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14 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burns v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Burns, 968 A.2d at 1024-25 ("Although Ritchie involved the disclosure of records in the possession of the State, nothing in the Ritchie Court's holding or analysis limits its application to records held by the State. . . . 2016See, e.g., Burns, 968 A.2d at 1024-25 ("Although Ritchie involved the disclosure of records in the possession of the State, nothing in the Ritchie Court's holding or analysis limits its application to records held by the State. . . . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Curielgreen1 sentence2006Indeed, the court recognized in Curiel that equal protection requires only that those similarly situated "be accorded similar treatment," not that they be "dealt with identically." Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 413 (emphasis added). *467 ¶ 22. | 1 | 1 |
John T. Patzer v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and State Department of Administrationgreen2 sentences2005"Flexible or even ad hoc exceptions should work to remedy any remaining over inclusion of [claim preclusion] in particular circumstances, but the exceptions should be small in scope even if necessarily considerable in number." Id. 31 Id. 32 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26, cmt. i). 33 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 -36 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 34 See Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 . 35 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(l)(f) (1982). 36 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 ("A holding that claim preclusion bars a seco 2005"Wisconsin law does not treat [claim preclusion] as an ironclad rule which must be implacably applied whenever its literal requirements are met, regardless of any countervailing considerations." Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 38 Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harv. | 1 | 1 |
Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green2 sentences2005"Flexible or even ad hoc exceptions should work to remedy any remaining over inclusion of [claim preclusion] in particular circumstances, but the exceptions should be small in scope even if necessarily considerable in number." Id. 31 Id. 32 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26, cmt. i). 33 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 -36 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 34 See Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 . 35 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(l)(f) (1982). 36 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 ("A holding that claim preclusion bars a seco 2005"Flexible or even ad hoc exceptions should work to remedy any remaining over inclusion of [claim preclusion] in particular circumstances, but the exceptions should be small in scope even if necessarily considerable in number." Id. 31 Id. 32 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26, cmt. i). 33 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 -36 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 34 See Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 . 35 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(l)(f) (1982). 36 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 ("A holding that claim preclusion bars a seco | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hortongreen2 sentences2004Rather, "a case announces a new rule if its outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds, or if a contrary result would not have been an illogical or even a grudging application of prior precedent." In contrast, a case extends an old rule only if its holding is "compelled or dictated by existing precedent." Horton, 195 Wis. 2d at 291 (citations omitted). 17 There fore, the pertinent question is not whether the issue or question before the court was pre-existing, dissent, ¶ 59, but whether the court's holding or the rule it announced adhered to precedent on a pre-existing issue. ¶ 2 2004Rather, "a case announces a new rule if its outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds, or if a contrary result would not have been an illogical or even a grudging application of prior precedent." In contrast, a case extends an old rule only if its holding is "compelled or dictated by existing precedent." Horton, 195 Wis. 2d at 291 (citations omitted). [17] Therefore, *99 the pertinent question is not whether the issue or question before the court was pre-existing, dissent, ¶ 59, but whether the court's holding or the rule it announced adhered to precedent on a pre-existing issue | 1 | 1 |
Schaller v. Marine National Bank of Neenahgreen2 sentences1995The bank correctly points out that we noted in Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 131 Wis. 2d 389, 402-03 , 388 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1986), that at least one law review article has characterized "good faith" as " 'decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or enforcement' of a contract' (emphasis added), but we do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the underlying contract. 1995The bank correctly points out that we noted in Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 131 Wis. 2d 389, 402-03 , 388 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1986), that at least one law review article has characterized "good faith" as " 'decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or enforcement' of a contract' (emphasis added), but we do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the underlying contract. | 1 | 1 |
Grady v. Corbinred1 sentence1991Id. at 2094 (footnote omitted). *764 This comparison illustrates how Corbin differs from the present appeal: [[Image here]] Harris urges a different analysis: A defendant's only conduct in an OAR offense is operating an auto; the element of revocation is a status, not conduct; and the element of defendant's knowledge of the revocation is a state of mind, not conduct. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chayka v. Santini
green
2 sentences2013Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107 . 20 Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 795 , 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). 18 No. 2011AP788 ¶28 The court of appeals in Foseid acknowledged what was implicit in Chayka's holding——that "accomplishing exactly what the agreement of the parties sought to prevent" constituted an independent breach even if there was no other technical breach alleged. "[W]e do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the 2013Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107 . 20 Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 795 , 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). 18 No. 2011AP788 ¶28 The court of appeals in Foseid acknowledged what was implicit in Chayka's holding——that "accomplishing exactly what the agreement of the parties sought to prevent" constituted an independent breach even if there was no other technical breach alleged. "[W]e do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the | 3 | 1995–2013 |
Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains
green
