21 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1933–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cowles v. Zahngreen2 sentences2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide 2006In Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743 , 746-47, 146 S.E.2d 200 , 203 (1966), we stated that "[o]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact. | 5 | 7 |
Carolina Coach Company v. Starchiagreen2 sentences2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide 1996The trial court charged the jurors that if they believed from the evidence that Washington, “without negligence on his part, was confronted with a sudden emergency and acted as a reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances of this case, he was not negligent.” Further, the instruction provided: “A sudden emergency is an event or a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Although the instruction correctly sets forth the sudden emergency doctrine, see Carolina Coach Company v. Starchia, 219 Va. 135, | 4 | 8 |
Jones v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2024For this reason, the Supreme Court has advised that “the grant of a sudden emergency instruction is rarely appropriate.” Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Jones, 263 Va. at 263 ); see also Vahdat, 274 Va. at 421 n.2. 2009Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237 , 263, 559 S.E.2d 592 , 605 (2002) ("the grant of a sudden emergency instruction is rarely appropriate"). | 3 | 5 |
Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burksgreen2 sentences2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A 2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A | 2 | 6 |
Pickett v. Coopergreen2 sentences2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A 2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A | 2 | 6 |
Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugengreen2 sentences2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A 2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A | 2 | 4 |
Herr v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2024An “emergency within the meaning of the sudden emergency doctrine is a sudden, unexpected and unforeseen happening or condition that calls for immediate action.” Herr v. Wheeler, 272 Va. 310, 315 (2006). 2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide | 2 | 3 |
Bentley v. Feltsgreen2 sentences2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide 2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide | 2 | 2 |
Gardner v. Phippsgreen2 sentences2006In Gardner v. Phipps, 250 Va. 256 , 260, 462 S.E.2d 91 , 94 (1995), we held that even though the evidence showed that another vehicle previously had "fishtailed" several times during the defendant's journey along a snowy road, the defendant was not entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when the evidence showed that a similar occurrence resulted in his vehicle striking the plaintiff's vehicle. 2006In Gardner v. Phipps, 250 Va. 256 , 260, 462 S.E.2d 91 , 94 (1995), we held that even though the evidence showed that another vehicle previously had "fishtailed" several times during the defendant's journey along a snowy road, the defendant was not entitled to a sudden emergency instruction when the evidence showed that a similar occurrence resulted in his vehicle striking the plaintiff's vehicle. | 1 | 3 |
Vahdat v. Hollandgreen2 sentences2024For this reason, the Supreme Court has advised that “the grant of a sudden emergency instruction is rarely appropriate.” Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Jones, 263 Va. at 263 ); see also Vahdat, 274 Va. at 421 n.2. 2009In Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417 , 421, 649 S.E.2d 691 , 693 (2007), we restated the essence of the doctrine as follows: The sudden emergency doctrine provides that "[w]hen the driver of an automobile, without prior negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence." Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60 , 63, 116 S.E.2d 48 , 51 (1960) (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53 , 60, 46 S.E.2d 26 , 30 (1948)); accord Velocity Express Mid-A | 1 | 2 |
Harrah v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide 2024A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v. Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has -5- existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294 ). “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)). “[W]hen the evide | 1 | 2 |
Pollins v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2007See Pollins v. Jones, 263 Va. 25 , 28, 557 S.E.2d 713 , 714 (2002) ("A jury instruction may be given only if there is evidence to support the instruction."). 2007See Pollins v. Jones, 263 Va. 25 , 28, 557 S.E.2d 713 , 714 (2002) ("A jury instruction may be given only if there is evidence to support the instruction."). | 1 | 1 |
