

2002Co. v. Cassell Truck Lines, 195 Kan. 51, 55 , 402 P.2d 782 [1965]). *865 “ “When considering the effect of the running of the statute of hmitations this court is committed to the general doctrine, almost universally recognized by the courts and textwriters, that there is a substantial distinction between a claim asserted as a pure defense and one where affirmative relief is sought.

2002Co. v. Cassell Truck Lines, 195 Kan. 51, 55 , 402 P.2d 782 [1965]). *865 “ “When considering the effect of the running of the statute of hmitations this court is committed to the general doctrine, almost universally recognized by the courts and textwriters, that there is a substantial distinction between a claim asserted as a pure defense and one where affirmative relief is sought.

1992One of the arguments raised by defendants was that “plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by way of administrative proceedings under G.S. 1949, 79-1702.” 183 Kan. at 293 .

1992One of the arguments raised by defendants was that “plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by *370 way of administrative proceedings under G.S. 1949, 79-1702.” 183 Kan. at 293 .

2018Highly summarized, the panel noted a distinction between defense counsel's *892 tactical decisions to request instructions and defense counsel's inadvertence in requesting constitutionally deficient instructions, noting the latter, if proven, would not be subject to the invited error rule. 48 Kan.

2018App. 2d at 547 , 293 P.3d 787 .

2012App. 2d 522, 530-33 , 263 P.3d 852 (2011) (discussing efforts by the United States Supreme Court to clarify the distinction between claim-processing rules and jurisdictional limitations and applying the “ ‘administrable bright line’ ” rule from Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 , 126 S. Ct. 1235 , 163 L.

2012App. 2d 522, 530-33 , 263 P.3d 852 (2011) (discussing efforts by the United States Supreme Court to clarify the distinction between claim-processing rules and jurisdictional limitations and applying the “ ‘administrable bright line’ ” rule from Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 , 126 S. Ct. 1235 , 163 L.

2012App. 2d 522, 530-33 , 263 P.3d 852 (2011) (discussing efforts by the United States Supreme Court to clarify the distinction between claim-processing rules and jurisdictional limitations and applying the “ ‘administrable bright line’ ” rule from Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 , 126 S. Ct. 1235 , 163 L.

2008The court, however, noted it "has generally not drawn a distinction between the analysis of whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under the state constitution and whether a sentence is cruel and unusual under the federal Constitution." 272 Kan. at 1047, 40 P.3d 139 .

2008The court also rejected Kleypas' argument that the historical record behind the adoption of ง 9 indicated the framers deliberately chose the phrase "cruel or unusual" over "cruel and unusual," justifying a more broad interpretation. 272 Kan. at 1047-48, 40 P.3d 139 .

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

2001The three cases cited by Kleypas and amicus curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 911 (1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); and Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989), are claimed to show that Instruction No. 8 (unanimous beyond a reasonable doubt burden on the State as to aggravating circumstances), Instruction No. 12, and Instruction No. 15 (verdict form provision discussed in issue No. 36) emphasize the requirement of unanimity regarding the aggravat

1984(See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590 , 313 P.2d 227 ; Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 .) Assumption of risk and contributory negligence being separate and distinct concepts in this state, the former remains a complete bar to recovery in cases such as here involved.” 1 Kan.

1984(See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590 , 313 P.2d 227 ; Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 .) Assumption of risk and contributory negligence being separate and distinct concepts in this state, the former remains a complete bar to recovery in cases such as here involved.” 1 Kan.

1984(See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590 , 313 P.2d 227 ; Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 .) Assumption of risk and contributory negligence being separate and distinct concepts in this state, the former remains a complete bar to recovery in cases such as here involved.” 1 Kan.

1984(See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590 , 313 P.2d 227 ; Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 .) Assumption of risk and contributory negligence being separate and distinct concepts in this state, the former remains a complete bar to recovery in cases such as here involved.” 1 Kan.

1984(See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590 , 313 P.2d 227 ; Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 .) Assumption of risk and contributory negligence being separate and distinct concepts in this state, the former remains a complete bar to recovery in cases such as here involved.” 1 Kan.

1975Statutes of limitation are not intended to affect matters asserted strictly in the defense of an action.” (p. 56.) In Christenson v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P. 2d 313 , a vendor sued vendee for the balance due on a written contract of sale of a business.

1975Statutes of limitation are not intended to affect matters asserted strictly in the defense of an action.” (p. 56.) In Christenson v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P. 2d 313 , a vendor sued vendee for the balance due on a written contract of sale of a business.

1912The opinion draws a distinction between the rule applicable to the explosion of a dangerous gas which had been allowed to escape into a confined place, as in Gas Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565 , 70 Pac. 635 , and the rule in a case where natural gás was allowed' to escape into the open air from a gas well, as in Gas Co. v. Dabney, 79 Kan. 820 , 101 Pac. 488 .

1912The opinion draws a distinction between the rule applicable to the explosion of a dangerous gas which had been allowed to escape into a confined place, as in Gas Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565 , 70 Pac. 635 , and the rule in a case where natural gás was allowed' to escape into the open air from a gas well, as in Gas Co. v. Dabney, 79 Kan. 820 , 101 Pac. 488 .

1912The opinion draws a distinction between the rule applicable to the explosion of a dangerous gas which had been allowed to escape into a confined place, as in Gas Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565 , 70 Pac. 635 , and the rule in a case where natural gás was allowed' to escape into the open air from a gas well, as in Gas Co. v. Dabney, 79 Kan. 820 , 101 Pac. 488 .

1912The opinion draws a distinction between the rule applicable to the explosion of a dangerous gas which had been allowed to escape into a confined place, as in Gas Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565 , 70 Pac. 635 , and the rule in a case where natural gás was allowed' to escape into the open air from a gas well, as in Gas Co. v. Dabney, 79 Kan. 820 , 101 Pac. 488 .

1907The distinction between the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution shall prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is fully treated in Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432 , upon which case the defendant places great reliance.

1905(Gould v. Howe, 131 Ill. 490 , 23 N. E. 602 .) While the distinction between an exception and a res ervation in a deed is well established, the words are frequently used interchangeably and synonymously. (11 A. & E.

1905(Gould v. Howe, 131 Ill. 490 , 23 N. E. 602 .) While the distinction between an exception and a res ervation in a deed is well established, the words are frequently used interchangeably and synonymously. (11 A. & E.