showing error in California

2024All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) “In the context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient performance is demonstrated by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel's performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]nquiry into actual conflict [does not require] something separate and apart from adverse effect.’ [Citation.] ‘An “actual conflict,” for Sixth Amendment purposes, is

2024All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) “In the context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient performance is demonstrated by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel's performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]nquiry into actual conflict [does not require] something separate and apart from adverse effect.’ [Citation.] ‘An “actual conflict,” for Sixth Amendment purposes, is

2024(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 .) “In the context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient performance is demonstrated by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’ ” (Doolin, at p. 417, quoting Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 171 .) Determining “whether counsel’s performance was ‘adversely affected’ under the federal standard ‘requires an inquiry into whether counsel “pulled his [or her]

2023(Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 164, 174 [ 120 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 ] (Mickens); People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1137 ; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837-838 .) As summarized by our Supreme Court, Mickens “confirmed that claims of Sixth Amendment violation based on conflicts of interest are a category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that . . . generally require a defendant to show (1) counsel’s deficient performance, and (2) a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficiencies, the 29 result of the proceeding would have been different. ([Peopl

2026(See People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 712 [§ 1172.6 prima facie case “does not require a showing that a claim to relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 arises from no other cause—only that the 2019 changes supply a basis for the claim and so are a cause”].) The evidence does not compel a conclusion that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution did not meet its burden.

2026People v. Clamp H051545 Lie, J., Concurring: By alleging “he . . . could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense ‘because of changes to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189[1] made effective January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)),” defendant Kenneth Kirk Clamp “put[] at issue all elements of the offense under a valid theory.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 (Curiel), italics added.) “[S]ection 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)’s ‘because of’ language does not require a showing that a claim to relief under [the statute] arises from no other cause—only that the 2019 changes supply a

2014Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 654 (Scottsdale).) “The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage. [Citation.] When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, ‘it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.’” (Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 655 , citing Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46 (Buss).) As explained in Buss, “before, the insurer had a duty to defend;

2005(Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 275-276 ; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that the

2026(See generally, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing of error and prejudice].) 18 General concedes, that the simple kidnapping instruction incorrectly defined the asportation element of that crime.

2024(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 .) “In the context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient performance is demonstrated by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’ ” (Doolin, at p. 417, quoting Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 171 .) Determining “whether counsel’s performance was ‘adversely affected’ under the federal standard ‘requires an inquiry into whether counsel “pulled his [or her]

2026Code,] § 2778, subd. 4.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 558, fn. 7 , italics added.) “ ‘When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, “it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.” ’ ” (Centex Homes, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238 , quoting Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 655 .) To summarize, “where the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts embraced by the indemnity agreement, the indemnitor has a duty to defend throughout the underlying tort action unless it can conclusively show by un

2026Code,] § 2778, subd. 4.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 558, fn. 7 , italics added.) “ ‘When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, “it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.” ’ ” (Centex Homes, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238 , quoting Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 655 .) To summarize, “where the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts embraced by the indemnity agreement, the indemnitor has a duty to defend throughout the underlying tort action unless it can conclusively show by un

2016(See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 715 P.2d 624 ] [declining to review the adequacy of an award of damages absent a transcript or settled statement of the damages portion of a jury trial]; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 448 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 ] (Vo) [“The absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion”].) We proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal, cognizant of appellants’ obligation to provide an adequate record to de

2016(See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 715 P.2d 624 ] [declining to review the adequacy of an award of damages absent a transcript or settled statement of the damages portion of a jury trial]; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 448 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 ] (Vo) [“The absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion”].) We proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal, cognizant of appellants’ obligation to provide an adequate record to de

2020(See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228 [objection to admission of evidence or exclusion of evidence must be made in the trial court and it must be specific in order to preserve the issue for appeal].) Even if not forfeited, the contention fails on its merits because the court’s error in admitting defendant’s prior conviction for battery with serious bodily injury did not prejudice defendant under even the more stringent Chapman standard for error, which requires a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d

2020(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [requiring reversal only if it is reasonably probable that mother would have obtained a more favorable result had the section 366.3 hearing been held]; see also Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [requiring a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) The upcoming permanency planning hearing provides a comprehensive forum in which to address all of Caden’s current needs and concerns, and mother will have an opportunity to present evidence and argument that her parental rights should not be terminated due to her ben

2020To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Estate of Fain); Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 (Flannery).) “We proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal, cognizant of appellant[’s] obligation to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error as well as our obligation to presume that the decision of the trial court is correct absent a showing of error on the record.” (Flannery, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 ; see Ketchum v. Moses (20

2016(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 ] (Ketchum).) Appellants’ Due Process Claim Appellants contend the trial court violated due process by granting respondents’ motions without a trial or a summary judgment motion.

