18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Marriage of K.E.V.green2 sentences2019See In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246 (Mont. 1994) (court applied equitable estoppel to prevent mother from denying paternity of husband where mother was not seeking to establish paternity in another man; court reiterated that the holding would not bar biological father or child from establishing paternity in father). 2016See In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246 (Mont. 1994) (court applied equitable estoppel to prevent mother from denying paternity of husband where mother was not seeking to establish paternity in another man; court reiterated that the holding would not bar biological father or child from establishing paternity in father). | 3 | 3 |
Wayne L. Patton v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2017See Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 878 (citing and quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 ) (discussing the difference between sex offenders on supervised release who are challenging a probation condition and sex offenders who had already completed probation, were not subject to any form of supervised release, and were challenging the constitutionality of a statute under which they were convicted). 2017See Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 878 (citing and quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 ) (discussing the difference between sex offenders on supervised release who are challenging a probation condition and sex offenders who had already completed probation, were not subject to any form of supervised release, and were challenging the constitutionality of a statute under which they were convicted). | 2 | 2 |
Berry v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Berry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Anglemyer v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Because voluntary treatment had not been successful, the trial court ordered executed time to be served in 2 Richey cites to Anglemyer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Ind. 2007), but the holding and analysis discussed in Anglemyer applies to Indiana’s criminal sentencing statutes and not to a sentence imposed following revocation of probation. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. AMAX COAL COMPANYgreen2 sentences2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. 2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Amax Coal Co.green2 sentences2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. 2017See Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 482 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (Ratliff, J., dissenting), vacated on transfer by Nichols v. Amax Coal Co., 490 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1986), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Anthony Scott Bratcher v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2017See Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 878 (citing and quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 ) (discussing the difference between sex offenders on supervised release who are challenging a probation condition and sex offenders who had already completed probation, were not subject to any form of supervised release, and were challenging the constitutionality of a statute under which they were convicted). 2017See Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 878 (citing and quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 ) (discussing the difference between sex offenders on supervised release who are challenging a probation condition and sex offenders who had already completed probation, were not subject to any form of supervised release, and were challenging the constitutionality of a statute under which they were convicted). | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Russellgreen2 sentences2016Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 518-19 (emphasis added). 2016Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 518-19 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Travis v. Stategreen1 sentence1998I, § 19, does apply. 8 See Greer v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1124, 1127-28 (Ind.1989); Travis v. State, 488 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Ind.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Greer v. Stategreen1 sentence1998I, § 19, does apply. 8 See Greer v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1124, 1127-28 (Ind.1989); Travis v. State, 488 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Ind.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ldh v. Kah
green
1 sentence2019In this regard, we generally agree with the Court of Appeals in this case in concluding that L.D.H. [v. K.A.H., 665 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),] was wrongly decided, at least to the extent that L.D.H. stands for the proposition that paternity actions filed in juvenile court collateral to pending dissolution actions are always improper. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Carswell v. State
green
1 sentence2013Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (citing Carswell, 721 N.E.2d at 1259 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence2013Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (citing Carswell, 721 N.E.2d at 1259 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State ex rel. Arbaugh v. Richland County Board of Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence2011Further, I respectfully disagree with the decision reached by a panel of this Court in Judy v. State, 470 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Seay v. State
green
2 sentences2008I, § 19 does apply." Seay, 698 N.E.2d at 736 . 2008I, § 19 does apply.” Seay, 698 N.E.2d at 736 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Duke's GMC, Inc. v. Erskine
green
1 sentence2001Duke's GMC, 447 N.E.2d at 1124 . 3 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Strong v. State
green
