holding hearing in Washington

2024“Bald assertions and conclusory allegations will not support the holding of a hearing.” Id.

2022Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 886 , 828 P.2d 1086 (1992) (“Bald assertions and conclusory allegations will not support the holding of a hearing.

2011The Ammons court based this holding on the rule that defendants have "a liberty interest which minimal due process protects" at sentencing. 105 Wash.2d at 186 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 .

2011The Ammons court based this holding on the rule that defendants have "a liberty interest which minimal due process protects" at sentencing. 105 Wash.2d at 186 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 .

2008We based this holding on the requirement that the articulable suspicion must be specific to the individual to rise to the level of probable cause to arrest. ¶9 Although article I, section 7 often provides greater protection in some instances for individual privacy than the Fourth Amendment, State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332 , 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), under both the state and federal constitutions, the probable cause requirement must be met.

2008We based this holding on the requirement that the articulable suspicion must be specific to the individual to rise to the level of probable cause to arrest. ¶ 9 Although article I, section 7 often provides greater protection in some instances for individual privacy than the Fourth Amendment, State v. Jones, 146 Wash.2d 328, 332 , 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), under both the state and federal constitutions the probable cause requirement must be met.

2008We based this holding on the requirement that the articulable suspicion must be specific to the individual to rise to the level of probable cause to arrest. ¶9 Although article I, section 7 often provides greater protection in some instances for individual privacy than the Fourth Amendment, State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332 , 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), under both the state and federal constitutions, the probable cause requirement must be met.

2008We based this holding on the requirement that the articulable suspicion must be specific to the individual to rise to the level of probable cause to arrest. ¶ 9 Although article I, section 7 often provides greater protection in some instances for individual privacy than the Fourth Amendment, State v. Jones, 146 Wash.2d 328, 332 , 45 P.3d 1062 (2002), under both the state and federal constitutions the probable cause requirement must be met.

2025Although Gresham did not address the invited error doctrine, we reject the State’s invitation to apply it here for the same reason the Gresham court declined to apply the waiver doctrine in such a scenario, namely that placing the duty to correctly instruct the jury on the trial court, rather than defense counsel, is “more efficient and better prevents the possibility of unfair prejudice than does the alternative of holding that defense - 17 - No. 85627-8-I counsel’s failure to craft a proper instruction is waiver of the request for a limiting instruction, thereby relegating the defendant to a

2020Id. at 836-37 .

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2017Id. at 728 .

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2017In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, took continuing jurisdiction over fishing disputes arising from the Treaty of Point Elliot and other 51 139 Wn.2d 379 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999). 52Id. at 402(quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 258-59 , 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)). 53 180 Wn.2d 54, 62 , 322 P.3d 1207 (2014). 15 No. 73893-3-1/16 treaties.54 Since then, the federal courts have not only interpreted these treaties but continue to supervise their application.

2015Instead, I view the trial court’s erroneous instruction as just that — an erroneous instruction of law — and would analyze it under our jurisprudence regarding instructional errors. ¶30 The purpose of article IV, section 16 “is to prevent the jury from being influenced by knowledge conveyed to it by the trial judge as to his opinion of the evidence submitted.” State v. Jacobsen, 78 Wn.2d 491, 495 , 477 P.2d 1 (1970).

2015Instead, I view the trial court’s erroneous instruction as just that — an erroneous instruction of law — and would analyze it under our jurisprudence regarding instructional errors. ¶30 The purpose of article IV, section 16 “is to prevent the jury from being influenced by knowledge conveyed to it by the trial judge as to his opinion of the evidence submitted.” State v. Jacobsen, 78 Wn.2d 491, 495 , 477 P.2d 1 (1970).

2015Consistent with Stewart Title's rejection of Restatement § 51, we do not adopt it here. 40 See jd. (rejecting the argument that "as long as there is no actual conflict of interest between an insurer and its insured, a nonclient insurer is presumed to be an intended beneficiary" and can sue the insured's attorney for malpractice). 41 jd 42 id 43]dn.2. 44 Additionally, the dissent in Mazon v. Krafchick vigorously argued for the adoption of the restatement's approach, without success. 158 Wn.2d 440, 455-56 , 144 P.3d 1168 (2006) (Sanders, J., dissenting); id at 447-53 (holding that no duties exis

2015Consistent with Stewart Title's rejection of Restatement § 51, we do not adopt it here. 40 See jd. (rejecting the argument that "as long as there is no actual conflict of interest between an insurer and its insured, a nonclient insurer is presumed to be an intended beneficiary" and can sue the insured's attorney for malpractice). 41 jd 42 id 43]dn.2. 44 Additionally, the dissent in Mazon v. Krafchick vigorously argued for the adoption of the restatement's approach, without success. 158 Wn.2d 440, 455-56 , 144 P.3d 1168 (2006) (Sanders, J., dissenting); id at 447-53 (holding that no duties exis

2015App. 436, 447-48 , 253 P.3d 445 (2011), the commissioner found that the record indicated that Mr. Almiron was advised that deportation was a likely result of his plea, but did not establish that Mr. Almiron was advised that deportation was a certain result.

