sudden emergency doctrine in Pennsylvania

2020The en banc panel of this Court in McKee, supra, recognized that “situations other than moving objects may also qualify to successfully invoke the sudden emergency doctrine,” such as the sudden blocking of the road, a deer in the roadway, or the appearance of a dust cloud.

2020McKee, supra at 274. - 10 - J-A10014-20 Furthermore, several years after McKee, our High Court held in Lockhart that the defendant driver was entitled to a sudden emergency instruction.

2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself

2020See also Lockhart, supra at 1183 (holding that where the evidence does not conclusively establish that the party seeking the defense of the sudden emergency doctrine created the sudden emergency, the jury should be instructed on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine).

2014We also concluded, based upon our prior decisions in Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329 , 483 A.2d 474 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986) and Cannon v. Tabor, 434 Pa.Super. 232 , 642 A.2d 1108 (1994), that where two vehicles were traveling in the same direction, one behind the other, the second driver could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.

2014We also concluded, based upon our prior decisions in Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329 , 483 A.2d 474 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986) and Cannon v. Tabor, 434 Pa.Super. 232 , 642 A.2d 1108 (1994), that where two vehicles were traveling in the same direction, one behind the other, the second driver could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.

1994Nearly twenty years ago, in Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463 , 344 A.2d 695, 698 (1975), this Court noted that: In order to decide the issues here presented we feel compelled to attempt to consolidate the various rulings into one consistent rule to which the present factual situation may be applied. [4] There are cases which have permitted the jury to be instructed on both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine.

1994Nearly twenty years ago, in Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463 , 344 A.2d 695, 698 (1975), this Court noted that: In order to decide the issues here presented we feel compelled to attempt to consolidate the various rulings into one consistent rule to which the present factual situation may be applied. [4] There are cases which have permitted the jury to be instructed on both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine.

2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself

2014Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452 (criminal defendant never entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine no matter the circumstances and, in any event, defendant was driving recklessly); Carpinet, 853 A.2d at 374 (defendant was driving recklessly); Cunningham, 732 A.2d at 658 (failure to see brake lights is not a sudden emergency); Brown, 386 A.2d at 49 (gravel in the road was not a sudden emergency); Reifel, 295 A.2d at 140 (driver had opportunity to assess the danger).

1994Though this case was later relied upon by a number of decisions for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, it is proper to charge on both the assured clear distance ahead and the sudden emergency doctrine, see, e.g., Potenburg v. Varner, supra 284 Pa.Super. at 22 , 424 A.2d at 1372 , the Stacy court, in fact, reached no such conclusion.

1994Though this case was later relied upon by a number of decisions for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, it is proper to charge on both the assured clear distance ahead and the sudden emergency doctrine, see, e.g., Potenburg v. Varner, supra 284 Pa.Super. at 22 , 424 A.2d at 1372 , the Stacy court, in fact, reached no such conclusion.

2014The trial court cites Elder and Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163 , 507 A.2d 822 (1986), to support its conclusion that Appellant could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine because his van and Stutts’ car were traveling in the same direction.

2014The trial court cites Elder and Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163 , 507 A.2d 822 (1986), to support its conclusion that Appellant could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine because his van and Stutts’ car were traveling in the same direction.

2023As Matroni himself acknowledges, “the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on the correct legal principles applicable to the facts presented at trial.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 686 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis added).

2015As [appellant] himself acknowledges, “the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on the correct legal principles applicable to the facts presented at trial.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 546 Pa. 515, 530 , 686 A.2d 1279, 1286 (1996) (emphasis added).

2014Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452 (criminal defendant never entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine no matter the circumstances and, in any event, defendant was driving recklessly); Carpinet, 853 A.2d at 374 (defendant was driving recklessly); Cunningham, 732 A.2d at 658 (failure to see brake lights is not a sudden emergency); Brown, 386 A.2d at 49 (gravel in the road was not a sudden emergency); Reifel, 295 A.2d at 140 (driver had opportunity to assess the danger).

