20 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Evergreen Packaging, Inc. v. Prathergreen2 sentences2020See Evergreen Packaging, Inc. v. Prather, 318 Ga. App. 440 , 445 n.15 ( 734 SE2d 209 ) (2012) (“Suffice it to say, we are never at liberty to ignore or disregard a binding precedent of this Court. 2020See Evergreen Packaging, Inc. v. Prather, 318 Ga. App. 440 , 445 n.15 ( 734 SE2d 209 ) (2012) (“Suffice it to say, we are never at liberty to ignore or disregard a binding precedent of this Court. | 1 | 1 |
State Health Planning Agency v. Coastal Empire Rehabilitation Hospitalgreen1 sentence2020See Coastal Empire, 261 Ga. at 832 (“A superior court reviewing the decision of an administrative agency may decide a constitutional challenge to the agency’s rules raised during the administrative process.”) (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1 |
Wylie v. Dentongreen2 sentences2014Thus, most elements of most claims can be pled in general terms, so long as they give fair notice of the nature of the claims to the defendant.” Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 169-170 (3) ( 746 SE2d 689 ) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2014Thus, most elements of most claims can be pled in general terms, so long as they give fair notice of the nature of the claims to the defendant.” Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 169-170 (3) ( 746 SE2d 689 ) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Reilygreen1 sentence2012Id. at 391-392, 394-395 . | 1 | 1 |
Borden, Inc. v. Hollandgreen1 sentence1997See Borders, Inc. v. Holland, supra; Travelers Ins. | 1 | 1 |
City of Jesup v. Bennettgreen2 sentences1996"It is, of course, fundamental that `the cardinal rule to guide the construction of laws is, first, to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law, and then to give it that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose.' [Cit.]" City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 608 (2), 176 S.E.2d 81 (1970). 1996"It is, of course, fundamental that `the cardinal rule to guide the construction of laws is, first, to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law, and then to give it that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose.' [Cit.]" City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 608 (2), 176 S.E.2d 81 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Pinion v. Stategreen2 sentences1993With regard to the trial court’s limitation on the voir dire, although Stell was entitled under OCGA § 15-12-133 to examine the individual jurors as to “any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the case,” “[hypothetical questions involving evidence or requiring a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from the examination of prospective jurors. [Cit.]” Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 37 ( 165 SE2d 708 ) (1969). 1993With regard to the trial court’s limitation on the voir dire, although Stell was entitled under OCGA § 15-12-133 to examine the individual jurors as to “any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the case,” “[hypothetical questions involving evidence or requiring a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from the examination of prospective jurors. [Cit.]” Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 37 ( 165 SE2d 708 ) (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Tendler v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1992This conclusion is based on the rule that "`[t]he law does not require a useless act.'" Wilson v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 180, 182 (5) (a) ( 390 SE2d 846 ) (1990), quoting Tendler v. Thompson, 256 Ga. 633, 634 ( 352 SE2d 388 ) (1987). 1992This conclusion is based on the rule that "`[t]he law does not require a useless act.'" Wilson v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 180, 182 (5) (a) ( 390 SE2d 846 ) (1990), quoting Tendler v. Thompson, 256 Ga. 633, 634 ( 352 SE2d 388 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Ledbettergreen2 sentences1992This conclusion is based on the rule that "`[t]he law does not require a useless act.'" Wilson v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 180, 182 (5) (a) ( 390 SE2d 846 ) (1990), quoting Tendler v. Thompson, 256 Ga. 633, 634 ( 352 SE2d 388 ) (1987). 1992This conclusion is based on the rule that "`[t]he law does not require a useless act.'" Wilson v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 180, 182 (5) (a) ( 390 SE2d 846 ) (1990), quoting Tendler v. Thompson, 256 Ga. 633, 634 ( 352 SE2d 388 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Royston v. Roystongreen2 sentences1990We granted the wife’s application for discretionary appeal. 1. (a) The wife contends that the trial court erred in granting a final judgment following a “temporary” hearing. *303 (b) In Royston v. Royston, 236 Ga. 648, 650 ( 225 SE2d 41 ) (1976), we held that “a party may consent to the holding of a hearing . . . prior to the expiration of 30 days. . . .” The record shows that counsel for the wife agreed that the sole purpose of the hearing was to determine the validity of the reconciliation agreement, and that if the agreement was determined not to be valid, then another hearing would be set 1990We granted the wife’s application for discretionary appeal. 1. (a) The wife contends that the trial court erred in granting a final judgment following a “temporary” hearing. *303 (b) In Royston v. Royston, 236 Ga. 648, 650 ( 225 SE2d 41 ) (1976), we held that “a party may consent to the holding of a hearing . . . prior to the expiration of 30 days. . . .” The record shows that counsel for the wife agreed that the sole purpose of the hearing was to determine the validity of the reconciliation agreement, and that if the agreement was determined not to be valid, then another hearing would be set | 1 | 1 |
