showing claim in New Jersey

2022"The core purpose underlying the statute is 'to require plaintiffs . . . to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified [and dismissed] at an early stage of litigation.'" Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 51 (2010) (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)).

2020In the case of an action for medical malpractice, the person executing the affidavit shall meet the requirements of a person who provides expert testimony or executes an affidavit as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41]. [N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.] The Affidavit of Merit Statute’s primary purpose “is ‘to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily [can] be identified at an early stage of litigation.’” Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 242 (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)).

2020In the case of an action for medical malpractice, the person executing the affidavit shall meet the requirements of a person who provides expert testimony or executes an affidavit as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41]. [N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.] The Affidavit of Merit Statute’s primary purpose “is ‘to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily [can] be identified at an early stage of litigation.’” Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 242 (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)).

2020The primary purpose of the statute is to “require plaintiffs . . . to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious.” Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 242 ).

2023In sum, the trial judge concluded that defendant failed to satisfy the two- prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing that defense counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different.

2020Thus, Judge Nelson concluded that defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing that defense counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different.

2021The AOM statute "require[s] plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious . . . ." Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J.

2019Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 , 395 A-3176-17T3 17 (2001), superseded by Affidavit of Merit Statutory Amendment L. 2001, c. 372, § 1, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, as recognized in Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 . 7 Therefore, the AOM's objective is to "require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious," Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J.

2020The primary purpose of the statute is to “require plaintiffs . . . to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious.” Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 242 ).

2019Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 , 395 A-3176-17T3 17 (2001), superseded by Affidavit of Merit Statutory Amendment L. 2001, c. 372, § 1, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, as recognized in Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 . 7 Therefore, the AOM's objective is to "require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious," Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J.

2025Ass'n, 202 N.J. 415 , A-1600-24 6 421 (2010) (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)). "[W]here a plaintiff fails to provide an [AOM] within the statutorily mandated timeframe, it shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action unless the plaintiff satisfies an exception to [the AOM] requirement." Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1 , 23 (2020).

2024"The core purpose underlying the statute is 'to require plaintiffs . . . to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early stage of the litigation.'" Paragon, 202 N.J. at 421 (quoting Alan J.

2022"The core purpose underlying the statute is 'to require plaintiffs . . . to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified [and dismissed] at an early stage of litigation.'" Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 51 (2010) (quoting In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997)).

2011"The core purpose underlying the [Affidavit of Merit] statute is `to require plaintiffs ... to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious,'" so that lawsuits lacking substance can be dismissed "`at an early stage of litigation.'" Ryan, supra, 203 N.J. at 51, 999 A. 2d 427 (quotation omitted); accord Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo.

2021In People v. Luttenberger, the California Supreme Court “adopt[ed] a preliminary showing requirement . . . that is somewhat less demanding than the” showing Franks requires “for purposes of discovery motions” challenging warrant affidavits “based on statements of an unidentified informant.” 784 P.2d 633, 646 (Cal. 1990).

2021In so doing, the court reviewed both state and federal case law and “adopt[ed] a preliminary showing standard, which a defendant must satisfy to obtain in camera examination and discovery of information regarding police informants.” Id. at 636 .

2015A "plaintiff's failure to serve the affidavit within 120 days of the filing of the answer is considered tantamount to the failure to state a cause of action, subjecting the complaint to dismissal with prejudice." Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 150 (2003) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29; Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 404 (2001); Alan J.

2011Ass'n, 202 N.J. 415, 421 , 997 A. 2d 982 (2010). "[T]here is no legislative interest in barring meritorious claims brought in good faith[.]" Ferreira, supra, 178 N.J. at 150-51 , 836 A. 2d 779 (quoting Galik v. Clara Maass Med.

2019Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 , 395 A-0175-17T3 10 (2001), superseded by Affidavit of Merit Statutory Amendment L. 2001, c. 372, § 1, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, as recognized in Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 .6 Therefore, the AOM's objective is to "require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious," Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J.

2019Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 , 395 A-3176-17T3 17 (2001), superseded by Affidavit of Merit Statutory Amendment L. 2001, c. 372, § 1, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, as recognized in Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 . 7 Therefore, the AOM's objective is to "require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious," Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J.

2020As such, in enacting the statute, the Legislature was not concerned with a plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegation contained in his or her complaint, but rather “with whether there is some objective threshold merit to the allegations.” Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 394 (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 331 N.J.

2001Given this purpose, the affidavit of merit statute serves a gate-keeping function so that only those cases that meet a threshold of merit proceed through the litigation stream. [ Hubbard, 331 N.J.Super. at 291-92 , 751 A. 2d 1055 .] Judge Braithwaite found the specific means a plaintiff selects to prove his claim irrelevant to the statutory mandate which requires plaintiffs to meet "a threshold of merit" early in litigation.

2015A "plaintiff's failure to serve the affidavit within 120 days of the filing of the answer is considered tantamount to the failure to state a cause of action, subjecting the complaint to dismissal with prejudice." Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 150 (2003) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29; Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 404 (2001); Alan J.

2010"The statute's essential goal is to put to rest unmeritorious and frivolous malpractice lawsuits at an early stage of litigation while allowing worthy claims to proceed through discovery and, if warranted, to trial." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 176 , 836 A. 2d 794 (2003) (citing Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 404 , 774 A. 2d 501 (2001)).

2025To meet this demanding threshold, the error must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).

2025"Relief under the A-0940-23 6 plain error rule, R. 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).

2025"Relief under the A-0940-23 6 plain error rule, R. 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).

2024Ibid. (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998)); Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377, 383 (2011).

2020See State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 119-20 (1979) (holding that in order to make a similar showing in a challenge to the prosecutor's denial of PTI, the defendant could not prevail merely because she could show that the prosecutor approved PTI for others "charged with similar offenses" but needed to prove that she received "less favorable treatment than identically situated individuals.").

2020See State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).

2019Having invited the court's instruction, defendant may not argue now that the instruction was flawed, absent a showing of an error "so egregious as to 'cut mortally into his substantive rights.'" Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 282 (quoting State v. Harper, 128 N.J.

2017Thus, we review his argument under a plain error standard, which requires a showing of error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2).

2017The court is required to give an unrequested instruction sua sponte "when there is obvious 3 Notably, as the question was posed in the disjunctive, it is unclear whether the jury even found entry at all. 22 A-2466-13T3 record support for such a charge"; in other words, "[o]nly if the record clearly indicates a lesser-included charge — that is, if the evidence is jumping off the page . . . ." Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2016See Alloway, supra, 157 N.J. at 236 , 723 A.2d 960 . *363 In sum, in given circumstances, “the violation of a statutory-duty of care” may be admissible as evidence of negligence.

2016See Alloway, supra, 157 N.J. at 236 , 723 A.2d 960 . *363 In sum, in given circumstances, “the violation of a statutory-duty of care” may be admissible as evidence of negligence.

2012See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

2012See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).