sudden emergency doctrine in Georgia

2025“The sudden emergency defense is available where the evidence shows that there has been a sudden peril caused by circumstances in which the defendant did not participate and which offered him a choice of conduct without time for thought[.]” Id. at 609 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021“A jury charge on the sudden emergency defense is authorized if the defendant presents any evidence, 8 however slight, to support such a defense, even if there is conflicting evidence that would allow the jury ultimately to find that an emergency did not exist.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2021See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 545 (2) (b) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998) (trial court properly instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine where “[the defendant], . . . when faced with the situation, chose to attempt to brake and stop rather than attempting to pass [the preceding vehicle] off the road to the right.”).

2021See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 545 (2) (b) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998) (trial court properly instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine where “[the defendant], . . . when faced with the situation, chose to attempt to brake and stop rather than attempting to pass [the preceding vehicle] off the road to the right.”).

2025See also Rayfield v. Farris, 253 Ga. App. 167, 168 ( 558 SE2d 748 ) (2002) (“[i]n the absence of evidence that [the defendant] had any choice [of conduct], the doctrine of sudden emergency did not apply”).

2025See also Rayfield v. Farris, 253 Ga. App. 167, 168 ( 558 SE2d 748 ) (2002) (“[i]n the absence of evidence that [the defendant] had any choice [of conduct], the doctrine of sudden emergency did not apply”).

2021See Stephens v. Hypes, 271 Ga. App. 863, 865 ( 610 SE2d 631 ) (2005) (because there was a conflict in the evidence regarding whether the defendant was negligent by speeding, “there was some evidence that [the defendant] was confronted by a sudden emergency that she did not participate in creating, and the trial court was correct in charging the jury on that issue”).6 (b) Choice of Conduct 6 To the extent that Smithwick relies on the investigating officer’s testimony that a “contributing factor” in the accident was that Campbell was following too closely, there was still enough evidence to warr

2021See Stephens v. Hypes, 271 Ga. App. 863, 865 ( 610 SE2d 631 ) (2005) (because there was a conflict in the evidence regarding whether the defendant was negligent by speeding, “there was some evidence that [the defendant] was confronted by a sudden emergency that she did not participate in creating, and the trial court was correct in charging the jury on that issue”).6 (b) Choice of Conduct 6 To the extent that Smithwick relies on the investigating officer’s testimony that a “contributing factor” in the accident was that Campbell was following too closely, there was still enough evidence to warr

2011See Butgereit v. Enviro-Tech Environmental Svcs., Inc., 262 Ga. App. at 757 (2); Rayfield v. Farris, 253 Ga. App. at 168 ; Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288 ( 450 SE2d 326 ) (1994); Howard v. Jones, 187 Ga. App. 756, 758 (2) ( 371 SE2d 196 ) (1988).

1994Moreover, Stairs did not testify that he considered any course of conduct other than braking. “[Application of the sudden emergency doctrine requires that the defendant have a choice of conduct. . . . [Cit.]” Howard v. Jones, 187 Ga. App. 756, 758 (2) ( 371 SE2d 196 ) (1988).

1971Held: "When a driver of a motor vehicle is confronted with a sudden emergency caused by the negligence of another, he is not barred from a recovery because he exercised bad judgment under the circumstances, but in such emergency is only charged with the duty of exercising ordinary care and diligence under the circumstances.” Everett v. Clegg, 213 Ga. 168, 169 ( 97 SE2d 689 ).

1971Held: "When a driver of a motor vehicle is confronted with a sudden emergency caused by the negligence of another, he is not barred from a recovery because he exercised bad judgment under the circumstances, but in such emergency is only charged with the duty of exercising ordinary care and diligence under the circumstances.” Everett v. Clegg, 213 Ga. 168, 169 ( 97 SE2d 689 ).

2025Thus, “[a]pplication of the sudden emergency doctrine requires that the defendant have a choice of conduct.” Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288, 289 (1) ( 450 SE2d 326 ) (1994) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025Thus, “[a]pplication of the sudden emergency doctrine requires that the defendant have a choice of conduct.” Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288, 289 (1) ( 450 SE2d 326 ) (1994) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2005See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 545 (2) (b) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998); Holt v. Scott, 226 Ga. App. 812, 815 (2) ( 487 SE2d 657 ) (1997).

2005See Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543, 545 (2) (b) ( 502 SE2d 487 ) (1998); Holt v. Scott, 226 Ga. App. 812, 815 (2) ( 487 SE2d 657 ) (1997).

2025“It is well settled that where several [defendants] are sued at law or in equity and a several verdict is had, a new trial as to one [defendant] will not disturb the other.” Flynn v. Mack, 259 Ga. App. 882, 883 ( 578 SE2d 488 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025“It is well settled that where several [defendants] are sued at law or in equity and a several verdict is had, a new trial as to one [defendant] will not disturb the other.” Flynn v. Mack, 259 Ga. App. 882, 883 ( 578 SE2d 488 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021As previously discussed, the sudden emergency defense “is not available unless the evidence shows that the sudden peril offered the defendant a choice of conduct without time for thought[.]” (Citation omitted.) Sawyer v. Marjon Enterprises, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 619, 620 ( 718 SE2d 922 ) (2011).

