sudden emergency doctrine in Ohio

2020Pickaway No. 04CA1, 2004-Ohio-5680, ¶ 15 ; see also, e.g., State v. Houston, 2018-Ohio- 2788, 114 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.); Oechsle v. Hart, 12 Ohio St.2d 29, 34 , 231 N.E.2d 306 (1967).

2018No. 04CA1, 2004-Ohio-5680 , 2004 WL 2390013 , ¶ 15 (but finding the trial court could disbelieve the testimony that an oncoming vehicle forced the bus to swerve). {¶ 32} The state cites a Twelfth District case where a defendant put on the affirmative defense of sudden emergency due to a deer.

2004This doctrine provides that "one who in a sudden emergency acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of time in which to form a judgment, omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence." Mapes v. Opper (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 140 , 141 , citing Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 , 365 . {¶ 14} An instruction regarding the sudden emergency doctrine may be given to a jury if the defendant presents evidence that (1) an emergency existed; (2) the emergency was not the fault of the defendant or any circumstance under his control; and (3) that t

2003Defendant relies on the sudden emergency doctrine as his legal excuse, and it provides that "one who in a sudden emergency acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of time in which to form a judgment, omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence." Mapes v. Opper (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 140 , 141 , citing Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 , 365 .

2018F. Goodrich Co. , 139 Ohio St. 141 , 38 N.E.2d 592 (1941) and distinguishing Francis v. Bieber , 10 Ohio St.2d 65 , 69, 225 N.E.2d 251 (1967) (allowing the sudden emergency defense where cars were parked without lights on the side of a road just after a crest of a hill, someone stepped across the center line into the defendant's lane while waving a flashlight, and the defendant braked causing her car to skid on an icy road into one of the parked cars).

2018F. Goodrich Co. , 139 Ohio St. 141 , 38 N.E.2d 592 (1941) and distinguishing Francis v. Bieber , 10 Ohio St.2d 65 , 69, 225 N.E.2d 251 (1967) (allowing the sudden emergency defense where cars were parked without lights on the side of a road just after a crest of a hill, someone stepped across the center line into the defendant's lane while waving a flashlight, and the defendant braked causing her car to skid on an icy road into one of the parked cars).

2018F. Goodrich Co. , 139 Ohio St. 141 , 38 N.E.2d 592 (1941) and distinguishing Francis v. Bieber , 10 Ohio St.2d 65 , 69, 225 N.E.2d 251 (1967) (allowing the sudden emergency defense where cars were parked without lights on the side of a road just after a crest of a hill, someone stepped across the center line into the defendant's lane while waving a flashlight, and the defendant braked causing her car to skid on an icy road into one of the parked cars).

2018F. Goodrich Co. , 139 Ohio St. 141 , 38 N.E.2d 592 (1941) and distinguishing Francis v. Bieber , 10 Ohio St.2d 65 , 69, 225 N.E.2d 251 (1967) (allowing the sudden emergency defense where cars were parked without lights on the side of a road just after a crest of a hill, someone stepped across the center line into the defendant's lane while waving a flashlight, and the defendant braked causing her car to skid on an icy road into one of the parked cars).

2005Steffy v. Blevins, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1278, 2003-Ohio-6443, at ¶ 27 ; Guthrie v. Wheeler, Franklin App. No. 04AP-243, 2004-Ohio-6442 , at ¶ 6. {¶ 28} When moving for summary judgment on the basis of the sudden emergency defense, a defendant has a heavy burden because, generally, whether a defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would have under the same circumstances is a jury question.

2005Steffy v. Blevins, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1278, 2003-Ohio-6443, at ¶ 27 ; Guthrie v. Wheeler, Franklin App. No. 04AP-243, 2004-Ohio-6442 , at ¶ 6. {¶ 28} When moving for summary judgment on the basis of the sudden emergency defense, a defendant has a heavy burden because, generally, whether a defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would have under the same circumstances is a jury question.

2005Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181 , 183 . {¶ 26} By Timberlake's second assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants because they did not present evidence proving each element required to establish the sudden emergency defense.

2004Radecki v. Lammers (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 101 , paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co. (1946), 146 Ohio St. 657 , 664-665 .

2004The Court further noted that the rule to apply in determining whether an instruction should be given and the scope thereof is that "`it should be adapted to and embrace all issues made by the pleadings and the evidence. * * * The instruction should be broad enough to properly cover the issues presented for consideration, or all the facts in issue which the evidence tends to establish or disprove.'" Murphy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 591 , fn. 3, quoting 89 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1989) 354-355, Trial, Section 289 (footnotes omitted). {¶ 13} During its instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed

2003Advanced Analytics Laboratories v Kegler, Brown, Hill Ritter, 148 Ohio App.3d 440 , 2002-Ohio-3328 , at ¶ 33 .

2003Badurina v. Bolen (1961), 114 Ohio App. 478 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 31} Ohio case law requires not only that an emergency exist, but also that the party asserting the excuse of sudden emergency be aware that he or she is in a position of peril at the time the emergency transpires.

1999However, the Supreme Court later used the Erdman sudden entrance language in reference to the sudden emergency doctrine in Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 51 : Plaintiff argues that the "sudden emergency" exception should apply here, excusing him from compliance with the assured-clear-distance-ahead requirement. *** This exception states that a driver does not violate the statute where the assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance into his path of an obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of reasonable care, to

1999Id. at 54 .

1993While the narrow application of the sudden emergency defense may seem harsh, “[t]he rule seems less harsh if we look at it from the point of view of the injured * * * [party] * * * [who] was entirely free from fault.” Spalding at 8 , 31 O.O. at 5, 205 N.E.2d at 895 .