showing error in Georgia

2020“For that reason, [his] claim that the trial court erred by [giving] the charge is subject to review only for plain error.” Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 172 (2) (a) ( 815 SE2d 38 ) (2018). 10 And Grullon cannot show plain error, which among other things requires a showing that the error “has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant.” State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 232 ) (2011) (citation omitted).

2020“For that reason, [his] claim that the trial court erred by [giving] the charge is subject to review only for plain error.” Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 172 (2) (a) ( 815 SE2d 38 ) (2018). 10 And Grullon cannot show plain error, which among other things requires a showing that the error “has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant.” State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 232 ) (2011) (citation omitted).

2026See, e.g., McKoy v. State, 303 Ga. 327, 333 (2018) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a conclusion that reversible error occurred requires a showing of error and harm and that an appellant has the burden of proving trial court error by the appellate record.” (cleaned up)); Swindle v. Swindle, 221 Ga. 760, 762 (1966) (“In order for this court to determine whether or not a trial judge erred in admitting evidence we must be able to determine what evidence is claimed to have been illegally admitted and what objection was made to the evidence at the time 15 it was admitted.”). 5.

2026See, e.g., McKoy v. State, 303 Ga. 327, 333 (2018) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a conclusion that reversible error occurred requires a showing of error and harm and that an appellant has the burden of proving trial court error by the appellate record.” (cleaned up)); Swindle v. Swindle, 221 Ga. 760, 762 (1966) (“In order for this court to determine whether or not a trial judge erred in admitting evidence we must be able to determine what evidence is claimed to have been illegally admitted and what objection was made to the evidence at the time 15 it was admitted.”). 5.

2025See, e.g., Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688 , 696–97 (2010) (determining that where this Court lacked information regarding the identification, or the circumstances surrounding the admission, of allegedly objectionable evidence, it “must apply the presumption of regularity and hold that the trial court discharged her duties properly”); Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga. 358, 361 (2010) (recognizing that “[t]here is a presumption of regularity that attaches to all official acts, which includes judicial proceedings,” and applying that presumption where absence of hearing transcript in appellat

2025See, e.g., Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688 , 696–97 (2010) (determining that where this Court lacked information regarding the identification, or the circumstances surrounding the admission, of allegedly objectionable evidence, it “must apply the presumption of regularity and hold that the trial court discharged her duties properly”); Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes, 287 Ga. 358, 361 (2010) (recognizing that “[t]here is a presumption of regularity that attaches to all official acts, which includes judicial proceedings,” and applying that presumption where absence of hearing transcript in appellat

2024See State v. Herrera- Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 263-264 (2) (b) (818 SE2d 552) (2018).

2024See State v. Herrera- Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 263-264 (2) (b) (818 SE2d 552) (2018).

2021Even if plain error review could apply, as previously stated, the second prong of the plain error test requires a showing that the error was “clear and not open to reasonable dispute.” (Citation omitted.) McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 134 (2) ( 834 SE2d 741 ) (2019).

2020“For that reason, [his] claim that the trial court erred by [giving] the charge is subject to review only for plain error.” Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 172 (2) (a) ( 815 SE2d 38 ) (2018). 10 And Grullon cannot show plain error, which among other things requires a showing that the error “has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant.” State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 232 ) (2011) (citation omitted).

2016See King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 263 ( 539 SE2d 783 ) (2000).

2016See King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 263 ( 539 SE2d 783 ) (2000).

2012And we take into account that, in Georgia, where (as here) a direct appeal is taken, “any other ruling that will affect the case below . . . may potentially be considered by an appellate court . . . .”24 Notwithstanding, it remains axiomatic that a conclusion that reversible error occurred requires a showing of error and harm25 and that “[a]n appellant has the burden of proving trial court error by the appellate record.”26 We are guided by Linares v. State27 (albeit decided prior to the enactment of OCGA § 24-9-84.1 28), wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia cited Luce precisely for 24 Jenkins

2012And we take into account that, in Georgia, where (as here) a direct appeal is taken, “any other ruling that will affect the case below . . . may potentially be considered by an appellate court . . . .”24 Notwithstanding, it remains axiomatic that a conclusion that reversible error occurred requires a showing of error and harm25 and that “[a]n appellant has the burden of proving trial court error by the appellate record.”26 We are guided by Linares v. State27 (albeit decided prior to the enactment of OCGA § 24-9-84.1 28), wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia cited Luce precisely for 24 Jenkins

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2012See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), which pertinently provides, “Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewh

2010Since any error, if it is indeed an error, “impairs” the presentation of the defense, the showing of such an error is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. *179 Strickland, v. Washington, supra at 693 (III) (B).

2010“When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, supra at 695 (III) (B).

1987Here, as in Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 328 (4) ( 297 SE2d 237 ) (1982), any error committed in connection with the topic of appellant's post-arrest silence would be harmless: "Because of the overwhelming evidence linking [appellant] with this crime, the error [, if any,] is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt...." See also Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541 (1) ( 265 SE2d 868 ) (1980).

1987Here, as in Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 328 (4) ( 297 SE2d 237 ) (1982), any error committed in connection with the topic of appellant's post-arrest silence would be harmless: "Because of the overwhelming evidence linking [appellant] with this crime, the error [, if any,] is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt...." See also Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541 (1) ( 265 SE2d 868 ) (1980).

1982See Sanders v. State, 132 Ga. App. 580 (2) ( 208 SE2d 597 ) (1974).

1982See Sanders v. State, 132 Ga. App. 580 (2) ( 208 SE2d 597 ) (1974).