1 sentence1992The holding of no error limits itself to those "particular circumstances," and points out that "[a]t all times during [lead counsel's] testimony, co-counsel ... remained and actively served as trial counsel for the defendant." Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Baker v. State
green
1 sentence1987In Baker v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 817 , we held that the improper reference to a polygraph examination requires a new trial. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Poole v. Gillison
green
1 sentence1976Ark. 1953), 15 F.R.D. 194 , wherein the court wrote: “In the final analysis the only basis upon which this case could be sent to the jury would be a holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
CITY OF EVANSVILLE, IND. v. Cunningham
neutral
2 sentences1969“By reason of such erroneous instruction, the case to that extent was tried on an improper legal definition of the duty owed by the appellant under the circumstances, and justice was not done.” See also Jones v. Beasley (1921), 191 Ind. 209 , 131 N. E. 225 ; New York Central RR. v. Knoll (1965), 140 Ind. App. 264 , 204 N. E. 2d 220 ; City of Evansville v. Cunningham (1964), 138 Ind. App. 39 , 202 N. E. 2d 384 ; Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith (1956), 126 Ind. App. 332 , 133 N. E. 2d 72 ; Hatton v. Hodell Furniture Co. (1920), 72 Ind. App. 357 , 125 N. E. 797 . 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. v. DeArk
green
2 sentences1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N. E. 2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: “The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial, (citations omitted) “In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from t 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N. E. 2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: “The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial, (citations omitted) “In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from t | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
New York Central Railroad Co. v. Knoll
green
2 sentences1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority
neutral
2 sentences1969“By reason of such erroneous instruction, the case to that extent was tried on an improper legal definition of the duty owed by the appellant under the circumstances, and justice was not done.” See also Jones v. Beasley (1921), 191 Ind. 209 , 131 N. E. 225 ; New York Central RR. v. Knoll (1965), 140 Ind. App. 264 , 204 N. E. 2d 220 ; City of Evansville v. Cunningham (1964), 138 Ind. App. 39 , 202 N. E. 2d 384 ; Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith (1956), 126 Ind. App. 332 , 133 N. E. 2d 72 ; Hatton v. Hodell Furniture Co. (1920), 72 Ind. App. 357 , 125 N. E. 797 . 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Jones v. Beasley
neutral
2 sentences1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hatton v. Hodell Furniture Co.
green
2 sentences1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the 1969In Public Service Co. of Indiana v. DeArk (1950), 120 Ind. App. 353 , 92 N.E.2d 723 , the court in holding an instruction erroneous as not applicable to the issues or the evidence said at page 360: "The propriety of an instruction is to be determined, not by whether it embodies a correct statement of the law upon a given state of facts, but whether it correctly states the law relevant to the issuable facts given in the evidence of the trial. (citations omitted) "In considering the effect of an erroneous instruction we must assume that the error influenced the result, unless it appears from the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co.
green
2 sentences1926Co. (1919), 289 Ill. 25 , 124 N. E. 334 , in which case, two paragraphs of the complaint contained usual, or general, charges of negligence, and two contained specific charges of negligence. 1926Co. (1919), 289 Ill. 25 , 124 N. E. 334 , in which case, two paragraphs of the complaint contained usual, or general, charges of negligence, and two contained specific charges of negligence. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Boughton
neutral
2 sentences1926Co. v. Boughton (1924), 81 Ind. App. 129 , 142 N. E. 869, 871 , there were two paragraphs of complaint, the first charging general negligence and the second charging specific acts of negligence, and it was held that the fact that the second paragraph charged specific facts did not make an instruction embracing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur reversible error, the court holding that the instruction was applicable to the evidence and to the issues presented by the first paragraph, and citing as authority Feldman v. Chicago R. 1926Co. v. Boughton (1924), 81 Ind. App. 129 , 142 N. E. 869, 871 , there were two paragraphs of complaint, the first charging general negligence and the second charging specific acts of negligence, and it was held that the fact that the second paragraph charged specific facts did not make an instruction embracing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur reversible error, the court holding that the instruction was applicable to the evidence and to the issues presented by the first paragraph, and citing as authority Feldman v. Chicago R. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Edwards v. Cooper
green
1 sentence1924Said section then provides as follows: “If the board shall decide after such hearing that the area or district to be drained is properly bounded, that the special-benefits to the property within such district or area, and the benefits, if any, to the said city will be equal to the estimated cost of the improvement as aforesaid, such finding shall be entered of record, and shall be final and conclusive on all parties, and the said resolution^shall be confirmed or modified; but if it be decided by the board, after such hearing, that the benefits as aforesaid will not equal such estimated cost, t | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Early v. Doe
green
2 sentences1923In Early v. Doe (1853), 57 U. S. (6 How.) 610 , 14 L. 1923In Early v. Doe (1853), 57 U. S. (6 How.) 610 , 14 L. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.