2026(Britts, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [courts have discretion to make discovery orders].) Having determined that the first deposition order was valid, we now turn to plaintiff’s claim that she did not disobey it.

2025(Britts, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [courts have discretion to make discovery orders].) Having determined that the first deposition order was valid, we now turn to plaintiff’s claim that she did not disobey it.

2026People v. Clamp H051545 Lie, J., Concurring: By alleging “he . . . could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense ‘because of changes to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189[1] made effective January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)),” defendant Kenneth Kirk Clamp “put[] at issue all elements of the offense under a valid theory.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 (Curiel), italics added.) “[S]ection 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)’s ‘because of’ language does not require a showing that a claim to relief under [the statute] arises from no other cause—only that the 2019 changes supply a

2025A. A Remand Is Required to Determine Defendant’s Eligibility for Section 1172.6 Relief Section 1172.6, in relevant part, provides that “person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” may file a petition to have that conviction vacated under certain circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. 11 (a); People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719 , 724; see also id. at 731 [clarifying that the language in § 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) referencing c

2024(People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1461, fn. 5 .) On a silent record, we do not assume the court misunderstood the scope of its discretion.

2024(People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1461, fn. 5 .) On a silent record, we do not assume the court misunderstood the scope of its discretion.

2024(See DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824 [issue preclusion “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided . . . even if the second suit raises different causes of action”], italics added.) Both PAGA and individual Labor Code 17 claims require a preliminary showing that a violation of the Labor Code occurred to succeed.

2024(See DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824 [issue preclusion “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided . . . even if the second suit raises different causes of action”], italics added.) Both PAGA and individual Labor Code 17 claims require a preliminary showing that a violation of the Labor Code occurred to succeed.

2015(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 139 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) 14 The Pompa-Ortiz rule applies only if the right of which the defendant has been deprived is a substantial right (Reilly v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 653 ), as established by a showing that the error, even though not necessarily prejudicial, might reasonably have affected the hearing’s outcome.

2015(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 139 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) 14 The Pompa-Ortiz rule applies only if the right of which the defendant has been deprived is a substantial right (Reilly v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 653 ), as established by a showing that the error, even though not necessarily prejudicial, might reasonably have affected the hearing’s outcome.

2026Code,] § 2778, subd. 4.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 558, fn. 7 , italics added.) “ ‘When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, “it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.” ’ ” (Centex Homes, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238 , quoting Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 655 .) To summarize, “where the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts embraced by the indemnity agreement, the indemnitor has a duty to defend throughout the underlying tort action unless it can conclusively show by un

2026Code,] § 2778, subd. 4.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 558, fn. 7 , italics added.) “ ‘When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, “it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.” ’ ” (Centex Homes, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238 , quoting Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 655 .) To summarize, “where the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts embraced by the indemnity agreement, the indemnitor has a duty to defend throughout the underlying tort action unless it can conclusively show by un

2024“A reporter’s transcript may not be necessary if the appeal involves legal issues requiring de novo review. [Citation.] In many cases involving the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard of review, however, a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement of the proceedings will be [indispensable].” (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 .) “We proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal, cognizant of [plaintiff’s] obligation to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error as well as our obligation to presume that the [judgment] is

2020To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Estate of Fain); Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 (Flannery).) “We proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal, cognizant of appellant[’s] obligation to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error as well as our obligation to presume that the decision of the trial court is correct absent a showing of error on the record.” (Flannery, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 ; see Ketchum v. Moses (20

2002“Because the notice requirement is intended, in part, to protect the interests of Indian tribes, it cannot be waived by the parents’ failure to raise it.” (Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 .) As explained more fully in Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at page 471 : “The tribe of an Indian child who is the subject of child custody proceedings may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate the action upon a showing of a violation of title 25 United States Code section 1912 . ( 25 U.S.C. § 1914 .) There is nothing either in the ICWA or the case law interpreting it whic

2002"Because the notice requirement is intended, in part, to protect the interests of Indian tribes, it cannot be waived by the parents' failure to raise it." ( Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 , 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 267 .) As explained more fully in Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 471 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 : "The tribe of an Indian child who is the subject of child custody proceedings may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate the action upon a showing of a violation of title 25 United States Code section 1912 . ( 25 U.S.C. § 1914 .) There is nothing either in th