1994Though our cases have repeated that the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine are generally mutually exclusive instructions, see McKee by McKee v. Evans, supra 380 Pa.Super. at 150 n. 5, 551 A.2d at 274 n. 5; Elder v. Orluck, supra 334 Pa.Super. at 341 — 45, 483 A.2d at 481-82 ; Brown v. Schriver, supra 254 Pa.Super. at 473-77 , 386 A.2d at 48-49 , the two instructions are often included in the same jury charge.

2014Our Supreme Court reasoned that neither Elder nor Cannon compelled the conclusion that where an accident involves motorists traveling in the same direction, only the first driver can invoke the sudden emergency doctrine. 9 More significantly, however, our Supreme Court again “cautioned against [] rigid adherence to the distinction between static and moving objects in determining the applicability of the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine.” Levey, 725 A.2d at 736 .

2014Therefore, since the facts did not unequivocally establish that DeNardo’s negligence led to the collision with Levey, “it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury that DeNardo, too, could be judged on the basis of the defense of the sudden emergency doctrine.” Levey, 725 A.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

2014We also concluded, based upon our prior decisions in Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329 , 483 A.2d 474 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986) and Cannon v. Tabor, 434 Pa.Super. 232 , 642 A.2d 1108 (1994), that where two vehicles were traveling in the same direction, one behind the other, the second driver could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.

2014We also concluded, based upon our prior decisions in Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329 , 483 A.2d 474 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986) and Cannon v. Tabor, 434 Pa.Super. 232 , 642 A.2d 1108 (1994), that where two vehicles were traveling in the same direction, one behind the other, the second driver could not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.

2014See e.g., Unangst v. Whitehouse [ 235 Pa.Super. 458 ], 344 A.2d 695 (Pa.Super.1975); Sullivan v. Wolson [ 262 Pa.Super. 397 ], 396 A.2d 1230 (Pa.Super.1978); Brown v. Schriver [ 254 Pa.Super. 468 ], 386 A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.1978).

2014See e.g., Unangst v. Whitehouse [ 235 Pa.Super. 458 ], 344 A.2d 695 (Pa.Super.1975); Sullivan v. Wolson [ 262 Pa.Super. 397 ], 396 A.2d 1230 (Pa.Super.1978); Brown v. Schriver [ 254 Pa.Super. 468 ], 386 A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.1978).

1994The complexity of the issue is further revealed in Potenburg v. Varner, supra. While the court in Stacy confined its statement of the law to "this situation”, Stacy v. Thrower Trucking, Inc., supra at 159, 384 A.2d at 1279 , this Court in Potenburg , cited the rule as universally applicable: Where the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency, it is proper to charge the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine in order that the jury has the applicable law to apply to the facts as they find them.

1994While the court in Stacy confined its statement of the law to "this situation", Stacy v. Thrower Trucking, Inc., supra at 159, 384 A.2d at 1279 , this Court in Potenburg , cited the rule as universally applicable: Where the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency, it is proper to charge the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine in order that the jury has the applicable law to apply to the facts as they find them.

2023This issue, therefore, “presents [a] pure question[] of law, over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 241 (Pa. 2017). -2- J-A09018-23 This Court previously addressed the application of the sudden emergency doctrine in criminal matters in Commonwealth v. Matroni, 923 A.2d 444 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself

2007Commonwealth v. Spano, 451 Pa.Super. 226 , 679 A.2d 240, 244 (1996) ( citing Commonwealth v. Blystone, 421 Pa.Super, 167, 617 A.2d 778, 785 (1992) ("[E]ven if we found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, we can only grant relief if the error prejudiced the appellant.")); Kukowski *452 v. Kukowski, 385 Pa.Super. 172 , 560 A.2d 222, 224 (1989) ("Reversible error will be found only where the jury instruction has been shown to have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party, as well as erroneous."). ¶ 19 The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergenc

2007Commonwealth v. Spano, 451 Pa.Super. 226 , 679 A.2d 240, 244 (1996) ( citing Commonwealth v. Blystone, 421 Pa.Super, 167, 617 A.2d 778, 785 (1992) ("[E]ven if we found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, we can only grant relief if the error prejudiced the appellant.")); Kukowski *452 v. Kukowski, 385 Pa.Super. 172 , 560 A.2d 222, 224 (1989) ("Reversible error will be found only where the jury instruction has been shown to have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party, as well as erroneous."). ¶ 19 The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergenc

1995Hrivnak v. Perrone, 472 Pa. 348 , 372 A.2d 730 (1977). *148 Both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine, which are most often employed in cases arising out of a motor vehicle accident, are well established in our case law. 2 Given the fact specific nature of motor vehicle accident cases, however, the application of these two doctrines in our case law, either in isolation or in conjunction with each other, is somewhat varied rendering a precise and absolute rule of law thereon rather elusive.

