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15 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Angle v. Koppers, Inc.green2 sentences2019Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So. 3d 1, 5 (Miss. 2010).1 1 I continue to disagree vehemently with the Court’s holding that a claim can accrue when the plaintiff knows of an injury but not its cause. 2017This Court thus decided that the plain language of Section 15-1-49(2) means “that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.” Id. (emphasis in original).13 13 While I have expressed strong disagreement with this Court’s holding that a claim can accrue when the plaintiff knows of an injury but not its cause, for the purposes of my analysis today, I apply the test from Angle, since it is the relevant precedent of this Court. | 4 | 4 |
City of Tupelo, Mississippi v. John Patterson (Pat) O'Callaghangreen2 sentences2019See City of Tupelo v. O'Callaghan , 208 So.3d 556 , 574 (Miss. 2017) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemore , 54 So.3d 833 , 840 (Kitchens J., dissenting); Angle , 42 So.3d at 9 (Kitchens, J, dissenting). 2017KING, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. , While I have expressed strong disagreement with-this Court's holding that a claim can accrue when the plaintiff knows of an injury but not its cause; for the purposes of my analysis today, I apply the test from Angle , since it is the relevant precedent of this Court, See City of Tupelo v. Patterson, 208 So.3d 556, 574 (Miss. 2017) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemore, 54 So.3d 833, 840 (Miss. 2010) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Angle, 42 So.3d at 9 (Kitchens, J., dissenting). | 4 | 4 |
Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemoregreen2 sentences2019See City of Tupelo v. O'Callaghan , 208 So.3d 556 , 574 (Miss. 2017) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemore , 54 So.3d 833 , 840 (Kitchens J., dissenting); Angle , 42 So.3d at 9 (Kitchens, J, dissenting). 2017KING, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. , While I have expressed strong disagreement with-this Court's holding that a claim can accrue when the plaintiff knows of an injury but not its cause; for the purposes of my analysis today, I apply the test from Angle , since it is the relevant precedent of this Court, See City of Tupelo v. Patterson, 208 So.3d 556, 574 (Miss. 2017) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemore, 54 So.3d 833, 840 (Miss. 2010) (Kitchens, J., dissenting); Angle, 42 So.3d at 9 (Kitchens, J., dissenting). | 2 | 4 |
Mount v. Mountgreen2 sentences2017"Awarding costs and attorney[']s fees because a contemptuous party has necessitated the holding of a hearing to enforce a prior order of the court is appropriate." McDonald , 850 So.2d at 1192 (¶ 40) (citing Mount v. Mount , 624 So.2d 1001 , 1005 (Miss. 1993) ). 2002Mount v. Mount, 624 So.2d 1001, 1005 (Miss. 1993). | 2 | 3 |
Adam Heisinger v. Priscilla Rileygreen1 sentence2020This Court then clarified that “[f]ees awarded on this basis, though, should not exceed the expense incurred as a result of the contemptuous conduct[,]” and explained that “fees incurred litigating other matters—such as custody modification or child support—are not recoverable based on the contempt.” Heisinger, 243 So. 3d at 259 (¶45). ¶34. | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2017"Awarding costs and attorney[']s fees because a contemptuous party has necessitated the holding of a hearing to enforce a prior order of the court is appropriate." McDonald , 850 So.2d at 1192 (¶ 40) (citing Mount v. Mount , 624 So.2d 1001 , 1005 (Miss. 1993) ). | 1 | 1 |
Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkisongreen2 sentences2002Co. v. Process Eng'g, Inc., 341 So.2d 646, 653 (Miss.1977) (quoting Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 247 Miss. 327, 338 , 153 So.2d 689, 694 (1963)). 2002Co. v. Process Eng'g, Inc., 341 So.2d 646, 653 (Miss.1977) (quoting Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 247 Miss. 327, 338 , 153 So.2d 689, 694 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson Const. Co., Inc. v. Process Eng.green1 sentence2002Co. v. Process Eng'g, Inc., 341 So.2d 646, 653 (Miss.1977) (quoting Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 247 Miss. 327, 338 , 153 So.2d 689, 694 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Sellersgreen1 sentence1987However, we would note that, while the chancellor correctly stated the test for rebutting this presumption, from Harris v. Sellers, 446 So.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Miss. 1984), he incorrectly applied it. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Leverock & Hamby
green
2 sentences2010While I concur with the majority's holding and analysis, I cannot join the majority opinion where it adopts the analysis found in In re: Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So.3d 424 (Miss.2009). 2010While I concur with the majority’s holding and analysis, I cannot join the majority opinion where it adopts the analysis found in In re: Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So.3d 424 (Miss.2009). | 2 | 2007–2010 |
Lovorn v. Hathorn
green
2 sentences2003Likewise, in Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 So.2d 947 (Miss.1978), this Court reversed and remanded to the chancery court a matter involving the proper means of electing state officials and never indicated that the chancery court was without jurisdiction. 2001Likewise, in Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1978), this Court reversed and remanded to the chancery court a matter involving the proper means of electing state officials and never indicated that the chancery court was without jurisdiction. | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins
green
2 sentences1993The Appellate Court, however, reversed the holding that the defense of interspousal immunity could be raised by a third party, and stated: "[t]he words legally entitled to recover mean that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages." Id. 33 Ill.Dec. at 141 , 396 N.E.2d at 530 . 1993The Appellate Court, however, reversed the holding that the defense of interspousal immunity could be raised by a third party, and stated: "[t]he words legally entitled to recover mean that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages." Id. 33 Ill.Dec. at 141 , 396 N.E.2d at 530 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.