sudden emergency doctrine in Michigan

2023In White, we provided a thorough explanation of the caselaw regarding the sudden-emergency doctrine: The sudden-emergency doctrine was explained by our Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946): “One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what -5- subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought abo

2023In White, we provided a thorough explanation of the caselaw regarding the sudden-emergency doctrine: The sudden-emergency doctrine was explained by our Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946): “One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what -5- subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought abo

2020The sudden-emergency doctrine applies “when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants’ own making.” Id., citing McKinney v Anderson, 373 Mich 414, 419 ; 129 NW2d 851 (1964). [White v Taylor Distribution Co, Inc., 482 Mich 136 , 139- 140; 753 NW2d 591 (2008) (White II).] “[A] sudden emergency sufficient to remove the statutory presumption must be ‘totally unexpected.’” Id. at 140 , quoting Vander Laan, 385 Mich at 232 . “[I]t is essential that the potential peril had not been in clear view for any significant length of time[.]” Vander Laan,

2020The sudden-emergency doctrine applies “when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants’ own making.” Id., citing McKinney v Anderson, 373 Mich 414, 419 ; 129 NW2d 851 (1964). [White v Taylor Distribution Co, Inc., 482 Mich 136 , 139- 140; 753 NW2d 591 (2008) (White II).] “[A] sudden emergency sufficient to remove the statutory presumption must be ‘totally unexpected.’” Id. at 140 , quoting Vander Laan, 385 Mich at 232 . “[I]t is essential that the potential peril had not been in clear view for any significant length of time[.]” Vander Laan,

1983Furthermore, the failure of the plaintiff to signal that he was stopping, coupled with the surrounding darkness, made the subsequent peril totally unexpected to the defendant.” In Wright, supra, this Court found a sudden emergency instruction proper in a case involving a child stepping out in front of a parked car.

1974As noted in Wright v Marzolf, 34 Mich App 612, 613-614 ; 192 NW2d 56 (1971), a party seeking to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency to avoid the harshness of the above two statutes is entitled to the sudden emergency instruction "if there is any evidence which would allow a jury to conclude that an emergency existed within the meaning of that doctrine”.

2015In general, “[n]egligence is the failure to use ordinary care,” meaning “the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful person would not do, under the circumstances that . . . existed in th[e] case.” M Civ JI 10.02. 4 “[V]iolation of a statute . . . creates a prima facie case from which a jury may draw an inference of negligence,” and the “jury may also consider whether a legally sufficient excuse has been presented to refute this inference.” Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 122 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); see also M Civ JIs

2015In general, “[n]egligence is the failure to use ordinary care,” meaning “the failure to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful person would not do, under the circumstances that . . . existed in th[e] case.” M Civ JI 10.02. 4 “[V]iolation of a statute . . . creates a prima facie case from which a jury may draw an inference of negligence,” and the “jury may also consider whether a legally sufficient excuse has been presented to refute this inference.” Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 122 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); see also M Civ JIs

1977No costs. 1 MCLA 257.634; MSA 9.2334. 2 Manning v Cheboygan Area Schools, 76 Mich App 700, 703 ; 257 NW2d 222 (1977), notes: "VanderLaan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971), sets out several principles involved when a party asserts the doctrine of sudden emergency.

1977No costs. 1 MCLA 257.634; MSA 9.2334. 2 Manning v Cheboygan Area Schools, 76 Mich App 700, 703 ; 257 NW2d 222 (1977), notes: "VanderLaan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971), sets out several principles involved when a party asserts the doctrine of sudden emergency.

2024Although the statutory presumption of negligence was certainly not rebutted by defendants’ evidence as a matter of law, the trial court decided that there was sufficient evidence at least to generate a jury question regarding rebutting of the presumption. [Id. at 557.] And with regard to whether defendants violated MCL 257.627 and MCL 257.643, the Lucas Court concluded: Since there was at least some evidence that defendant driver was operating her vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner prior to the accident, the question of whether or not defendant violated one or both of these statutes wa

1978From the above cited cases we have already con- eluded that the clear, positive and credible test set forth in Szymborski, supra, the positive, unequivocal, strong and credible test adopted by Lucas, supra, and Zeni, supra, and the clear and convincing test urged upon us by plaintiffs, in the instant case, applies only to whether the presumption of negligence for violation of a penal statute has been rebutted as a matter of law and does not control the issue of whether the facts in a particular case should be submitted for jury determination.

2023“The sudden emergency doctrine provides a basis for a defendant to be excused of a statutory violation in regards to the events that occur after the defendant discovers the emergency.” Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 333 ; 780 NW2d 844 (2009).

2015White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc, 482 Mich 136, 139-140 ; 753 NW2d 591 (2008); Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 331 ; 780 NW2d 844 (2009).5 The doctrine is a judicially crafted principle, which provides that a person who suddenly finds himself or herself in a place of danger, and is required to act without the time to consider the best means to adopt in order to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence for failing to adopt what upon subsequent reflection may have been the better option or path.

2023“The sudden emergency doctrine provides a basis for a defendant to be excused of a statutory violation in regards to the events that occur after the defendant discovers the emergency.” Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 333 ; 780 NW2d 844 (2009).

2015In Freed, 286 Mich App at 333 , this Court observed: The sudden emergency doctrine provides a basis for a defendant to be excused of a statutory violation in regards to the events that occur after the defendant discovers the emergency.