Bishop v. Memorial Mission Hospitalgreen1 sentence2006See Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C.App. 701 , 474 S.E.2d 141 , 143 (1996), review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Alt v. John Umstead Hospitalgreen1 sentence2006See Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C.App. 701 , 474 S.E.2d 141 , 143 (1996), review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Efirdgreen2 sentences2006See Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C.App. 701 , 474 S.E.2d 141 , 143 (1996), review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997). 2006See Allen v. Efird, 123 N.C.App. 701 , 474 S.E.2d 141 , 143 (1996), review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Poe v. Pittmangreen2 sentences1987In Poe v. Pittman, 150 W.Va. 179, 189 , 144 S.E.2d 671, 678 (1965), the Court said that “[a] party may not rely on the sudden emergency doctrine if the situation he alleges to have been a sudden emergency was created, in whole or in part, by his own negligence.” (Emphasis added.) We are of opinion that reasonable persons could not disagree on the proposition that the defendant’s negligence in speeding on a wet road approaching a known curve created, at least in part, the sudden emergency upon which he relies to excuse his conduct. 1987In Poe v. Pittman, 150 W.Va. 179, 189 , 144 S.E.2d 671, 678 (1965), the Court said that “[a] party may not rely on the sudden emergency doctrine if the situation he alleges to have been a sudden emergency was created, in whole or in part, by his own negligence.” (Emphasis added.) We are of opinion that reasonable persons could not disagree on the proposition that the defendant’s negligence in speeding on a wet road approaching a known curve created, at least in part, the sudden emergency upon which he relies to excuse his conduct. | 1 | 1 |
So. W. Improvement Co. v. Smith's Adm'rgreen2 sentences1978In the 62 Virginia cases found which contain any more than a passing comment on the sudden emergency doctrine, the earliest being South West Improvement Co. v. Smith’s Adm’r, 85 Va. 306, 319 , 7 S.E. 365, 371 (1888), citing Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Morris, 72 Va. (31 Graft.) 200, 210 (1878), and the most recent being Lendvay v. Sobrito, 211 Va. 548, 550 , 178 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1971), there has been no substantial change in the statement of this common-law rule that one is excused from liability if, without prior negligence on his part, he is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as 1978In the 62 Virginia cases found which contain any more than a passing comment on the sudden emergency doctrine, the earliest being South West Improvement Co. v. Smith’s Adm’r, 85 Va. 306, 319 , 7 S.E. 365, 371 (1888), citing Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Morris, 72 Va. (31 Graft.) 200, 210 (1878), and the most recent being Lendvay v. Sobrito, 211 Va. 548, 550 , 178 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1971), there has been no substantial change in the statement of this common-law rule that one is excused from liability if, without prior negligence on his part, he is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as | 1 | 1 |
Lendvay v. Sobritogreen2 sentences1978In the 62 Virginia cases found which contain any more than a passing comment on the sudden emergency doctrine, the earliest being South West Improvement Co. v. Smith’s Adm’r, 85 Va. 306, 319 , 7 S.E. 365, 371 (1888), citing Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Morris, 72 Va. (31 Graft.) 200, 210 (1878), and the most recent being Lendvay v. Sobrito, 211 Va. 548, 550 , 178 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1971), there has been no substantial change in the statement of this common-law rule that one is excused from liability if, without prior negligence on his part, he is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as 1978In the 62 Virginia cases found which contain any more than a passing comment on the sudden emergency doctrine, the earliest being South West Improvement Co. v. Smith’s Adm’r, 85 Va. 306, 319 , 7 S.E. 365, 371 (1888), citing Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Morris, 72 Va. (31 Graft.) 200, 210 (1878), and the most recent being Lendvay v. Sobrito, 211 Va. 548, 550 , 178 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1971), there has been no substantial change in the statement of this common-law rule that one is excused from liability if, without prior negligence on his part, he is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garnot v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2024As the Supreme Court stated in Garnot, “such a stopping, absent evidence of an unforeseen happening, does not constitute an emergency that would invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.” Id. (emphasis added). 2006When evidence is conflicting or different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury to say (1) whether the defendant was confronted with an emergency; (2) whether the emergency, if one existed, was created by the defendant's own negligence; and (3) whether the defendant conducted himself as an ordinarily prudent person might have done under the same or similar circumstances." In Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81 , 85-86, 387 S.E.2d 473 , 476 (1990), we explained that emergency within the meaning of the sudden emergency doctrine is a sudden, unexpected and unforeseen happening o | 5 | 1990–2024 |
Virginia Transit Co. v. Durham
green
2 sentences1954Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, supra; Virginia Transit Company v. Durham, 190 Va. 979 , 59 S. E. *546 (2d) 58; Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107 , 60 S. E. (2d) 4 ; Hinton v. Gallagher, supra. See also 38 Am. 1954Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. Burks, supra; Virginia Transit Company Durham, 190 Va. 979 , 59 S.E.(2d) *546 58; Interstate Veneer Co. Edwards, 191 Va. 107 , 60 S.E.(2d) 4; Hinton Gallagher, supra. See also 38 Am. | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1954Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, supra; Virginia Transit Company v. Durham, 190 Va. 979 , 59 S. E. *546 (2d) 58; Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107 , 60 S. E. (2d) 4 ; Hinton v. Gallagher, supra. See also 38 Am. 1954Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, supra; Virginia Transit Company v. Durham, 190 Va. 979 , 59 S. E. *546 (2d) 58; Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107 , 60 S. E. (2d) 4 ; Hinton v. Gallagher, supra. See also 38 Am. | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Hancock-Underwood v. Knight
