holding analysis in Virginia

1874It is the holding by claim of title adverse to another’s title, that constitutes adverse possession.” The court, by Tucker, P., in Williams v. Snidow, 4 Leigh 20 , cited in Chapman v. Chapman, 91 Va. 400 , 21 S. E.

1874It is the holding by claim of title adverse to another’s title, that constitutes adverse possession.” The court, by Tucker, P., in Williams v. Snidow, 4 Leigh 20 , cited in Chapman v. Chapman, 91 Va. 400 , 21 S. E.

2022Id. at 584 .

2022Id. at 584 .

1960In a per curiam opinion rendered in Mins McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307 (D.C.Cir.), where a motion for leave to file a stay was denied, it was held: "The Court is of the opinion that where a committee of the Congress has issued a subpoena ad testificandum to a witness to appear at a hearing, without defining the questions to be asked, the judicial branch of the Government should not enjoin in advance the holding of the hearing or suspend the subpoena.

1960In a per curiam opinion rendered in Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F. 2d 307 (D.C.Cir.), where a motion for leave to file a stay was denied, it was held: “The Court is of the opinion that where a committee of the Congress has issued a subpoena ad testificandum to a witness to appear at a hearing, without defining the questions to be asked, the judicial branch of the Government should not enjoin in advance the holding of the hearing or suspend the subpoena.

2009Id. at 383 , 601 S.E.2d at 651-52 .

2009Id. at 383 , 601 S.E.2d at 651-52 .

2008Therefore, it is this Court’s holding that the privilege granted by § 8.01-581.17 does not protect from discovery the final result of the peer review activity, that is the policies, procedures, and practices manuals that are ultimately promulgated by the health care providers and which are used to govern the operations of the hospital. 45 Va. Cir., at p. 363 .

2008In reviewing this record, I am mindful that “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 658, 663 , 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2008In reviewing this record, I am mindful that “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 658, 663 , 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2007In the case relied upon by the majority, Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 558 , a trial judge found the defendant, Frazier-El "not competent because of arguments he made to represent himself." The Fourth Circuit stated, If this particular statement by the court was intended as an explanation for its refusal to permit Frazier-El to proceed pro se, as Frazier-El now contends, it was an error of law.

1997The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to overrule either of these cases; however, we interpret the holding and analysis of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), decided subsequent to Perroiv and Adkins , to be determinative of the application of autrefois acquit under the circumstances of the instant case.

1997The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to overrule either of these cases; however, we interpret the holding and analysis of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), decided subsequent to Perroiv and Adkins , to be determinative of the application of autrefois acquit under the circumstances of the instant case.

1997In Scott , the Court held that for double jeopardy *447 purposes “a defendant is acquitted only when ‘the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ ” Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 , 98 S.Ct. at 2198 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)) (emphasis added).

1997In Scott , the Court held that for double jeopardy *447 purposes “a defendant is acquitted only when ‘the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ ” Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 , 98 S.Ct. at 2198 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)) (emphasis added).

1895Creekmur v. Creekmur, 75 Va. 430, 436 ; Whitlock v. Johnson, 87 Va. 323, 327 .

1895Creekmur v. Creekmur, 75 Va. 430, 436 ; Whitlock v. Johnson, 87 Va. 323, 327 .