60 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1902–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Widmergreen2 sentences2024In Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000), our Supreme Court highlighted the distinction between a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which contests the quantity of the evidence presented at trial, and -7- J-A01030-24 a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which attacks the quality of that evidence. 2024In Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted the distinction between a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which contests the quantity of the evidence presented at trial, and a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which attacks the quality of that evidence: The distinction between these two challenges is critical. | 14 | 18 |
Commonwealth v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2019In Lucarelli, our Supreme Court also stated: Like the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 257-59 (Pa. Super. 2005), we find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 , 1099- 1101 (3d Cir. 1995). 2017Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lucarelli explained the difference between waiving one’s right to counsel and forfeiting it: Like the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 257-59 (Pa. Super. 2005), we find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1995). | 6 | 6 |
United States v. Ronald J. Goldberggreen2 sentences2019In Lucarelli, our Supreme Court also stated: Like the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 257-59 (Pa. Super. 2005), we find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 , 1099- 1101 (3d Cir. 1995). 2019As we explained in Commonwealth v. Lucarelli , 601 Pa. 185 , 971 A.2d 1173 (2009), waiver connotes a voluntary relinquishment of a right, while forfeiture results from egregious conduct: [W]e find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg , 67 F.3d 1092 , 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1995). | 5 | 7 |
Commonwealth v. Lucarelligreen2 sentences2019As we explained in Commonwealth v. Lucarelli , 601 Pa. 185 , 971 A.2d 1173 (2009), waiver connotes a voluntary relinquishment of a right, while forfeiture results from egregious conduct: [W]e find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg , 67 F.3d 1092 , 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1995). 2019As we explained in Commonwealth v. Lucarelli , 601 Pa. 185 , 971 A.2d 1173 (2009), waiver connotes a voluntary relinquishment of a right, while forfeiture results from egregious conduct: [W]e find persuasive the distinction between waiver and forfeiture made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Goldberg , 67 F.3d 1092 , 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1995). | 2 | 4 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2017See Illinois v. 5 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 2017Notwithstanding the issuance of Birchfield, the Commonwealth maintains that the results of Appellee’s blood test withstand suppression since the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.3 3 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See Illinois v. 5 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 2017Notwithstanding the issuance of Birchfield, the Commonwealth maintains that the results of Appellee’s blood test withstand suppression since the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.3 3 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Illinois v. Krullgreen2 sentences2017See Illinois v. 5 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 2017Notwithstanding the issuance of Birchfield, the Commonwealth maintains that the results of Appellee’s blood test withstand suppression since the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.3 3 The Commonwealth attempts to draw a distinction between the rule set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule originally announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Touwgreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915 , 3 See Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining the distinction between a claim that counsel failed to file a direct appeal, and a claim that counsel failed to consult regarding the potential of filing a direct appeal). 4 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, non- precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915 , 3 See Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining the distinction between a claim that counsel failed to file a direct appeal, and a claim that counsel failed to consult regarding the potential of filing a direct appeal). 4 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, non- precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. | 1 | 1 |
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. McAninleygreen1 sentence2021See In re Melograne, 812 A.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Pa. 2002) (discussing the distinction between a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction which is not waivable and a challenge to a court’s “authority, or power, to act” which is waivable). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Antidormigreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756-57 (Pa. Super. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Victor Darnell Thomasgreen1 sentence2019By contrast, forfeiture, as defined by the Third Circuit, does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right, but rather may be the result of the defendant’s “extremely serious misconduct” or “extremely dilatory conduct.” United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Goldberg, supra at 1100-02 )..... - 11 - J-S35042-19 The consequences of the distinction between waiver of the right to counsel and forfeiture of the right to counsel are significant because, we now hold, Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 and its colloquy requirements do not apply to situations where forfeiture i | 1 | 1 |
Norwegian Township v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment Appealsgreen1 sentence2018Norwegian Township v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment Appeals, 74 A.3d 1124, 1131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2007See n. 3, supra. [20] The American Heritage Dictionary 247 (4th ed.2001). [21] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [22] For those that believe that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781 would prohibit us from taking this action, the answer lies in drawing a distinction between a challenge to a sentence and a challenge of trial court error that occurred during sentencing. 2007See n. 3, supra. [20] The American Heritage Dictionary 247 (4th ed.2001). [21] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [22] For those that believe that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781 would prohibit us from taking this action, the answer lies in drawing a distinction between a challenge to a sentence and a challenge of trial court error that occurred during sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
Kenneth Eugene Bousley v. Joseph M. Brooks, Wardengreen2 sentences2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). . 2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev'd on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). [21] The PCRA court treated this issue as previously litigated, explaining that Appellant had argued on direct appeal that his taking of Thorazine and Elavil demonstrated his lack of competency. | 1 | 1 |
Bousley v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). . 2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). . | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Fraziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Millikengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leisenring's Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Burkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2021In Weaver v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017), the United States Supreme Court discussed this distinction: The question then becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim. 2021In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017), the United States Supreme Court discussed the distinction between the presumption of prejudice on direct appeal and the prejudice that must be proven in the context of a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel: -5- J-A13030-21 The question then becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim. | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Batts, Q., Aplt.