2022This Court, however, has held that, although “it is not unusual for Michigan roads to be icy in the winter, this does not mean that icy patches cannot be unsuspected.” Young v Flood, -4- 182 Mich App 538, 543 ; 452 NW2d 869 (1990).1 Indeed, “Michigan roads are not ice-covered and dangerously slippery all winter long.” Id.; see also Vsetula v Whitmyer, 187 Mich App 675, 681 ; 468 NW2d 53 (1991) (citation omitted) (“Icy patches on Michigan roads in winter can be unsuspected.”).2 Both plaintiff’s deposition and Janet’s affidavit testimonies establish that no material factual dispute exists regard

2022This Court, however, has held that, although “it is not unusual for Michigan roads to be icy in the winter, this does not mean that icy patches cannot be unsuspected.” Young v Flood, -4- 182 Mich App 538, 543 ; 452 NW2d 869 (1990).1 Indeed, “Michigan roads are not ice-covered and dangerously slippery all winter long.” Id.; see also Vsetula v Whitmyer, 187 Mich App 675, 681 ; 468 NW2d 53 (1991) (citation omitted) (“Icy patches on Michigan roads in winter can be unsuspected.”).2 Both plaintiff’s deposition and Janet’s affidavit testimonies establish that no material factual dispute exists regard

2022In Patzer, our Supreme Court discussed winter driving conditions in the Upper Peninsula, where snow blowing across exposed areas of roads may reduce visibility yet compel drivers to proceed despite the danger, lest they be rear-ended by other drivers; thus, “it isn’t possible at all times to obey the letter of the enactment requiring an assured clear distance ahead, and still obey the variable and jury-determinable requirement of due care.” Patzer, 370 Mich at 354-355 .

2020Defendant argues that his dog’s actions, combined with the characteristics of the roadway that he alleges to have obscured the stop sign, created a “lack of visibility” similar to that caused by the weather in Patzer v Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Home, 370 Mich 350, 358 ; 121 NW2d 843 (1963).

2016The instruction should be given when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant, Manning v Cheboygan Area Sch, 76 Mich App 700, 703 ; 257 NW2d 222 (1977), “ ‘any evidence . . . would allow a jury to conclude that an emergency existed within the meaning of that doctrine,’ ” Dennis v Jakeway, 53 Mich App 68, 74 ; 218 NW2d 389 (1974), quoting Wright v Marzolf, 34 Mich App 612, 614 ; 192 NW2d 56 (1971).

2016The instruction should be given when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant, Manning v Cheboygan Area Sch, 76 Mich App 700, 703 ; 257 NW2d 222 (1977), “ ‘any evidence . . . would allow a jury to conclude that an emergency existed within the meaning of that doctrine,’ ” Dennis v Jakeway, 53 Mich App 68, 74 ; 218 NW2d 389 (1974), quoting Wright v Marzolf, 34 Mich App 612, 614 ; 192 NW2d 56 (1971).

1983In Ivy v Binger, 39 Mich App 59 ; 197 NW2d 133 (1972), this Court again found the sudden emergency instruction proper in a case involving a six-year-old child darting into traffic.

1983In Ivy v Binger, 39 Mich App 59 ; 197 NW2d 133 (1972), this Court again found the sudden emergency instruction proper in a case involving a six-year-old child darting into traffic.

1971Walker v. Rebeuhr (1931), 255 Mich 204 ; Gapske v. Hatch (1957), 347 Mich 648 ; Elliott v. A. J.

1958In Lepley v. Bryant, 336 Mich 224, 235 ,- Justice-Carr incorporates .in his opinion a paragraph from Huddy on Automobiles, taken from Walker v. Rebeuhr, supra, and, also, refers to' the cases cited by Chief Justice Dethmers, supra, in support of thócontention that the request to charge by the defendant in that case (which was similar to the one in the instant case) did not constitute a complete and proper statement of the sudden emergency rule, and,, therefore, the trial court correctly refused to give it..

1958Here the plaintiff has duly invoked the doctrine of sudden emergency (not hitherto unknown in such like cases as Loucks v. Fox, 261 Mich 338 ; Smith v. Maticka, 305 Mich 32 ; Schneider v. Pomerville, 348 Mich 49 ).

1958Here the plaintiff has duly invoked the doctrine of sudden emergency (not hitherto unknown in such like cases as Loucks v. Fox, 261 Mich 338 ; Smith v. Maticka, 305 Mich 32 ; Schneider v. Pomerville, 348 Mich 49 ).

2026AdvisaCare 4 “Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307 ; 911 NW2d 219 (2017). -10- has not shown how bringing the motion for directed verdict on this ground was improper, as it did not challenge the sufficiency or credibility of the evidence; it argued that the evidence was undisputed, and required judgment be entered in its favor.

2026AdvisaCare 4 “Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307 ; 911 NW2d 219 (2017). -10- has not shown how bringing the motion for directed verdict on this ground was improper, as it did not challenge the sufficiency or credibility of the evidence; it argued that the evidence was undisputed, and required judgment be entered in its favor.

2025It is from this point onward, and not before, with respect to a crossing subordinate driver appearing in his path, that we scrutinize his acts to determine whether or not he is guilty of negligence for failure to act as a reasonably prudent person, and in all fairness to him, we must measure his conduct in light of the emergency then presented, if not of his making. [McGuire v Rabaut, 354 Mich 230, 234-236 ; 92 NW2d 299 (1958).] To come within the application of the sudden emergency doctrine, the sudden emergency must not arise from the defendants’ own making and the emergency involves a situa

2025It is from this point onward, and not before, with respect to a crossing subordinate driver appearing in his path, that we scrutinize his acts to determine whether or not he is guilty of negligence for failure to act as a reasonably prudent person, and in all fairness to him, we must measure his conduct in light of the emergency then presented, if not of his making. [McGuire v Rabaut, 354 Mich 230, 234-236 ; 92 NW2d 299 (1958).] To come within the application of the sudden emergency doctrine, the sudden emergency must not arise from the defendants’ own making and the emergency involves a situa