2021As previously discussed, the sudden emergency defense “is not available unless the evidence shows that the sudden peril offered the defendant a choice of conduct without time for thought[.]” (Citation omitted.) Sawyer v. Marjon Enterprises, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 619, 620 ( 718 SE2d 922 ) (2011).

2021See also Dubberly v. Cooper, 258 Ga. App. 193, 194 ( 573 SE2d 442 ) (2002) (“To justify a charge on a given subject, it is not necessary there should be direct evidence going to that point; it is enough if there be something from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to it.”) (citation omitted).

2021See also Dubberly v. Cooper, 258 Ga. App. 193, 194 ( 573 SE2d 442 ) (2002) (“To justify a charge on a given subject, it is not necessary there should be direct evidence going to that point; it is enough if there be something from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to it.”) (citation omitted).

2021See MARTA v. Mehretab, 224 Ga. App. 263, 266 (1) ( 480 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (explaining that the trial court may instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine “if some evidence exists from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to the charge even if the great preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary”). 14 Next, Smithwick contends that the instruction was erroneous because Campbell faced no choice of conduct after the emergency arose.

2021See MARTA v. Mehretab, 224 Ga. App. 263, 266 (1) ( 480 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (explaining that the trial court may instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine “if some evidence exists from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to the charge even if the great preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary”). 14 Next, Smithwick contends that the instruction was erroneous because Campbell faced no choice of conduct after the emergency arose.

2016“Any charge which is not necessarily harmful to the complaining party is not such substantial error as to require reversal of the case, in the absence of a proper [objection] to the charge.” Moon v. Kimberly, 116 Ga. App. 74, 75 (2) ( 156 SE2d 414 ) (1967).

2016“Any charge which is not necessarily harmful to the complaining party is not such substantial error as to require reversal of the case, in the absence of a proper [objection] to the charge.” Moon v. Kimberly, 116 Ga. App. 74, 75 (2) ( 156 SE2d 414 ) (1967).

2016See Franklin v. Hennrich, 196 Ga. App. 372, 374-375 (2) (a) ( 395 SE2d 859 ) (1990).

2016See Franklin v. Hennrich, 196 Ga. App. 372, 374-375 (2) (a) ( 395 SE2d 859 ) (1990).

2016Jimenez v. Morgan Drive Away, 238 Ga. App. 638, 641 (2) (a) ( 519 SE2d 722 ) (1999).

2016Jimenez v. Morgan Drive Away, 238 Ga. App. 638, 641 (2) (a) ( 519 SE2d 722 ) (1999).

2011See Butgereit v. Enviro-Tech Environmental Svcs., Inc., 262 Ga. App. at 757 (2); Rayfield v. Farris, 253 Ga. App. at 168 ; Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288 ( 450 SE2d 326 ) (1994); Howard v. Jones, 187 Ga. App. 756, 758 (2) ( 371 SE2d 196 ) (1988).

2010See Hunter v. Batton, 160 Ga. App. 849, 850 (3) ( 288 SE2d 244 ) (1982).

2010See Hunter v. Batton, 160 Ga. App. 849, 850 (3) ( 288 SE2d 244 ) (1982).

1999Svcs. v. Marcola, 231 Ga. App. 144, 147 (4) ( 497 SE2d 679 ) (1998). (a) Lucas asserts that the trial court erred in charging the doctrine of sudden emergency.

1999Svcs. v. Marcola, 231 Ga. App. 144, 147 (4) ( 497 SE2d 679 ) (1998). (a) Lucas asserts that the trial court erred in charging the doctrine of sudden emergency.

1998Robinson v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2) ( 399 SE2d 252 ) (1990) (physical precedent).

1998Robinson v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2) ( 399 SE2d 252 ) (1990) (physical precedent).

1987Such an instruction is authorized where there is evidence that a party “was required to make quick judgments on the immediate action to be taken without having time for mature reflection.” Reece v. Callahan, 164 Ga. App. 131, 132 ( 296 SE2d 425 ) (1982).

1987Such an instruction is authorized where there is evidence that a party “was required to make quick judgments on the immediate action to be taken without having time for mature reflection.” Reece v. Callahan, 164 Ga. App. 131, 132 ( 296 SE2d 425 ) (1982).

1984See in this connection Gilbert v. Parks, 140 Ga. App. 550, 551 (4) ( 231 SE2d 391 ); Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 68 Ga. App. 142 (1), 147 ( 22 SE2d 336 ).

1984See in this connection Gilbert v. Parks, 140 Ga. App. 550, 551 (4) ( 231 SE2d 391 ); Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 68 Ga. App. 142 (1), 147 ( 22 SE2d 336 ).

1977See Rothrock v. Martin, 138 Ga. App. 16 (1) ( 225 SE2d 489 ); Ford v. Pinckney, 138 Ga. App. 714, 716 (3b) ( 227 SE2d 430 ).

1977See Rothrock v. Martin, 138 Ga. App. 16 (1) ( 225 SE2d 489 ); Ford v. Pinckney, 138 Ga. App. 714, 716 (3b) ( 227 SE2d 430 ).