holding hearing in West Virginia

2026Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the following two-part test: “(1) [c]ounsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different”). 4 As we noted in Losh, a claim that does not have “detailed factual support does not justify . . . the appointment of counsel [or] the holding of a hearing.” 166 W.

2019We agree with respondent. 3 In Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Miller, 194 W.

1978NEELY, Justice, concurring: I concur in the majority's holding that the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), incorporated in our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), is fully and completely retroactive, extending even to permit collateral attack upon convictions not in the process of direct appellate review at the time Pendry or Mullaney were decided.

1978NEELY, Justice, concurring: I concur in the majority's holding that the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), incorporated in our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), is fully and completely retroactive, extending even to permit collateral attack upon convictions not in the process of direct appellate review at the time Pendry or Mullaney were decided.

1978NEELY, Justice, concurring: I concur in the majority's holding that the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), incorporated in our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), is fully and completely retroactive, extending even to permit collateral attack upon convictions not in the process of direct appellate review at the time Pendry or Mullaney were decided.

1978Neely, Justice, concurring: I concur in the majority’s holding that the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), incorporated in our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va. 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), is fully and completely retroactive, extending even to permit collateral attack upon convictions not in the process of direct appellate review at the time Pendry or Mullaney were decided.

2021Pt. 2, White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 601 S.E.2d 18 (2004).

2021Pt. 2, White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 601 S.E.2d 18 (2004).

2021“A mere recitation of any of our enumerated grounds without detailed factual support does not justify the issuance of a writ, the appointment of counsel, and the holding of a hearing.” Id. at 734 , 601 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.

2021“A mere recitation of any of our enumerated grounds without detailed factual support does not justify the issuance of a writ, the appointment of counsel, and the holding of a hearing.” Id. at 734 , 601 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.

2020Regarding the holding of a hearing, in State v. King, 205 W.

2020Va. 422 , 518 S.E.2d 663 (1999), we rejected the argument that the circuit court erred in not holding a hearing on a Rule 35(b) motion.2 In that case, we explained that a hearing on the motion was unnecessary where the record established that “the circuit court held lengthy hearings when the appellant pled guilty and when he was sentenced.” King, 205 W.

2020Va. 935 , 253 S.E.2d 534 (1979), we held: “A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence unless the case comes within the following rules: (1) The evidence must appear to have been discovered since the trial, and, from the affidavit of the new witness, what such evidence will be, or its absence satisfactorily explained. (2) It must appear from facts stated in his affidavit that plaintiff was diligent in ascertaining and securing his evidence, and that the new evidence is such that due diligence would not have secured it before the verdict. (3) Such evidence must be

2019While petitioner argues that the minor victims’ testimony was not credible, that determination was for the jury to make pursuant to Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Guthrie, 194 W.

2004After reviewing other, related cases, the Court in Ward ruled that, "we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in holding a hearing when the non-moving parties were given almost no notice and no time to prepare." Id., 200 W.Va. at 276 , 489 S.E.2d at 30 .

2004After reviewing other, related cases, the Court in Ward ruled that, "we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in holding a hearing when the non-moving parties were given almost no notice and no time to prepare." Id., 200 W.Va. at 276 , 489 S.E.2d at 30 .

1978This is justified exclusively because the United States Supreme Court has determined that the primary purpose of the new constitutional rule set forth in Mullaney is "to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 at 243 , 97 S.Ct. 2339 at 2345 , 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977) quoting Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 at 204 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 959 (1972).

1978This is justified exclusively because the United States Supreme Court has determined that the primary purpose of the new constitutional rule set forth in Mullaney is "to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 at 243 , 97 S.Ct. 2339 at 2345 , 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977) quoting Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 at 204 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 959 (1972).

1895In French v. Gifford, 31 Iowa 428 , this distinction is clearly drawn by the holding that the rule that the compensation of a receiver to take charge of the assets and wind up the affairs of an insolvent corporation should be paid out of the fund in his hands generally applies to cases where he closes up his business, and settles his accounts, not to cases where the order appointing him is set aside as improperly made.

1895It was later recognized in Radford v. Folsom, 55 Iowa 276 ( 7 N. W.

1895It was later recognized in Radford v. Folsom, 55 Iowa 276 ( 7 N. W.