44 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1906–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen2 sentences2019The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding that a warning is legally sufficient if it informs the licensee that refusing a request for chemical testing means that [she] ‘will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation.’ Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Weaver, [ 912 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. 2006)] [(Weaver II)] citing Weaver v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) [(Weaver I)].FN6 FN6. 2015Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding that a warning is legally sufficient if it informs the licensee that refusing a request for chemical testing means that he “will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation.” Weaver, 912 A.2d at 261 (citing Weaver v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)). 10 Here, Licensee conceded Officer summarized the consequences of refusal. | 4 | 4 |
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Weavergreen2 sentences2019The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding that a warning is legally sufficient if it informs the licensee that refusing a request for chemical testing means that [she] ‘will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation.’ Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Weaver, [ 912 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. 2006)] [(Weaver II)] citing Weaver v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) [(Weaver I)].FN6 FN6. 2015Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding that a warning is legally sufficient if it informs the licensee that refusing a request for chemical testing means that he “will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation.” Weaver, 912 A.2d at 261 (citing Weaver v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)). 10 Here, Licensee conceded Officer summarized the consequences of refusal. | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Infantegreen2 sentences2021A central reason for our Supreme Court’s preference is that deferring the violation would help “avoid the risk of entering a VOP sentence that would ultimately be void if the defendant were acquitted of the new charges.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 , 1243 (Pa. 2019); see also Brown, 469 A.2d at 1376 ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1977). - 11 - J-A23038-20 Here, the Probation Department submitted to the VOP court a Gagnon II Summary outlining potential violations of Colon’s pro 2021Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion. 22 See Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005) (noting this Court’s “preference for deferral of VOP sentencing until the final outcome of any new criminal charges”), partially abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019); but see Kates, 305 A.2d at 706 (“[T]here is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to th | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Katesgreen2 sentences2021See e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 441 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983). “[I]t is clear that there is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to the trial for the subsequent offense.” Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. 1973). 2021Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion. 22 See Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005) (noting this Court’s “preference for deferral of VOP sentencing until the final outcome of any new criminal charges”), partially abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019); but see Kates, 305 A.2d at 706 (“[T]here is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to th | 1 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Burrellgreen1 sentence2021See e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 441 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983). “[I]t is clear that there is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to the trial for the subsequent offense.” Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Davisgreen1 sentence2021A central reason for our Supreme Court’s preference is that deferring the violation would help “avoid the risk of entering a VOP sentence that would ultimately be void if the defendant were acquitted of the new charges.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 , 1243 (Pa. 2019); see also Brown, 469 A.2d at 1376 ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1977). - 11 - J-A23038-20 Here, the Probation Department submitted to the VOP court a Gagnon II Summary outlining potential violations of Colon’s pro | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2021See e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 441 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983). “[I]t is clear that there is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to the trial for the subsequent offense.” Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. 1973). 2021A central reason for our Supreme Court’s preference is that deferring the violation would help “avoid the risk of entering a VOP sentence that would ultimately be void if the defendant were acquitted of the new charges.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 , 1243 (Pa. 2019); see also Brown, 469 A.2d at 1376 ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1977). - 11 - J-A23038-20 Here, the Probation Department submitted to the VOP court a Gagnon II Summary outlining potential violations of Colon’s pro | 1 | 1 |
Stodghill v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2020Stodghill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 150 A.3d 547, 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 177 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fostergreen1 sentence2017Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2017Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Reddick v. Punturerigreen2 sentences2014Reddick v. Puntureri, 242 Pa.Super. 138 , 363 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1976). 2 Instantly, the record confirms that Dr. Schutt filed his *267 preliminary objections on October 10, 2012. 2014Reddick v. Puntureri, 242 Pa.Super. 138 , 363 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1976). 2 Instantly, the record confirms that Dr. Schutt filed his *267 preliminary objections on October 10, 2012. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Spotzgreen2 sentences2011See Spotz, 587 Pa. at 92-93 , 896 A.2d at 1245-46 . 2011See Spotz, 587 Pa. at 92-93 , 896 A.2d at 1245-46 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Williams, 557 Pa. at 238 , 732 A.2d at 1183 . 2001See, e.g., Williams, 557 Pa. at 238 , 732 A.2d at 1183 . | 1 | 1 |
| Drummond v. Drummondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Slezynger v. Bischakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carelli v. Lytergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. CITY OF CONNELLSVILLEgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guiseppi Appealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Katesgreen2 sentences2021See e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 441 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983). “[I]t is clear that there is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to the trial for the subsequent offense.” Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. 1973). 2021Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion. 22 See Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2005) (noting this Court’s “preference for deferral of VOP sentencing until the final outcome of any new criminal charges”), partially abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019); but see Kates, 305 A.2d at 706 (“[T]here is no statutory restriction in this State that would prevent the court from holding a hearing where the alleged violation is the commission of an offense during the probationary period prior to th | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirsch v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board
green
