sudden emergency instruction in Kentucky

1970In Marye v. Commonwealth, Ky., 240 S.W.2d 852 , Marye was confronted with a sudden emergency when another motor vehicle suddenly pulled into the path of his vehicle, and Marye had the alternative of attempting to avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle or of risking sure collision.

1955Feck’s Adm’r v. Bell Line, Inc., 284 Ky. 288 , 144 S.W.2d 483 ; Marye v. Com., Ky., 240 S.W.2d 852 .

2022Cumberland Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007). 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -5- In Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained that the sudden emergency doctrine is used to evaluate the conduct of one who is unexpectedly confronted with an emergency situation that allows no time for deliberation.

2010We granted discretionary review to consider Henson’s argument that the jury was incorrectly instructed on the sudden emergency doctrine, and to re-examine our holding in Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.2004). 1 We conclude that the sudden emergency jury instruction is essential to a proper determination of liability in emergency situations.

2010By the early twentieth century, a review of reported cases shows that the rule was more often invoked by defendants, often transportation companies, as evidenced by its application in Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roschi’s Adm’r, 186 Ky. 371 , 216 S.W. 579 (1919) and Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Hopkins’ Adm’r, 238 Ky. 136 , 37 S.W.2d 1 (1931) (“[I]f the driver of the bus had turned to the right instead of turning to the left, he would have passed behind the Ford, and no one would have been injured, but, with only two-thirds of a second in which to act, the bus company is not responsible

2010By the early twentieth century, a review of reported cases shows that the rule was more often invoked by defendants, often transportation companies, as evidenced by its application in Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roschi’s Adm’r, 186 Ky. 371 , 216 S.W. 579 (1919) and Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Hopkins’ Adm’r, 238 Ky. 136 , 37 S.W.2d 1 (1931) (“[I]f the driver of the bus had turned to the right instead of turning to the left, he would have passed behind the Ford, and no one would have been injured, but, with only two-thirds of a second in which to act, the bus company is not responsible

2010The Development of Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Kentucky Jurisprudence In City of Louisville v. Maresz, 835 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Ky.App.1992), the Court of Appeals briefly recited the historic underpinning of the sudden emergency doctrine, including its introduction into American law by the United States Supreme Court in Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181, 193 , 10 L.Ed. 115 (1839) (citing as authority the English case of Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie’s Rep. 393, 171 Eng.

2010The Development of Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Kentucky Jurisprudence In City of Louisville v. Maresz, 835 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Ky.App.1992), the Court of Appeals briefly recited the historic underpinning of the sudden emergency doctrine, including its introduction into American law by the United States Supreme Court in Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181, 193 , 10 L.Ed. 115 (1839) (citing as authority the English case of Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie’s Rep. 393, 171 Eng.

2010Regenstreif overruled Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559 (Ky.App.1992), and held that the sudden emergency doctrine is unaffected by the adoption of comparative fault. 2 .

2010The Bass court reasoned that the sudden emergency doctrine “has a quality to it that diminishes the duties of the defendant-driver ... and is in violation of the ‘direct proportion to fault’ concept in Hilen[ 6 ],” and further, that it violates the concept that “[a party] is liable for an amount equal to his degree of fault, no more and no less.” Bass, 839 S.W.2d at 563 ; see also Stratton v. Parker, 793 5.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky.1990).

1992Without the sudden emergency instruction changing the duty of Garlinger he would be negligent as a matter of law for driving his vehicle in the lane belonging to Weich-hand.); Phipps v. Bisceglia, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 367 (1964), (A third vehicle pulled into the highway from a driveway causing Bisceglia to swerve his car into the left lane to avoid the third vehicle.

1992Without the sudden emergency instruction changing the duty of Garlinger he would be negligent as a matter of law for driving his vehicle in the lane belonging to Weich-hand.); Phipps v. Bisceglia, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 367 (1964), (A third vehicle pulled into the highway from a driveway causing Bisceglia to swerve his car into the left lane to avoid the third vehicle.

2022Cumberland Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007). 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -5- In Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained that the sudden emergency doctrine is used to evaluate the conduct of one who is unexpectedly confronted with an emergency situation that allows no time for deliberation.

2022Id.

2018If a party is confronted with a sudden emergency, "[t]he fact that his [responsive] choice [to the emergency] may not have been the best choice will not deprive him of the sudden emergency instruction." Mudd v. Mudd , 710 S.W.2d 236 , 237 (Ky. App. 1986).

2018If a party is confronted with a sudden emergency, "[t]he fact that his [responsive] choice [to the emergency] may not have been the best choice will not deprive him of the sudden emergency instruction." Mudd v. Mudd , 710 S.W.2d 236 , 237 (Ky. App. 1986).

2018Swope , 413 S.W.2d at 85 .

2018A similar scenario is presented in Swope v. Fallen , 413 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1967).

2010See Reed v. Reed, 182 Neb. 136 , 153 N.W.2d 356 (1967) (whether defendant’s conduct in motorboat collision was excusable under sudden emergency doctrine was question for jury); Del Vecchio v. Lund, 293 N.W.2d 474 (S.D.1980) (operator of motorboat that struck water skier held entitled to a sudden emergency instruction).

2007Id.

1992The sudden emergency instruction was necessary to alter the duty of Bisceglia who had gone into the left lane in such a manner that without the sudden emergency instruction, his action would have been negligent as a matter of law.); Agee v. Hammons, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 732 (1960), (Hammons swerved to the left to go around a truck that had just pulled in front of him out of a driveway, and in so doing he collided head-on with the Agee car on the latter's side of the road.

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K

1992Cf. Weichhand v. Garlinger, Ky., 447 S.W.2d 606 (1969), (The recipient of the sudden emergency instruction (Garlinger) alleged that it was the other motorist's (Weichhand’s) actions in passing a third automobile that caused Garlinger to apply his brakes and to skid into the path of Weichhand.

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K

1992Ky., 446 S.W.2d 273 (1969), (Ryan was not negligent as a matter of law and was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when he swerved into the lane of the on-coming Payne vehicle since Ryan swerved into that lane in an attempt to avoid a truck that had pulled out in front of Ryan in Ryan’s lane, thereby creating a sudden emergency.) ”[t]hat where one is forced to suddenly switch lanes in daylight because of a vehicle in front of him suddenly checking its speed this is not as a matter of law such negligence as to warrant a directed verdict.” Ryan, 446 S.W.2d at 276 (citing Nall v. Larkin, K