sudden emergency doctrine in Montana

2004She contends that under the sudden emergency doctrine, see Simonson v. White (1986), 220 Mont. 14, 25 , 713 P.2d 983, 989 , Naumer was not negligent as a matter of law.

2004She contends that under the sudden emergency doctrine, see Simonson v. White (1986), 220 Mont. 14, 25 , 713 P.2d 983, 989 , Naumer was not negligent as a matter of law.

1999In Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29 , 572 P.2d 183 , we pointed out that the sudden emergency doctrine rarely should be applied in ordinary automobile. accident negligence cases.

1999In Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29 , 572 P.2d 183 , we pointed out that the sudden emergency doctrine rarely should be applied in ordinary automobile. accident negligence cases.

1972Co., 80 Mont. 492, 498 , 261 P. 261, 262 , on the giving of the sudden emergency instruction, it should have been given: “If the evidence in this case were sufficient to warrant a reasonable conclusion that at the time in question the defendant Siegel was confronted with a ‘sudden emergency,’ or that ‘there was want of time in which to form a judgment’, under the circumstances, as they appeared to him, the court should have given the offered instructions.” Emphasis supplied.

1972Co., 80 Mont. 492, 498 , 261 P. 261, 262 , on the giving of the sudden emergency instruction, it should have been given: “If the evidence in this case were sufficient to warrant a reasonable conclusion that at the time in question the defendant Siegel was confronted with a ‘sudden emergency,’ or that ‘there was want of time in which to form a judgment’, under the circumstances, as they appeared to him, the court should have given the offered instructions.” Emphasis supplied.

1981In Finley v. Wiley, 103 N. J.Super. 95, 246 A.2d 715 (1968), the court criticized the sudden emergency rule: “‘Further we entertain grave doubt whether a sudden emergency charge should ever be given in an ordinary automobile accident case.

1981Super. 95 , 246 A.2d 715 (1968), the court criticized the sudden emergency rule: "` Further we entertain grave doubt whether a sudden emergency charge should ever be given in an ordinary automobile accident case.

1999We have similarly put to rest the defenses of the “unavoidable accident” and “the mere fact of an injury.” Helmke v. Goff (1979), 182 Mont. 494, 500 , 597 P.2d 1131, 1134 ; Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 150 Mont. 270, 289 , 435 P.2d 263, 273 . ¶32 In the present case, it is undisputed that Moseman encountered a deer running across his path of travel.

1999We have similarly put to rest the defenses of the “unavoidable accident” and “the mere fact of an injury.” Helmke v. Goff (1979), 182 Mont. 494, 500 , 597 P.2d 1131, 1134 ; Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 150 Mont. 270, 289 , 435 P.2d 263, 273 . ¶32 In the present case, it is undisputed that Moseman encountered a deer running across his path of travel.

1999Specifically, we observed that the doctrine is qualified by the requirement that people anticipate and be prepared for some emergencies when engaged in an activity where emergencies are likely to arise, and that any driver “ ‘must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles in the highway.’ ” Kudrna, 175 Mont. at 43 , 572 P.2d at 191 (quoting Erickson v. Perrett (1976), 169 Mont. 167, 174 , 545 P.2d 1074, 1079 ). ¶31 Moreover, we again addressed the application of the sudden emergency doctrine in Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 292 , 636 P.2d 254 .

1999Specifically, we observed that the doctrine is qualified by the requirement that people anticipate and be prepared for some emergencies when engaged in an activity where emergencies are likely to arise, and that any driver “ ‘must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles in the highway.’ ” Kudrna, 175 Mont. at 43 , 572 P.2d at 191 (quoting Erickson v. Perrett (1976), 169 Mont. 167, 174 , 545 P.2d 1074, 1079 ). ¶31 Moreover, we again addressed the application of the sudden emergency doctrine in Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 292 , 636 P.2d 254 .

1999We have similarly put to rest the defenses of the “unavoidable accident” and “the mere fact of an injury.” Helmke v. Goff (1979), 182 Mont. 494, 500 , 597 P.2d 1131, 1134 ; Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 150 Mont. 270, 289 , 435 P.2d 263, 273 . ¶32 In the present case, it is undisputed that Moseman encountered a deer running across his path of travel.

1999We have similarly put to rest the defenses of the “unavoidable accident” and “the mere fact of an injury.” Helmke v. Goff (1979), 182 Mont. 494, 500 , 597 P.2d 1131, 1134 ; Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 150 Mont. 270, 289 , 435 P.2d 263, 273 . ¶32 In the present case, it is undisputed that Moseman encountered a deer running across his path of travel.

1986In Knapp v. Stanford (Miss. 1981), 392 So.2d 196 , the Mississippi Supreme Court abolished prospectively the sudden emergency instruction in all negligence cases, stating: “The hazard of relying on the doctrine of ‘sudden emergency’ is the tendency to elevate its principles above what is required to be proven in a negligence action.

