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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogers Corp. v. State Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2000This Court has determined that settlement of the claims brought by the Evans-Withycombe claimants and the failure to settle the identical claims brought by these Plaintiffs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and article IX § 1, of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 27 In their opening briefs, ADOR and the County argue that this holding was error because it allowed the taxpayers “to use a judgment from a case in which they were not a party against their opponent who was a party to the other action.” ADOR and the County contend that the taxpayers thus used collateral 2000This Court has determined that settlement of the claims brought by the Evans-Withycombe claimants and the failure to settle the identical claims brought by these Plaintiffs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and article IX § 1, of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 27 In their opening briefs, ADOR and the County argue that this holding was error because it allowed the taxpayers “to use a judgment from a case in which they were not a party against their opponent who was a party to the other action.” ADOR and the County contend that the taxpayers thus used collateral | 1 | 1 |
First Interstate Bank v. State Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2000This Court has determined that settlement of the claims brought by the Evans-Withycombe claimants and the failure to settle the identical claims brought by these Plaintiffs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and article IX § 1, of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 27 In their opening briefs, ADOR and the County argue that this holding was error because it allowed the taxpayers “to use a judgment from a case in which they were not a party against their opponent who was a party to the other action.” ADOR and the County contend that the taxpayers thus used collateral 2000This Court has determined that settlement of the claims brought by the Evans-Withycombe claimants and the failure to settle the identical claims brought by these Plaintiffs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and article IX § 1, of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 27 In their opening briefs, ADOR and the County argue that this holding was error because it allowed the taxpayers “to use a judgment from a case in which they were not a party against their opponent who was a party to the other action.” ADOR and the County contend that the taxpayers thus used collateral | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stoll v. Gottlieb
green
2 sentences1956(Italics ours.) Every tribunal has the power to hear and determine its own jurisdiction, Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 , 59 S.Ct. 134 , 83 L.Ed. 104 , and the same power is not to be denied to the National Labor Relations Board. “ * * * The corporation contends that, since it denies that interstate or foreign commerce is involved and claims that a hearing would subject it to irreparable damage, rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution will be denied unless it be held that the District Court has jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the Board. 1956(Italics ours.) Every tribunal has the power to hear and determine its own jurisdiction, Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 , 59 S.Ct. 134 , 83 L.Ed. 104 , and the same power is not to be denied to the National Labor Relations Board. “ * * * The corporation contends that, since it denies that interstate or foreign commerce is involved and claims that a hearing would subject it to irreparable damage, rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution will be denied unless it be held that the District Court has jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the Board. | 2 | 1956–1956 |
Hollingsworth v. City of Phoenix
green
1 sentence1990Those cases do not support the majority's holding that a claim letter satisfies the sum certain requirement of our claims statute as long as it includes "a reasonable estimate of what the claim is worth." See majority decision, supra, at 465, 793 P.2d at 1132 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Kush v. Rutledge
green
2 sentences1985The Court’s holding and analysis were affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 , 103 S.Ct. 1483 , 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). 1985The Court’s holding and analysis were affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 , 103 S.Ct. 1483 , 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Kinsey v. State of Arizona
green
2 sentences1970“In regards to the trial court’s action in excusing the lawyer, this court has held that a defendant is not entitled to be tried by a particular juror, Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201 , 65 P.2d 1141 , 125 A.L.R. 3 , * * * ” The basis for the holding of a violation of substantial rights is the compelling of the individual to accept a juror objectionable to him, it being recognized in Thompson, supra, that the peremptory challenge was a substantial right to reject a juror and not for the purpose of selecting one. 1970“In regards to the trial court’s action in excusing the lawyer, this court has held that a defendant is not entitled to be tried by a particular juror, Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201 , 65 P.2d 1141 , 125 A.L.R. 3 , * * * ” The basis for the holding of a violation of substantial rights is the compelling of the individual to accept a juror objectionable to him, it being recognized in Thompson, supra, that the peremptory challenge was a substantial right to reject a juror and not for the purpose of selecting one. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Graff
green
1 sentence1957California has an identical statute, West’s Ann.Pen.Code, § 17, with section 13-103, supra, and while it has not had occasion to consider its constitutionality it held in Frankfort v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.App. 357 , 235 P. 60 , and in People v. Graff, Cal.App., 300 P.2d 837, 841 , in passing upon the discretionary clause thereof, that a violation of the act is: *25 “ * * * considered as a felony for every purpose up to the judgment and by a judgment other than imprisonment in the State prison it loses that character prospectively only, without retroactive effect. * * * ” We agree with this h | 1 | 1957–1957 |
People v. Stevens
neutral
1 sentence1957California has an identical statute, West’s Ann.Pen.Code, § 17, with section 13-103, supra, and while it has not had occasion to consider its constitutionality it held in Frankfort v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.App. 357 , 235 P. 60 , and in People v. Graff, Cal.App., 300 P.2d 837, 841 , in passing upon the discretionary clause thereof, that a violation of the act is: *25 “ * * * considered as a felony for every purpose up to the judgment and by a judgment other than imprisonment in the State prison it loses that character prospectively only, without retroactive effect. * * * ” We agree with this h | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Frankfort v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1957California has an identical statute, West’s Ann.Pen.Code, § 17, with section 13-103, supra, and while it has not had occasion to consider its constitutionality it held in Frankfort v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.App. 357 , 235 P. 60 , and in People v. Graff, Cal.App., 300 P.2d 837, 841 , in passing upon the discretionary clause thereof, that a violation of the act is: *25 “ * * * considered as a felony for every purpose up to the judgment and by a judgment other than imprisonment in the State prison it loses that character prospectively only, without retroactive effect. * * * ” We agree with this h | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.