red
2 sentences2022This was critical, we explained, because the distinction between a claim challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence, as opposed to its legality, “also encompasses matters of issue preservation, this Court’s jurisdiction to decide the question presented, and the level of deference the reviewing court must give to the decision of the sentencing court.” Id. 2022Ultimately, after conducting an extensive review of the High Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent, we resolved that “in the absence of the sentencing court reaching a conclusion . . . that the defendant will forever be incorrigible, without any hope for rehabilitation, a life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile is illegal, as it is beyond the court’s power to impose.” Id. at 435 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Lyons
green
1 sentence2014Harris has even offered an on-point citation to this Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2003), elucidating the distinction between challenges to the weight of the evidence and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence: The distinction between a claim challenging the sufficiency of evidence and a claim challenging the weight of evidence is critical. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2010At the outset, we note that Appellant's argument blurs the distinction between the test for ineffectiveness derived from Strickland v. Washington, supra , and the standard articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). 2010At the outset, we note that Appellant's argument blurs the distinction between the test for ineffectiveness derived from Strickland v. Washington, supra , and the standard articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010Under Strickland , a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that his attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that counsel's missteps affected the outcome of the proceeding. [4] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2010Under Strickland , a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that his attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that counsel's missteps affected the outcome of the proceeding. [4] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Airpark International I v. Interboro School District
green
2 sentences2000Further, the Airpark I distinction was subject to further review resulting in an evenly split Supreme Court in Airpark International v. Interboro School District (Airpark II), 558 Pa. 1 , 735 A.2d 646 (1999). 2000Further, the Airpark I distinction was subject to further review resulting in an evenly split Supreme Court in Airpark International v. Interboro School District (Airpark II), 558 Pa. 1 , 735 A.2d 646 (1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Airpark International I v. Interboro School District
green
1 sentence2000In fact, the distinction between a privilege and a transaction in Gilberti was not reviewed by this Court until 1996 when Airpark International v. Interboro School District (Airpark I), 677 A.2d 388 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), was decided on appeal by a split court with a dissent. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Alco Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp.
green
2 sentences1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1996A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because its subject is only the transaction and not the privilege of engaging in a business that allows the transaction to be consummated. 9 This distinction between a privilege tax on gross receipts and a transaction tax is illustrated by our decision in Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433 , 291 A.2d 556 (1972), reversed on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245 , 307 A.2d 851 (1973), reversed, 417 U.S. 369 , 94 S.Ct. 2291 , 41 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Darlington v. Allegheny City
green
1 sentence1992Kunkel & Jordan v. Wherry, 189 Pa. 198, 201 , 42 A. 112 (1899) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kunkel v. Wherry
green
1 sentence1992Kunkel & Jordan v. Wherry, 189 Pa. 198, 201 , 42 A. 112 (1899) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mellace v. Armstrong
neutral
2 sentences1989In Mellace v. Armstrong, 469 Pa. 326 , 365 A.2d 850 (1976), appellant landowners claimed that they had extinguished appellee adjacent property owner’s easement by adverse possession over a period of twenty-one years, as they had erected a fence for some eighteen years, and had planted a “victory garden,” hemlocks and other trees and plants in the common alleyway. 1989In Mellace v. Armstrong, 469 Pa. 326 , 365 A.2d 850 (1976), appellant landowners claimed that they had extinguished appellee adjacent property owner’s easement by adverse possession over a period of twenty-one years, as they had erected a fence for some eighteen years, and had planted a “victory garden,” hemlocks and other trees and plants in the common alleyway. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Commonwealth v. Mills
green
2 sentences1988The Stevens court recognized the distinction between the factors with which it was concerned and a case such as Commonwealth v. Mills, 344 Pa. Superior Ct. 200 , 496 A.2d 752 (1985), which we find more closely analogous to the present situation. 1988The Stevens court recognized the distinction between the factors with which it was concerned and a case such as Commonwealth v. Mills, 344 Pa. Superior Ct. 200 , 496 A.2d 752 (1985), which we find more closely analogous to the present situation. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Commonwealth v. Speer green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Mandle v. Gharing green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Robert v. Chodoff green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Commonwealth v. Holland green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Commonwealth v. Speer neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Wells v. Bunnell neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Cancilla v. Bondy green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Jinks v. Currie green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Weimer Et Ux. v. Westm'd Water Co. green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Neely v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Watkins v. Prudential Insurance green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Knox v. Flack neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Hutchinson v. Ledlie green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| O'Hara v. Baum neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Lawrence v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Williams v. Notopolos green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Spiese v. Shee neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Young v. Lyman neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Jacob A. Bohem & Bros. v. Seel green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Vansciver v. Churchill neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Blanchard v. Wild neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| In re the Division of North Whitehall Township neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.