green
2 sentences2024For this reason, the Supreme Court has advised that “the grant of a sudden emergency instruction is rarely appropriate.” Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Jones, 263 Va. at 263 ); see also Vahdat, 274 Va. at 421 n.2. 2024For this reason, the Supreme Court has advised that “the grant of a sudden emergency instruction is rarely appropriate.” Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Jones, 263 Va. at 263 ); see also Vahdat, 274 Va. at 421 n.2. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Daniels v. CI WHITTEN TRANSFER COMPANY
green
1 sentence2007In doing so, the Court held that the sudden emergency doctrine "does not constitute an affirmative defense shifting the burden of proof in the case." Id. (citing Southern Passenger Motor Lines, 187 Va. at 59 , 46 S.E.2d at 29 ); but see Monahan v. Obici Med. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mawyer v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2006Moreover, trial courts must use particular care when determining whether to grant a sudden emergency instruction because, as is the case with an "unavoidable accident" instruction, it has the tendency to afford a jury "an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the issue made by the evidence in the case." Cf. Mawyer v. Thomas, 199 Va. 897 , 901, 103 S.E.2d 217 , 220 (1958). 2006Moreover, trial courts must use particular care when determining whether to grant a sudden emergency instruction because, as is the case with an "unavoidable accident" instruction, it has the tendency to afford a jury "an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the issue made by the evidence in the case." Cf. Mawyer v. Thomas, 199 Va. 897 , 901, 103 S.E.2d 217 , 220 (1958). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Banks v. McGee
green
2 sentences2006Cf. Banks v. McGee, 124 N.C.App. 32 , 475 S.E.2d 733 , 734 (1996) (holding, under similar facts, that the "evidence simply cannot support a conclusion that the defendant's contact with the puddle of water was an unanticipated event"). 2006Cf. Banks v. McGee, 124 N.C.App. 32 , 475 S.E.2d 733 , 734 (1996) (holding, under similar facts, that the "evidence simply cannot support a conclusion that the defendant's contact with the puddle of water was an unanticipated event"). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Massie v. Firmstone
green
1 sentence1995The Plaintiffs also argue that the sudden emergency instruction should not have been given because Mr. Settle’s own testimony shows that he was negligent They cite the doctrine of Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450 (1922). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Crew v. Nelson
green
1 sentence1995I do not feel that Massie is applicable to this case because in the context of a negligence action, under Crew v. Nelson, 188 Va. 108 (1948), and Shelley v. West, 213 Va. 611 (1973), Mr. Settle is not precluded from asserting that he was confronted with a sudden emergency unless his testimony shows clearly and unequivocally that he has no case, i.e., that he was negligent. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Shelley v. West
green
1 sentence1995I do not feel that Massie is applicable to this case because in the context of a negligence action, under Crew v. Nelson, 188 Va. 108 (1948), and Shelley v. West, 213 Va. 611 (1973), Mr. Settle is not precluded from asserting that he was confronted with a sudden emergency unless his testimony shows clearly and unequivocally that he has no case, i.e., that he was negligent. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cook v. Basnight
green
2 sentences1994Unlike Cook v. Basnight, 207 Va. 491 , 151 S.E.2d 408 (1966), in which there was a complete brake failure and a sudden emergency instruction was appropriate, Felts was faced only with a loss of power assistance in braking his car. 1994Unlike Cook v. Basnight, 207 Va. 491 , 151 S.E.2d 408 (1966), in which there was a complete brake failure and a sudden emergency instruction was appropriate, Felts was faced only with a loss of power assistance in braking his car. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Blunt's Administrator
green
2 sentences1933Judge Gregory, in Virginia Electric & Power Company v. Blunt’s Adm’r, 158 Va. 421, 440 , 163 S. E. 329, 335 , said: “Instruction E was an attempt to apply the sudden emergency doctrine to the motorman, and it was properly refused because if he was placed in a position where he was not required to act as a man of ordinary prudence would have acted, he placed himself in that position by failing to look out for and yield the right of way to the deceased.” See, also, Virginia & S. W. 1933Judge Gregory, in Virginia Electric & Power Company v. Blunt’s Adm’r, 158 Va. 421, 440 , 163 S. E. 329, 335 , said: “Instruction E was an attempt to apply the sudden emergency doctrine to the motorman, and it was properly refused because if he was placed in a position where he was not required to act as a man of ordinary prudence would have acted, he placed himself in that position by failing to look out for and yield the right of way to the deceased.” See, also, Virginia & S. W. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.