distinction between immunity in Connecticut

2019In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes. . . . [T]he state’s waiver of its immunity from liability only arises after a prior determination that it has waived its immu- nity from suit, and that a waiver of immunity from suit does not necessarily imply a waiver of immunity from all aspects of liability. ‘‘Thus . . . the state’s sovereign

2019In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes. . . . [T]he state’s waiver of its immunity from liability only arises after a prior determination that it has waived its immu- nity from suit, and that a waiver of immunity from suit does not necessarily imply a waiver of immunity from all aspects of liability. ‘‘Thus . . . the state’s sovereign

2011See State v. Velez, 113 Conn.App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (2009) (failure to take exception to trial court's response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore ); State v. Akande, 111 Conn.App. 596, 608-609 , 960 A.2d 1045 (2008) ("We decline to draw a distinction between defense counsel stating that he had no problem with a jury charge that he specifically requested and defense counsel stating that he had no problem with a jury charge that he had not specifically requested.

2011See State v. Velez, 113 Conn.App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (2009) (failure to take exception to trial court's response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore ); State v. Akande, 111 Conn.App. 596, 608-609 , 960 A.2d 1045 (2008) ("We decline to draw a distinction between defense counsel stating that he had no problem with a jury charge that he specifically requested and defense counsel stating that he had no problem with a jury charge that he had not specifically requested.

2003The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability appears to have been recognized in State v. Kilburn, [supra, 81 Conn. 11 ], and State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 392, 394 , 73 A. 751 [1909].

2003The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability appears to have been recognized in State v. Kilburn, [supra, 81 Conn. 11 ], and State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 392, 394 , 73 A. 751 [1909].

2000In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided “a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes.” See also Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 271 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998) (where state sued pursuant to statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in action for negligence of state employee operating state owned vehicle, state not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h

2000In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided “a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes.” See also Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 271 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998) (where state sued pursuant to statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in action for negligence of state employee operating state owned vehicle, state not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h

2014For the purposes of the regulation of pleadings and proce- dure in civil actions, a plaintiff’s cause of action consti- tutes ‘‘a single group of facts which are claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff for which one or more of the defendants are liable, without regard to the character of the legal rights of the plaintiff which have been violated.’’ (Emphasis added.) Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 434 , 58 A.2d 389 (1948).

2014For the purposes of the regulation of pleadings and proce- dure in civil actions, a plaintiff’s cause of action consti- tutes ‘‘a single group of facts which are claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff for which one or more of the defendants are liable, without regard to the character of the legal rights of the plaintiff which have been violated.’’ (Emphasis added.) Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 434 , 58 A.2d 389 (1948).

2012Moreover, the defendants read this language out of context, as the language immediately preceding it quotes Spears v. Garcia, [ 263 Conn. 22, 28 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003)], for the proposition that ‘[t]his court has previously stated that [a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law. ...

2012Moreover, the defendants read this language out of context, as the language immediately preceding it quotes Spears v. Garcia, [ 263 Conn. 22, 28 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003)], for the proposition that ‘[t]his court has previously stated that [a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law. ...

2011Partly in response to this approach by the Appellate Court, we attempted to clarify our approach to induced error and waiver in State v. Ebron, supra, 292 Conn. at 682 , 975 A.2d 17 .

2011Partly in response to this approach by the Appellate Court, we attempted to clarify our approach to induced error and waiver in State v. Ebron, supra, 292 Conn. at 682 , 975 A.2d 17 .

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009There is also no difference between counsel stating that he has no comment about the charge and counsel stating that the charge as read was correct.” State v. Akande, supra, 608-609 ; see also State v. Velez, 113 Conn. App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (failure to except to trial court’s response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 917 , 970 A.2d 729 (2009); State v. Farmer, 108 Conn. App. 82, 88 , 946 A.2d 1262 (failure to file request to charge or except to constancy of accusation instruction constituted waiver under Fabricatore

2009There is also no difference between counsel stating that he has no comment about the charge and counsel stating that the charge as read was correct.” State v. Akande, supra, 608-609 ; see also State v. Velez, 113 Conn. App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (failure to except to trial court’s response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 917 , 970 A.2d 729 (2009); State v. Farmer, 108 Conn. App. 82, 88 , 946 A.2d 1262 (failure to file request to charge or except to constancy of accusation instruction constituted waiver under Fabricatore

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009There is also no difference between counsel stating that he has no comment about the charge and counsel stating that the charge as read was correct.” State v. Akande, supra, 608-609 ; see also State v. Velez, 113 Conn. App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (failure to except to trial court’s response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 917 , 970 A.2d 729 (2009); State v. Farmer, 108 Conn. App. 82, 88 , 946 A.2d 1262 (failure to file request to charge or except to constancy of accusation instruction constituted waiver under Fabricatore

