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9 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Phillips v. Legurskygreen2 sentences2005Phillips v. Legursky, 187 W.Va. 607, 608 , 420 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1992) (“Traditionally, we have held that habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal and that a showing of error of a constitutional dimension is required in order to set aside a criminal conviction in a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus.”). 2005Phillips v. Legursky, 187 W.Va. 607, 608 , 420 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1992) (“Traditionally, we have held that habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal and that a showing of error of a constitutional dimension is required in order to set aside a criminal conviction in a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus.”). | 2 | 2 |
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.green2 sentences2022La. 2014) (citing 20 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 82 ); accord Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 301 (stating that “if a notice violation occur[s], the ‘FMLA’s comprehensive remedial mechanism’ grants no relief absent a showing that the violation prejudiced” the plaintiff (quoting Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 )); Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The] FMLA’s remedial scheme . . . requires an employee to prove prejudice as a result of an employer’s noncompliance”); Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F.Supp.3d 702 , 725 (E.D. 2022La. 2014) (citing 20 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 82 ); accord Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 301 (stating that “if a notice violation occur[s], the ‘FMLA’s comprehensive remedial mechanism’ grants no relief absent a showing that the violation prejudiced” the plaintiff (quoting Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 )); Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The] FMLA’s remedial scheme . . . requires an employee to prove prejudice as a result of an employer’s noncompliance”); Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F.Supp.3d 702 , 725 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Downey v. Straingreen1 sentence2022La. 2014) (citing 20 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 82 ); accord Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 301 (stating that “if a notice violation occur[s], the ‘FMLA’s comprehensive remedial mechanism’ grants no relief absent a showing that the violation prejudiced” the plaintiff (quoting Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 )); Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The] FMLA’s remedial scheme . . . requires an employee to prove prejudice as a result of an employer’s noncompliance”); Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F.Supp.3d 702 , 725 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
John Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bankgreen1 sentence2022La. 2014) (citing 20 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 82 ); accord Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 301 (stating that “if a notice violation occur[s], the ‘FMLA’s comprehensive remedial mechanism’ grants no relief absent a showing that the violation prejudiced” the plaintiff (quoting Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89 )); Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The] FMLA’s remedial scheme . . . requires an employee to prove prejudice as a result of an employer’s noncompliance”); Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F.Supp.3d 702 , 725 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2019See Syl. pt. 1, in part, Cahill, 208 W. | 1 | 1 |
Remeta v. Singletarygreen2 sentences2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do -with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 | 1 | 1 |
Cross v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do -with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 | 1 | 1 |
Richard Lara v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen2 sentences2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do -with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 | 1 | 1 |
Maggard v. Gammongreen2 sentences2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do -with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 | 1 | 1 |
Westley v. Texasgreen2 sentences2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do -with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 2006Cross, 87 F.3d at 587-8 (claim of IAD violation not cognizable in habeas action as IAD provision at issue has nothing to do with securing a fair trial and there has been no allegation that violation impaired defense or appeal); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1998) (must show exceptional circumstance that violation of IAD constitutes fundamental defect causing a miscarriage of justice to the prejudice of the defendant before claim is cognizable under federal habeas statutes); Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 519 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1225 , 117 S.Ct. 1727 , 137 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Leon D. Harvey)green1 sentence1995In In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1010 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.1982), the Fourth Circuit stated: “We recognize that normally a subpoena is presumed to be regular, and that the subpoenaed party has the burden of showing that the information sought is privileged or that there has been an abuse of the grand jury process.... | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences1982See State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977). 1982See State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 412716
green
1 sentence1995In In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1010 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.1982), the Fourth Circuit stated: “We recognize that normally a subpoena is presumed to be regular, and that the subpoenaed party has the burden of showing that the information sought is privileged or that there has been an abuse of the grand jury process.... | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1993In Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital, 188 W.Va. 674 , 425 S.E.2d 629 (1992), we held that a person may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of an accompanying physical injury upon a showing that the claim for emotional damages is not spurious. 1993In Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital, 188 W.Va. 674 , 425 S.E.2d 629 (1992), we held that a person may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of an accompanying physical injury upon a showing that the claim for emotional damages is not spurious. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Stout
green
2 sentences1982Similarly, in State v. Stout, 169 W.Va. 90 , 285 S.E.2d 892 (1982), this Court stated: “Under our doctrine of harmless constitutional error, the State can avoid a reversal *438 only by a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 169 W.Va. at 92, 285 S.E.2d at 893. 1982Similarly, in State v. Stout, 169 W.Va. 90 , 285 S.E.2d 892 (1982), this Court stated: “Under our doctrine of harmless constitutional error, the State can avoid a reversal *438 only by a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 169 W.Va. at 92, 285 S.E.2d at 893. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.