2 sentences2013Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107 . 20 Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 795 , 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). 18 No. 2011AP788 ¶28 The court of appeals in Foseid acknowledged what was implicit in Chayka's holding——that "accomplishing exactly what the agreement of the parties sought to prevent" constituted an independent breach even if there was no other technical breach alleged. "[W]e do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the 2013Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d at 107 . 20 Foseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis. 2d 772, 795 , 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). 18 No. 2011AP788 ¶28 The court of appeals in Foseid acknowledged what was implicit in Chayka's holding——that "accomplishing exactly what the agreement of the parties sought to prevent" constituted an independent breach even if there was no other technical breach alleged. "[W]e do not consider that reference as a holding that violation of the implied promise of good-faith dealing may not be considered independent of any breach (or lack of breach) of the | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Terbush v. Boyle
green
2 sentences2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis.2d 47 , 60 n. 7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is . . . not essential to the determination of the issues"). [9] Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶ 96. [10] Our discussions of Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640 , 259 N.W. 859 (1935), and Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750 , 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), are made in the context of examining a claim for damages arising from medical negligence. 2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis.2d 47 , 60 n. 7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is . . . not essential to the determination of the issues"). [9] Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶ 96. [10] Our discussions of Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640 , 259 N.W. 859 (1935), and Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750 , 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), are made in the context of examining a claim for damages arising from medical negligence. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis.2d 47 , 60 n. 7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is . . . not essential to the determination of the issues"). [9] Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶ 96. [10] Our discussions of Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640 , 259 N.W. 859 (1935), and Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750 , 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), are made in the context of examining a claim for damages arising from medical negligence. 2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis.2d 47 , 60 n. 7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is . . . not essential to the determination of the issues"). [9] Justice Crooks' dissent/concurrence, ¶ 96. [10] Our discussions of Terbush v. Boyle, 217 Wis. 636, 640 , 259 N.W. 859 (1935), and Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750 , 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), are made in the context of examining a claim for damages arising from medical negligence. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Sartin
green
2 sentences2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47 , 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is ... not essential to the determination of the issues"). 2009State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47 , 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) (explaining that dictum "is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion [that] extends beyond the facts in the case and is ... not essential to the determination of the issues"). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co.
green
2 sentences1992By The Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 1 164 Wis. 2d 343 , 474 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1991). 2 Although the section was originally numbered 893.235, the Legislature changed the number to 893.56 in 1979. 1992By The Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 1 164 Wis. 2d 343 , 474 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1991). 2 Although the section was originally numbered 893.235, the Legislature changed the number to 893.56 in 1979. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Lomagro
green
2 sentences1984Although the author of this opinion and Chief Justice Hef fer-nan acknowledge that the issue of jury unanimity in this case is controlled by State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582 , 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983), the author and Chief Justice Heffernan disagree with the holding and analysis in that case. 1984Although the author of this opinion and Chief Justice Hef fer-nan acknowledge that the issue of jury unanimity in this case is controlled by State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582 , 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983), the author and Chief Justice Heffernan disagree with the holding and analysis in that case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Henry v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1971Ed. 2d 1247 . [2] State v. Clarke (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 161, 173 , 181 N. W. 2d 355 . [3] Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443 , 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. 1971Ed. 2d 1247 . [2] State v. Clarke (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 161, 173 , 181 N. W. 2d 355 . [3] Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443 , 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1971The court has already suggested the holding of such a hearing on "an in-court identification allegedly based on a lineup claimed to be defective." [3] NOTES [1] Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U. S. 377, 384 , 88 Sup. Ct. 967, 19 L. 1971The court has already suggested the holding of such a hearing on "an in-court identification allegedly based on a lineup claimed to be defective." [3] NOTES [1] Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U. S. 377, 384 , 88 Sup. Ct. 967, 19 L. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State Ex Rel. Goodchild v. Burke
green
2 sentences1971Goodchild v. Burke (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 244 , 133 N. W. 2d 753 . 1971Goodchild v. Burke (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 244 , 133 N. W. 2d 753 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Clarke
green
2 sentences1971Ed. 2d 1247 . [2] State v. Clarke (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 161, 173 , 181 N. W. 2d 355 . [3] Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443 , 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. 1971Ed. 2d 1247 . [2] State v. Clarke (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 161, 173 , 181 N. W. 2d 355 . [3] Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443 , 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler
green
1 sentence1938The contention is at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” See also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54 , 58 Sup. Ct. 466, 82 L. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.