sudden emergency doctrine in North Carolina

2023As noted above, in order to submit jury instructions regarding the doctrine of sudden emergency, there must be substantial evidence showing the emergency was not “created by the negligence of the party seeking the protection of the doctrine.” Allen, 123 N.C.

2003“In other words, a person may lose control of his vehicle responding to a sudden emergency, but a defendant may not assert the sudden emergency doctrine as a defense where the sudden emergency was caused, at least in part, by defendant’s negligence in failing to maintain the proper lookout or speed in light of the roadway conditions at the time.” Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C.

2007See also Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227, 239 , 311 S.E.2d 559, 568 (1984) (“The crucial question' in determining the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine is . . . whether [defendant], when approaching the stopped vehicle, saw or by the exercise of due care should have seen that he was approaching a zone of danger.”) (emphasis added).

2007See also Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227, 239 , 311 S.E.2d 559, 568 (1984) (“The crucial question' in determining the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine is . . . whether [defendant], when approaching the stopped vehicle, saw or by the exercise of due care should have seen that he was approaching a zone of danger.”) (emphasis added).

2006See Day v. Davis, 268 N.C. 643, 647 , 151 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1966) (applying the sudden emergency doctrine under similar facts and leaving defendant’s allegations of contributory negligence “for jury determination under proper instructions.”).

2006See Day v. Davis, 268 N.C. 643, 647 , 151 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1966) (applying the sudden emergency doctrine under similar facts and leaving defendant’s allegations of contributory negligence “for jury determination under proper instructions.”).

1977Boykin v. Bissette, supra. “A party is not entitled.to the benefit of the doctrine of sudden emergency, if he himself contributes to its creation in whole or in part.” Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 276 , 123 S.E. 2d 785, 792 (1962).

1977Boykin v. Bissette, supra. “A party is not entitled.to the benefit of the doctrine of sudden emergency, if he himself contributes to its creation in whole or in part.” Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 276 , 123 S.E. 2d 785, 792 (1962).

2023Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 568 , 146 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1966); see also Foy v. Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 120 , 209 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1974) (“The sudden emergency rule is a mere application of the rule of the prudent man.”).

2023Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 568 , 146 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1966); see also Foy v. Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 120 , 209 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1974) (“The sudden emergency rule is a mere application of the rule of the prudent man.”).

2022See, e.g., Schaefer v. Wickstead, 88 N.C.

2022See, e.g., Schaefer v. Wickstead, 88 N.C.

1998App. 32, 34 , 475 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1996), viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C.

1996The sudden emergency doctrine allows the court to “explain to the jury the effect certain external forces have on whether a duty of care has been breached.” Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C.

2023Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 568 , 146 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1966); see also Foy v. Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 120 , 209 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1974) (“The sudden emergency rule is a mere application of the rule of the prudent man.”).

2023Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564, 568 , 146 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1966); see also Foy v. Bremson, 286 N.C. 108, 120 , 209 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1974) (“The sudden emergency rule is a mere application of the rule of the prudent man.”).

2022See, e.g., Goins v. Time Warner Cable Se., LLC, 258 N.C.

2022See, e.g., Goins v. Time Warner Cable Se., LLC, 258 N.C.

2022App. at 589 , 551 S.E.2d at 490 . ¶ 22 Plaintiffs compare this case to several cases where a driver was precluded from invoking the sudden emergency doctrine because of their own negligence—for failure to travel at a safe speed, maintain control, or keep a proper lookout—because it contributed to the emergency.

2022App. at 589 , 551 S.E.2d at 490 . ¶ 22 Plaintiffs compare this case to several cases where a driver was precluded from invoking the sudden emergency doctrine because of their own negligence—for failure to travel at a safe speed, maintain control, or keep a proper lookout—because it contributed to the emergency.

2022App. 49, 56 , 387 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1990) (holding evidence of an oncoming vehicle in the wrong lane of travel was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine).

2022App. 49, 56 , 387 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1990) (holding evidence of an oncoming vehicle in the wrong lane of travel was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine).