Register v. Kandlbindergreen2 sentences1976See Register v. Kandlbinder, 231 Ga. 786 ( 204 SE2d 145 ) (1974). 1976See Register v. Kandlbinder, 231 Ga. 786 ( 204 SE2d 145 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Aultgreen2 sentences1973See Smith v. Ault, 230 Ga. 433 ( 197 SE2d 348 ); Patterson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 321 ( 191 SE2d 43 ). 3. 1973See Smith v. Ault, 230 Ga. 433 ( 197 SE2d 348 ); Patterson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 321 ( 191 SE2d 43 ). 3. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thakkar v. St. Ives Country Club
green
2 sentences2017Ives Country Club, 250 Ga. App. 893 ( 553 SE2d 181 ) (2001) (trial court’s allowance of lay and expert witness testimony proper where witnesses were disclosed prior to trial and no evidence of deliberate concealment). 15 has been deliberately suppressed, is to postpone a trial or declare a mistrial, such a holding is error. 2017Ives Country Club, 250 Ga. App. 893 ( 553 SE2d 181 ) (2001) (trial court’s allowance of lay and expert witness testimony proper where witnesses were disclosed prior to trial and no evidence of deliberate concealment). 15 has been deliberately suppressed, is to postpone a trial or declare a mistrial, such a holding is error. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Sauls
neutral
2 sentences2013This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in State v. Sauls, 315 Ga.App. 98 ( 728 SE2d 241 ) (2012), to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of defendant Sauls’s motion to suppress evidence that he refused to submit to chemical testing where the police officer failed to convey the entire substance of the implied consent notice required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2). 1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the holding was in error, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 2013This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in State v. Sauls, 315 Ga.App. 98 ( 728 SE2d 241 ) (2012), to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of defendant Sauls’s motion to suppress evidence that he refused to submit to chemical testing where the police officer failed to convey the entire substance of the implied consent notice required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2). 1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the holding was in error, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Yellow Cab of Chatham County, Inc. v. Karwoski
green
2 sentences2001I cannot concur in the analysis contained in Division 1 or the holding and analysis of Yellow Cab of Chatham County v. Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 (1997). 2001I cannot concur in the analysis contained in Division 1 or the holding and analysis of Yellow Cab of Chatham County v. Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 (1997). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Nelson v. Mixon
green
2 sentences2000However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in footnote 9 that Nelson v. Mixon, 265 Ga. 441 ( 457 SE2d 669 ) (1995), is distinguishable. 2000However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in footnote 9 that Nelson v. Mixon, 265 Ga. 441 ( 457 SE2d 669 ) (1995), is distinguishable. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Varn v. Varn
green
2 sentences2000I completely agree with the majority that Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 ( 248 SE2d 667 ) (1978), properly construed, controls this case and requires a holding that the waiver language here involved is viable, valid and effective. 2000I completely agree with the majority that Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 ( 248 SE2d 667 ) (1978), properly construed, controls this case and requires a holding that the waiver language here involved is viable, valid and effective. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Woodall v. Beauchamp
green
1 sentence1982In Woodall v. Beauchamp, supra, Woodall bought out the interest of Beauchamp and Taylor in a corporation which owned a nightclub. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Williamson v. Gulf Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1977Co., 137 Ga. App. 79 ( 222 SE2d 885 ) (1975), in which the court held that the administrative law judge could recompute the average weekly wage on a change of condition hearing. 1977Co., 137 Ga. App. 79 ( 222 SE2d 885 ) (1975), in which the court held that the administrative law judge could recompute the average weekly wage on a change of condition hearing. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1977Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co., 158 Ga. 613 ( 123 SE 897 ); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599 ( 134 SE 357 ).” This court and the Court of Appeals have consistently followed this holding with the exception of Williamson v. Gulf Ins. 1977Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co., 158 Ga. 613 ( 123 SE 897 ); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599 ( 134 SE 357 ).” This court and the Court of Appeals have consistently followed this holding with the exception of Williamson v. Gulf Ins. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford
green
2 sentences1977Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co., 158 Ga. 613 ( 123 SE 897 ); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599 ( 134 SE 357 ).” This court and the Court of Appeals have consistently followed this holding with the exception of Williamson v. Gulf Ins. 1977Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co., 158 Ga. 613 ( 123 SE 897 ); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599 ( 134 SE 357 ).” This court and the Court of Appeals have consistently followed this holding with the exception of Williamson v. Gulf Ins. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Middlebrooks
green
1 sentence1976Again reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52 , 55 that"... a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and... once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.” The opinion also cites Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39 ( 165 SE2d 711 ) to the effect that the purpose of a commitment hearing under Code § 27-407 is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged and, if so, to b | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Phillips v. Stynchcombe
green
1 sentence1976It carefully points out that there was a pre-indictment commitment hearing, and it also reiterates the ruling in Phillips v. Stynchcombe, supra, that the holding of such a hearing is not a requisite to a trial for commission of a felony. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences1976Again reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52 , 55 that"... a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and... once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.” The opinion also cites Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39 ( 165 SE2d 711 ) to the effect that the purpose of a commitment hearing under Code § 27-407 is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged and, if so, to b 1976Again reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52 , 55 that"... a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and... once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.” The opinion also cites Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39 ( 165 SE2d 711 ) to the effect that the purpose of a commitment hearing under Code § 27-407 is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged and, if so, to b | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Patterson v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences1973See Smith v. Ault, 230 Ga. 433 ( 197 SE2d 348 ); Patterson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 321 ( 191 SE2d 43 ). 3. 1973See Smith v. Ault, 230 Ga. 433 ( 197 SE2d 348 ); Patterson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 321 ( 191 SE2d 43 ). 3. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hill v. State
green
1 sentence1969Hill v. State, 221 Ga. 65 (1, 2), supra. The trial court in the habeas corpus proceeding applied that ruling, which was correct. 5. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Thacker v. Thacker
neutral
2 sentences1953On this question two decisions of this court, to wit, Thacker v. Thacker, 167 Ga. 706 ( 146 S. E. 457 ), and Fowler v. Fowler, 206 Ga. 542 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 593 ), both having the concurrence of all the Justices, are in irreconcilable conflict, the former holding that such waiver did not give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in the case, and the latter holding to the contrary. 1953On this question two decisions of this court, to wit, Thacker v. Thacker, 167 Ga. 706 ( 146 S. E. 457 ), and Fowler v. Fowler, 206 Ga. 542 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 593 ), both having the concurrence of all the Justices, are in irreconcilable conflict, the former holding that such waiver did not give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in the case, and the latter holding to the contrary. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Fowler v. Fowler
green
2 sentences1953On this question two decisions of this court, to wit, Thacker v. Thacker, 167 Ga. 706 ( 146 S. E. 457 ), and Fowler v. Fowler, 206 Ga. 542 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 593 ), both having the concurrence of all the Justices, are in irreconcilable conflict, the former holding that such waiver did not give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in the case, and the latter holding to the contrary. 1953On this question two decisions of this court, to wit, Thacker v. Thacker, 167 Ga. 706 ( 146 S. E. 457 ), and Fowler v. Fowler, 206 Ga. 542 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 593 ), both having the concurrence of all the Justices, are in irreconcilable conflict, the former holding that such waiver did not give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in the case, and the latter holding to the contrary. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.