1995Hrivnak v. Perrone, 472 Pa. 348 , 372 A.2d 730 (1977). *148 Both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine, which are most often employed in cases arising out of a motor vehicle accident, are well established in our case law. 2 Given the fact specific nature of motor vehicle accident cases, however, the application of these two doctrines in our case law, either in isolation or in conjunction with each other, is somewhat varied rendering a precise and absolute rule of law thereon rather elusive.

1995On the other hand, Appellees submit, and the Superior Court agreed, that the instant matter is virtually identical to the facts at issue in this Court’s decision in Haines v. Dulaney, 424 Pa. 608 , 227 A.2d 625 (1967), wherein this Court upheld the trial court’s rulings that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that, therefore, the sudden emergency charge was properly denied by the trial court.

1995On the other hand, Appellees submit, and the Superior Court agreed, that the instant matter is virtually identical to the facts at issue in this Court’s decision in Haines v. Dulaney, 424 Pa. 608 , 227 A.2d 625 (1967), wherein this Court upheld the trial court’s rulings that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that, therefore, the sudden emergency charge was properly denied by the trial court.

2020See Drew, supra at 330 .

2018Drew v. Work , 95 A.3d 324 , 333 (Pa. Super. 2014) ; Papandrea v. Hartman , 352 Pa.Super. 163 , 507 A.2d 822 , 825 n.2 (1986) (citing Railroad Company v. Aspell , 23 Pa. 147 (1854) ).

2014Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452 (criminal defendant never entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine no matter the circumstances and, in any event, defendant was driving recklessly); Carpinet, 853 A.2d at 374 (defendant was driving recklessly); Cunningham, 732 A.2d at 658 (failure to see brake lights is not a sudden emergency); Brown, 386 A.2d at 49 (gravel in the road was not a sudden emergency); Reifel, 295 A.2d at 140 (driver had opportunity to assess the danger).

2007Indeed, any sudden or unexpected peril in this matter was created in part by [the defendant's] own actions in apparently following too closely behind [the plaintiff]. . . ." Id., 853 A.2d at 374 . ¶ 24 Thus, the sudden emergency doctrine is not applicable to the circumstances at hand, since the tractor trailer was moving in the same direction as Matroni's vehicle.

2014E.g., Commonwealth v. Matroni, 923 A.2d 444 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 729 , 952 A.2d 675 (2008); Carpinet v. Mitchell, 853 A.2d 366 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 706 , 889 A.2d 1212 (2005), superseded on other grounds by Pa.R.C.P. 223.3 as recognized by Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 866 (Pa.Super.2012); Cunningham, 732 A.2d at 658 ; Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Su per. 468, 386 A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.1978); Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa.Super. 212 , 295 A.2d 138, 140 (1972).

2014Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452 (criminal defendant never entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine no matter the circumstances and, in any event, defendant was driving recklessly); Carpinet, 853 A.2d at 374 (defendant was driving recklessly); Cunningham, 732 A.2d at 658 (failure to see brake lights is not a sudden emergency); Brown, 386 A.2d at 49 (gravel in the road was not a sudden emergency); Reifel, 295 A.2d at 140 (driver had opportunity to assess the danger).

1989See Chiodo v. Gargloff & Downham Trucking Co., 308 Pa.Super. 498 , 454 A.2d 645 (1983) (sudden emergency defense is available to a defendant where, inter alia, defendant proves he did not create the emergency and he responded in a reasonable fashion).

1989See Chiodo v. Gargloff & Downham Trucking Co., 308 Pa.Super. 498 , 454 A.2d 645 (1983) (sudden emergency defense is available to a defendant where, inter alia, defendant proves he did not create the emergency and he responded in a reasonable fashion).