2022App. at 728 , 615 S.E.2d at 72 . ¶ 16 Our Court has held that reacting in less than five seconds qualifies as acting “instantly” to avoid injury for the purposes of the sudden emergency doctrine.

2022App. at 728 , 615 S.E.2d at 72 . ¶ 16 Our Court has held that reacting in less than five seconds qualifies as acting “instantly” to avoid injury for the purposes of the sudden emergency doctrine.

2006After denying plaintiff’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on plaintiff’s theory of defendant’s negligence, defendant’s theory of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, and that plaintiff had a duty to exercise the care a “reasonably careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” The doctrine of sudden emergency, however, “provides a less stringent standard of care for one who, through no fault of his own, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with imminent danger to himself or others.” Holbrook, 118 N.C.

2006App. at 153 , 454 S.E.2d at 677-78 .

2023The doctrine of sudden emergency applies “when a defendant is confronted by an emergency situation not of his own making and requires [the] defendant to act only as a reasonable person would react to similar emergency circumstances.” Massengill v. Starling, 87 N.C.

2023App. 233, 236 , 360 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1987) (citation omitted).

2018App. 629 , 638, 640 S.E.2d 805 , 812 (2007) (quoting Campbell v. McIlwain , 163 N.C.

2007“The sudden emergency doctrine provides that one confronted with an emergency is not liable for an injury resulting from his acting as a reasonable man might act in such an emergency.” Campbell v. McIlwain, 163 N.C.

2013See Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C. 185, 190 , 136 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1964).

1994“In applying the doctrine of sudden emergency, the courts have not been inclined to weigh in ‘golden scales’ the conduct of the motorist who has acted under the excited impulse of sudden panic induced by the negligence of the other motorist.” Id.

2007On appeal, this Court framed the issue thusly: “[Wjhether the defendant is entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when she loses control of her. automobile on a rainy day after striking a puddle of water on a road when she is aware that water tends to puddle on that road.” Id. at 33-34 , 475 S.E.2d at 734 .

2007On appeal, this Court framed the issue thusly: “[Wjhether the defendant is entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when she loses control of her. automobile on a rainy day after striking a puddle of water on a road when she is aware that water tends to puddle on that road.” Id. at 33-34 , 475 S.E.2d at 734 .

2002App. 461 , 528 S.E.2d 633 (2000); Conner v. Continental Industrial Chemicals, 123 N.C.

1996We agree. *703 Two conditions must be met before the doctrine of sudden emergency may be applied: (1) “an emergency situation must exist requiring immediate action to avoid injury . . . ,” and (2) “the emergency must not have been created by the negligence of the party seeking the protection of the doctrine.” Conner v. Continental Industrial Chemicals, Inc., 123 N.C.

1986A broader statement of this proposition is that “one cannot escape liability for acts otherwise negligent because done under the stress of an emergency if such emergency was caused, wholly or in material part, by his own negligent or wrongful act.” Cockman v. Powers, 248 N.C. 403, 407 , 103 S.E. 2d 710, 713 (1958) (emphasis supplied).

1986A broader statement of this proposition is that “one cannot escape liability for acts otherwise negligent because done under the stress of an emergency if such emergency was caused, wholly or in material part, by his own negligent or wrongful act.” Cockman v. Powers, 248 N.C. 403, 407 , 103 S.E. 2d 710, 713 (1958) (emphasis supplied).

1985Foy v. Bremson, supra. “One cannot, by his negligent conduct, permit *549 an emergency to arise and then excuse himself on the ground that he was called upon to act in an emergency.” Brunson v. Gainey, 245 N.C. 152, 156 , 95 S.E. 2d 514, 517 (1956).

1985Foy v. Bremson, supra. “One cannot, by his negligent conduct, permit *549 an emergency to arise and then excuse himself on the ground that he was called upon to act in an emergency.” Brunson v. Gainey, 245 N.C. 152, 156 , 95 S.E. 2d 514, 517 (1956).