1986Even the wording of a well-drawn instruction intimates that ordinary rules or negligence do not apply to the circumstances constituting the claimed ‘sudden emergency.’ Also it tends to confuse the principle of comparative negligence that is well ingrained in the jurisprudence of this State.” Knapp, 392 So.2d at 198 .

1981Following the quotation from Kudma and Prosser the majority opinion refers to the annotation in 80 ALR 2d 1 and points out that before the instruction on the doctrine of sudden emergency is given, the evidence should be sufficient to support a finding that (1) the claimed emergency actually or apparently existed; (2) the apparent situation was not created or contributed to by the person confronted; (3) alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person or there was an opportunity to take some action to avert the threatened casualty; (4) the action or course taken w

1981Following the quotation from Kudrna and Prosser the majority opinion refers to the annotation in 80 A.L.R.2d 1 and points out that before the instruction on the doctrine of sudden emergency is given, the evidence should be sufficient to support a finding that (1) the claimed emergency actually *263 or apparently existed; (2) the apparent situation was not created or contributed to by the person confronted; (3) alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person or there was an opportunity to take some action to avert the threatened casualty; (4) the action or course

1981It should be noted that this instruction is a duplicate of the sudden emergency instruction given in Dawe v. Dalley (1972), 161 Mont. 73 , 504 P.2d 982 .

1981It should be noted that this instruction is a duplicate of the sudden emergency instruction given in Dawe v. Dalley (1972), 161 Mont. 73 , 504 P.2d 982 .

1981Lyndes v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177 , 589 P.2d 1000 , 36 St.Rep. 185 ; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369 , 492 P.2d 926 .

1981Lyndes v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177 , 589 P.2d 1000 , 36 St.Rep. 185 ; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369 , 492 P.2d 926 .

1981Lyndes v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177 , 589 P.2d 1000 , 36 St.Rep. 185 ; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369 , 492 P.2d 926 .

1981Lyndes v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177 , 589 P.2d 1000 , 36 St.Rep. 185 ; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369 , 492 P.2d 926 .

1981Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App. 355 , 499 P.2d 68 , and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App. 602 , 563 P.2d 1322 , and that their theory of the accident (Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency situation) was supported by the evidence presented.

1981Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App. 355 , 499 P.2d 68 , and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App. 602 , 563 P.2d 1322 , and that their theory of the accident (Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency situation) was supported by the evidence presented.

1981Therefore, respondent was entitled to present its theory to the jury by proper instruction Locker v. Sammons Trucking Company (1974), 10 Wash.App. 899 , 520 P.2d 939 .

1981Therefore, respondent was entitled to present its theory to the jury by proper instruction Locker v. Sammons Trucking Company (1974), 10 Wash.App. 899 , 520 P.2d 939 .

1981Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App. 355 , 499 P.2d 68 , and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App. 602 , 563 P.2d 1322 , and that their theory of the accident (Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency situation) was supported by the evidence presented.

1981Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App. 355 , 499 P.2d 68 , and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App. 602 , 563 P.2d 1322 , and that their theory of the accident (Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency situation) was supported by the evidence presented.

1977In Custer Broadcasting Corp. v. Brewer, 163 Mont. 519, 522 , 518 P.2d 257 (1974), this Court held a driver who collided with the vehicle ahead negligent as a matter of law for following too closely.

1977In Custer Broadcasting Corp. v. Brewer, 163 Mont. 519, 522 , 518 P.2d 257 (1974), this Court held a driver who collided with the vehicle ahead negligent as a matter of law for following too closely.

1977See Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167 , 545 P.2d 1074 , (1976); 2 Restatement of Torts 2d ¶296, Comment d; Peabody v. Northern Pacific Railway *41 Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497 , 261 P. 261 (1927); Marsh v. Ayers, 80 Mont. 401 , 260 P. 702 (1927); Maynard v. City of Helena, 117 Mont. 402 , 160 P.2d 484 (1945).

1977See Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167 , 545 P.2d 1074 , (1976); 2 Restatement of Torts 2d ¶296, Comment d; Peabody v. Northern Pacific Railway *41 Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497 , 261 P. 261 (1927); Marsh v. Ayers, 80 Mont. 401 , 260 P. 702 (1927); Maynard v. City of Helena, 117 Mont. 402 , 160 P.2d 484 (1945).

1977See Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167 , 545 P.2d 1074 , (1976); 2 Restatement of Torts 2d ¶296, Comment d; Peabody v. Northern Pacific Railway *41 Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497 , 261 P. 261 (1927); Marsh v. Ayers, 80 Mont. 401 , 260 P. 702 (1927); Maynard v. City of Helena, 117 Mont. 402 , 160 P.2d 484 (1945).

1977See Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167 , 545 P.2d 1074 , (1976); 2 Restatement of Torts 2d ¶296, Comment d; Peabody v. Northern Pacific Railway *41 Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497 , 261 P. 261 (1927); Marsh v. Ayers, 80 Mont. 401 , 260 P. 702 (1927); Maynard v. City of Helena, 117 Mont. 402 , 160 P.2d 484 (1945).