2 sentences2018The Office of Administration ("OA") 2 and PSP (collectively, "Appellants") appealed the December Award to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the arbitration award violated the creditable leave provision found in section 5302(b)(2) of the Retirement Code, 71 Pa.C.S. § 5302(b)(2), as, in their view, that section obligated the Commonwealth to pay a trooper on union leave only the compensation that the trooper would receive "as if he were in full-time active service." 3 , 4 Id. *743 The Commonwealth Court agreed with Appellants, basing its reasoning on this Court's holding and analysis in Kirsch 2018The Office of Administration ("OA") 2 and PSP (collectively, "Appellants") appealed the December Award to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the arbitration award violated the creditable leave provision found in section 5302(b)(2) of the Retirement Code, 71 Pa.C.S. § 5302(b)(2), as, in their view, that section obligated the Commonwealth to pay a trooper on union leave only the compensation that the trooper would receive "as if he were in full-time active service." 3 , 4 Id. *743 The Commonwealth Court agreed with Appellants, basing its reasoning on this Court's holding and analysis in Kirsch | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re: Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Authority C. DeLuca v. Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Authority
green
1 sentence2024DeLuca, 166 A.3d at 560 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2021Appellant : : SUBMITTED: April 21, 2021 CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: AUGUST 6, 2021 I agree with the majority’s holding that the requirement of 18 Pa.C.S. §4952(b)(2) is an element of the first-degree felony graded offense of witness intimidation and the trial court’s instruction directing the jury to find such fact violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Long
green
1 sentence2021Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding Appellant’s suppression motions without a holding a hearing.14 See Long, 753 A.2d at 281 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Stodghill v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2020Stodghill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 150 A.3d 547, 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 177 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2018). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang
green
1 sentence2019This Court has previously rejected this argument, Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437 (Pa.Super. 2003), and we are bound by the holding under the doctrine of stare decisis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n , 979 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. 2009) (" PSTA I "). 5 By way of background, in Kirsch , recently retired public school employees on union officer leave sought to utilize the compensation that they had received as union officers-a compensation greater than they would have received had they remained in their positions in the school district-for purposes of retirement computation. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Foster
green
1 sentence2017Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
green
2 sentences2017As the U.S. Supreme Court explained- in Semtek-. “the traditional rule is that expiration of the applicable ■ statute of limitations merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that dismissal on that ground does not have claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations periods.” 531 U.S. at 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1021 . 2017As the U.S. Supreme Court explained- in Semtek-. “the traditional rule is that expiration of the applicable ■ statute of limitations merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that dismissal on that ground does not have claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations periods.” 531 U.S. at 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1021 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2017In Birchfield v. North Dakota, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), Justice Sotomayor, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the majority’s holding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment did not permit warrantless blood tests, but dissented as to the majority’s holding that the exception did permit warrantless breath tests of drivers suspected of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or other impairing substances. 2017Id. at 4 __, 136 S. Ct. at 2187 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kelly v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2011Simmons "Life Means Life" Instruction I support the majority's holding on this claim solely in light of this Court's holding that Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 , 122 S.Ct. 726 , 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), is to be applied only prospectively. 2011Simmons "Life Means Life" Instruction I support the majority's holding on this claim solely in light of this Court's holding that Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 , 122 S.Ct. 726 , 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), is to be applied only prospectively. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Buffalo Township v. Jones
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 654-55, 813 A.2d at 670 . ¶ 18 Based upon the Court’s holding and analysis in Buffalo Toumship, it is abundantly clear that in the case sub judice, the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bergman v. United Services Automobile Ass'n
green
1 sentence2003More to the point, the holding did bar such evidence only “that expert testimony is not required as a per se rale under Pennsylvania law in bad faith actions.” Id. at 1107 . (emphasis in original) These limitations to the holding in Bergman were brought into further focus in Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 791 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. 2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2003More to the point, the holding did bar such evidence only “that expert testimony is not required as a per se rale under Pennsylvania law in bad faith actions.” Id. at 1107 . (emphasis in original) These limitations to the holding in Bergman were brought into further focus in Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 791 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. 2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Penns Manor Area School District v. Penns Manor Education Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence2002Central to the arbitrator’s holding was his analysis of Mifflinburg and its relationship to Penns Manor Area School District v. Penns Manor Education Association, 556 Pa. 438 , 729 A.2d 71 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Mls
neutral
1 sentence2002Central to the arbitrator’s holding was his analysis of Mifflinburg and its relationship to Penns Manor Area School District v. Penns Manor Education Association, 556 Pa. 438 , 729 A.2d 71 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v. Peace Valley Lakeside Community & Agricultural Trust, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| City of Worcester v. HCA Management Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Federal Deposit Insurance v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Cases that have used the five-factor analysis to support a holding that the privilege was not lost through an inadvertent disclosure caused by counsel’s negligence include Hydraflow Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Commonwealth v. Evans green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| cluster 396888 green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Commonwealth v. Kull green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Chambers v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Richard P. Herman, United States of America v. James J. McCann in No. 78-1282 green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Bell v. Bell green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Terpeluk v. Insurance Co. of North America green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Blair green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Eubanks v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Commonwealth v. Butler green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| United States v. Wade green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Commonwealth v. Funk green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Wall v. Toomey green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Bredin v. Road Commissioners neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Smith v. Wertheimer neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Barclay v. Weaver neutral | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.