showing error in Texas

2024Id. “[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted.” Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim.

2024Id. “[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted.” Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim.

2016Hutchins v. State, 475 S.W.3d 496 , 500–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (“While the showing of a warning is of evidentiary value in determining whether a 11 valid consent was given, such a warning is not required or essential.”) (citing Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2016“While a warning that an individual does not have to consent to a search and has the right to refuse is not required nor [sic] essential, the showing of a warning is of evidentiary value in determining whether a valid consent was given.” Meeks, 692 S.W.2d at 510 .

2024Id. “[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted.” Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim.

2024Id. “[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted.” Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim.

2026“Ordinarily, a defendant can make such a showing only at a hearing on a motion for new trial because only then will he be able to produce evidence regarding what additional information, evidence, 7 or witnesses would have been available to him if the trial court had granted the motion.” Brooks, 2024 WL 1200481 , at *3 n.2; see Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 842– 43 (noting that a showing of harm “can ordinarily be made only at a hearing on a motion for new trial, because almost always only at that time will the defendant be able to produce evidence as to what additional information, evidence[,] or wi

2023Ordinarily, a defendant can “make such a showing only at a hearing on a motion for -4- 04-22-00329-CR new trial because only then will she be able to produce evidence regarding what additional information, evidence, or witnesses the defense would have had available if the trial court had granted the motion for delay.” Id. at 825–26.

2016Co., 421 S.W.3d at 173 (explaining that a rule 202 petition that does not include “explanatory facts regarding the anticipated suit or the potential claim ... is insufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden”); see also In re Contractor’s Supplies, Inc., No. 12-09-00231-CV, 2009 WL 2488374 , at *5 (Tex.App.-Tyler Aug. 17, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.) (“A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering a presuit deposition if the petitioner does not make the showing required by rule 202.”).

2016Co., 421 S.W.3d at 173 (explaining that a rule 202 petition that does not include “explanatory facts regarding the anticipated suit or the potential claim . . . is insufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden”); see also In re Contractor’s Supplies, Inc., No. 12-09-00231-CV, 2009 WL 2488374 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 17, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering a presuit deposition if the petitioner does not make the showing required by rule 202.”).

2014Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim.

2014Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.2012).

2009See In re Campos, No. 02-07-00197-CV, 2007 WL 2013057 , at *4 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 12, 2007, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (trial court abused discretion by ordering presuit deposition where evidence established proposed deponent possessed no information that would be useful to petitioner); In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 363-64 (trial court abused discretion by ordering presuit investigative deposition when party seeking deposition did not establish that benefit of deposition outweighed potential burden or expense of procedure); In re Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut.

2009See In re Campos , No. 02-07-00197-CV, 2007 WL 2013057 , at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 12, 2007, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (trial court abused discretion by ordering presuit deposition where evidence established proposed deponent possessed no information that would be useful to petitioner); In re Hewlett Packard , 212 S.W.3d at 363-64 (trial court abused discretion by ordering presuit investigative deposition when party seeking deposition did not establish that benefit of deposition outweighed potential burden or expense of procedure); In re Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut.

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir.2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir.2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir.2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir.2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2007See In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir.2006); In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir.2003); In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).

2005Id .; see Reasor , 12 S.W.3d at 818 . [7] Additionally, A [w]hile a warning that an individual does not have to consent to a search and has the right to refuse is not required nor essential, the showing of a warning is of evidentiary value in determining whether a valid consent was given. @ See Meeks v. State , 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2005Id.; see Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 818 . 7 Additionally, “[wjhile a warning that an individual does not have to consent to a search and has the right to refuse is not required nor essential, the showing of a warning is of evidentiary value in determining whether a valid consent was given.” See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1952See Smith v. State, 129 Tex. Cr.

1943See Smith v. State, 86 S. W. (2d) 750 ; Harris v. State, 106 Tex. Cr.

2026“Under the Estates Code, the Legislature provided a means for ‘interested person[s]’ to file a bill of review to revise or correct an order or judgment of a probate court upon a showing of error in the order or judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX.

2021Woods, 501 S.W.3d at 191 (citing former Texas Probate Code section 31, which is now codified in Estates Code section 55.521); see also Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 230 (noting, in applying limitations to section 55.521, that “[b]ills of review are intrinsically incongruous with finality, and thus are not lightly granted.”).4 So long as the bill of review is filed timely, not “more than two years after the date of the order or judgment,” an interested person may “have an order or judgment rendered by the court revised and corrected on a showing of error in the order or judgment.” Tex. Est.

2022See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2019Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 .

2026App. 1997). “[W]ithout a showing that the error resulted in the denial of a fair and impartial jury,” Texas courts have consistently held “that there was no reversible error in cases in which the trial judge improperly granted a challenge for cause.” Gray v. State, 233 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2023Id. (“These two prongs require first, a showing of error, and second, a showing that the error was harmful.”); see Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 249 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“In the unique context of most family law issues, however, an appellant must go one-step further and show that as a result of the challenged factual finding, the trial court’s decision on issues of property division, conservatorship, visitation, or child support, was an abuse of discretion.).

2023Id. (“These two prongs require first, a showing of error, and second, a showing that the error was harmful.”); see Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 249 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“In the unique context of most family law issues, however, an appellant must go one-step further and show that as a result of the challenged factual finding, the trial court’s decision on issues of property division, conservatorship, visitation, or child support, was an abuse of discretion.).

2022A bill of review under this statute “may not be filed more than two years after the date of the order or judgment, as applicable.” Id. § 55.251(b). 15 will not be re-examined.” City of Hous. v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). “[A] reviewing court may apply the law of the case doctrine in a subsequent proceeding if the facts in the later proceeding are ‘so nearly the same [as the earlier proceeding] that they do not materially affect the legal issues involved in the later proceeding.’” In re B.G.D., 351 S.W.3d 131,