2009There is also no difference between counsel stating that he has no comment about the charge and counsel stating that the charge as read was correct.” State v. Akande, supra, 608-609 ; see also State v. Velez, 113 Conn. App. 347, 357-59 , 966 A.2d 743 (failure to except to trial court’s response to jury question about proof of intent constituted waiver under Fabricatore), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 917 , 970 A.2d 729 (2009); State v. Farmer, 108 Conn. App. 82, 88 , 946 A.2d 1262 (failure to file request to charge or except to constancy of accusation instruction constituted waiver under Fabricatore

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2009Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham, 290 Conn. 695, 707 , 718-19 n. 30, 966 A.2d 188 (2009) (citing strict construction rule applied to statutes implicating tax exemption and relying in part on legislative history); Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 24-25 , 843 A.2d 500 (2004) (considering legislative history when strict construction given to eminent domain statutes), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 294-95 , 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (noting that text and legislative history examined when strict construction given to statute that was bo

2008I conclude that neither type of immunity was waived in the present case either by "the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983). [2] It was undisputed that the state hired a contractor to provide snow removal services for the sidewalk abutting the state owned property, and that these services were provided one day prior to when the plaintiff was injured. [3] Although an earlier revision of the Practice Book, with a different numbering system, was applicable when this court decide

2008I conclude that neither type of immunity was waived in the present case either by "the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983). [2] It was undisputed that the state hired a contractor to provide snow removal services for the sidewalk abutting the state owned property, and that these services were provided one day prior to when the plaintiff was injured. [3] Although an earlier revision of the Practice Book, with a different numbering system, was applicable when this court decide

2008I conclude that neither type of immunity was waived in the present case either by "the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983). [2] It was undisputed that the state hired a contractor to provide snow removal services for the sidewalk abutting the state owned property, and that these services were provided one day prior to when the plaintiff was injured. [3] Although an earlier revision of the Practice Book, with a different numbering system, was applicable when this court decide

2008I conclude that neither type of immunity was waived in the present case either by "the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983). [2] It was undisputed that the state hired a contractor to provide snow removal services for the sidewalk abutting the state owned property, and that these services were provided one day prior to when the plaintiff was injured. [3] Although an earlier revision of the Practice Book, with a different numbering system, was applicable when this court decide

2001In State v. Francis, 246 Conn. 339, 358 , 717 A.2d 696 (1998), our Supreme Court addressed the distinction between an instruction on intent to cause a result, death, and intent to engage in proscribed conduct.

2001In State v. Francis, 246 Conn. 339, 358 , 717 A.2d 696 (1998), our Supreme Court addressed the distinction between an instruction on intent to cause a result, death, and intent to engage in proscribed conduct.

2001In Donohue v. Copiaque Union Free School , 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y., 1979), the court noted at page 1353 that: "the thrust of appellant's claim is that notwithstanding his receipt of a certificate of graduation he lacks even the rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to complete applications for employment." At page 1354, in rejecting a cause of action for educational malpractice, the court said that if we accepted such a theory of liability it would CT Page 3605 require the courts to "make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies.

2001In Donohue v. Copiaque Union Free School , 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y., 1979), the court noted at page 1353 that: "the thrust of appellant's claim is that notwithstanding his receipt of a certificate of graduation he lacks even the rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to complete applications for employment." At page 1354, in rejecting a cause of action for educational malpractice, the court said that if we accepted such a theory of liability it would CT Page 3605 require the courts to "make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies.

2000In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided “a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes.” See also Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 271 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998) (where state sued pursuant to statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in action for negligence of state employee operating state owned vehicle, state not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h

2000In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided “a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes.” See also Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 271 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998) (where state sued pursuant to statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in action for negligence of state employee operating state owned vehicle, state not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h

1995A variance constitutes a specific permission to restrictively “act in a manner that is otherwise prohibited under the zoning law . . . .” Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206 , 658 A.2d 559 (1995).

1995A variance constitutes a specific permission to restrictively “act in a manner that is otherwise prohibited under the zoning law . . . .” Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206 , 658 A.2d 559 (1995).

1988In Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 182 , 120 A.2d 550 (1956), the defendant board in 1948 granted an extension of a nonconforming use.

1988In Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 182 , 120 A.2d 550 (1956), the defendant board in 1948 granted an extension of a nonconforming use.

1961Co., 118 Conn. 538, 547 , 173 A. 783 .

1961Co., 118 Conn. 538, 547 , 173 A. 783 .

1957The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability appears to have been recognized in State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 11 , 69 A. 1028 , and State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 392, 394 , 73 A. 751 .

1957The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability appears to have been recognized in State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 11 , 69 A. 1028 , and State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 392, 394 , 73 A. 751 .