2015Relying on the holding of hearing and considered the evidence presented. 8 No. 32353-6-III State v. Almiron State v. Martinez, 161 Wn.

2013However, the trial court has no duty to give the limiting instruction sua sponte. ]g\ at 423 n.2. 27 ]d. at 424-25 ("This approach is also more efficient and better prevents the possibility of unfair prejudice than does the alternative of holding that defense counsel's failure to craft a proper instruction is waiver of the request for a limiting instruction, thereby relegating the defendant to a personal restraint petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel."). 28 id, at 423-24. 29 ]d at 425. 30 ]cL (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780 , 725 P.

2013However, the trial court has no duty to give the limiting instruction sua sponte. ]g\ at 423 n.2. 27 ]d. at 424-25 ("This approach is also more efficient and better prevents the possibility of unfair prejudice than does the alternative of holding that defense counsel's failure to craft a proper instruction is waiver of the request for a limiting instruction, thereby relegating the defendant to a personal restraint petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel."). 28 id, at 423-24. 29 ]d at 425. 30 ]cL (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780 , 725 P.

2012This follows from our pronouncement in State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 379 , 218 P.2d 300 (1950), that “the court should state to the jury whatever it determines is the purpose (or purposes) for which the evidence is admissible; and it should also be the court’s duty to give the cautionary instruction that such evidence is to be considered for no other purpose or purposes.” (Emphasis added.) This approach is also more efficient and better prevents the possibility of unfair prejudice than does the alternative of holding that defense counsel’s failure to craft a proper instruction is waiver of th

2012This follows from our pronouncement in State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 379 , 218 P.2d 300 (1950), that “the court should state to the jury whatever it determines is the purpose (or purposes) for which the evidence is admissible; and it should also be the court’s duty to give the cautionary instruction that such evidence is to be considered for no other purpose or purposes.” (Emphasis added.) This approach is also more efficient and better prevents the possibility of unfair prejudice than does the alternative of holding that defense counsel’s failure to craft a proper instruction is waiver of th

2012State v. Mason, 160 Wn.2d 910, 935 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007).

2012State v. Mason, 160 Wn.2d 910, 935 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007).

1997Further, "[a]bsent contrary evidence of the [drafters'] intent, [the court stated it] would ... be inclined to resolve the ambiguity... by holding the exception was meant to cover only the minor child of either spouse." Ludwig, 931 S.W.2d at 243 . [1] Here, the language at issue is also unpunctuated.

1974STAFFORD, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) I agree with the majority's holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still viable and that appellant's constitutional challenge is without merit, based as it was on the grounds advanced in Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617 , 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).

1974STAFFORD, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) I agree with the majority's holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still viable and that appellant's constitutional challenge is without merit, based as it was on the grounds advanced in Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617 , 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).

1974He relies upon the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 16 L.

1974He relies upon the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 16 L.

1973In Schiebelhut v. United States, 357 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1966) at 745 the court stated: If the material available to the [trial judge] was limited to the pre-plea colloquy, the charges of . . . petition and the government’s opposing affidavits, and if petitioner’s charges had the required specificity, we would, . . . remand for the holding of a hearing.

1973In Schiebelhut v. United States, 357 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.1966) at 745 the court stated: If the material available to the [trial judge] was limited to the pre-plea colloquy, the charges of . .. petition and the government's opposing affidavits, and if petitioner's charges had the required specificity, we would, ... remand for the holding of a hearing.

1955Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wash. 506 , 80 Pac. 772 , is an outstanding example, since the holding was that the privilege was exceeded but the court discussed truth and falsity, which were not issues in the case, and laid down rules in regard thereto which have been cited ever since.

1955Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wash. 506 , 80 Pac. 772 , is an outstanding example, since the holding was that the privilege was exceeded but the court discussed truth and falsity, which were not issues in the case, and laid down rules in regard thereto which have been cited ever since.

1927There is nothing contrary to the above statement in the case of Feldtman v. Russak, 141 Wash. 287 , 251 Pac. 572 , where the testimony of interested witnesses had been corroborated, and then not refuted by the plaintiff in the case, the court holding that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff had been entirely overcome.

1927There is nothing contrary to the above statement in the case of Feldtman v. Russak, 141 Wash. 287 , 251 Pac. 572 , where the testimony of interested witnesses had been corroborated, and then not refuted by the plaintiff in the case, the court holding that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff had been entirely overcome.