sudden emergency instruction in Iowa

2018“In reviewing whether a sudden emergency instruction was properly submitted, we 6 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party asserting the defense.” Hagenow v. Schmidt, 842 N.W.2d 661, 670 (Iowa 2014), overruled on other grounds by Alcala, 880 N.W.2d at 708 n.3.

2014See Hagenow v. Schmidt, 842 N.W.2d 661, 677 (Iowa 2014) (concluding error was harmless where the defendant prevailed on the sudden-emergency defense and the district court’s wording of the sudden-emergency instruction made it more difficult to prove the defense).

2014Id. 600.74 (emphasis added). 2 The sudden emergency instruction “is merely an expression of the reasonably prudent person standard of care.” Weiss v. Bal, 501 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa 1993).

2014In Weiss , we listed “a sudden heart attack” as an example of a situation that could warrant a sudden emergency instruction. 501 N.W.2d at 482 ; see also Fitas v. Estate of Baldridge, 102 Ohio App.3d 365 , 657 N.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1995) (finding heart attack suffered by driver of automobile created sudden emergency that precluded liability of driver or his wife); Diaz v. Sopade, 69 A.D.3d 558 , 893 N.Y.S.2d 164 , 165 (2010) (concluding sudden emergency defense applied to motorist who, after being assaulted by his passenger and rendered unconscious, struck a bicyclist).

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

1993In Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1986), we reversed a judgment for defendant motorist due to imprecision in the sudden emergency instruction given, but noted that unusually hazardous road conditions could excuse a driver’s failure to obey traffic laws that would otherwise constitute negligence per se.

2014See id. at 54-55 (holding sudden emergency instruction was inappropriate when driver failed to see biker riding on the side of the road); Foster, 636 N.W.2d at 107 (rejecting sudden emergency instruction when defendant had ten to fifteen seconds to deliberate); Weiss, 501 N.W.2d at 482 (denying instruction when “[t]he facts reveal no more than the everyday hazard of driving through a school parking lot and the not uncommon appearance of pedestrians crossing the traveled way to reach their parked cars”).

2002The sudden emergency doctrine “allows a fact finder to excuse a defendant’s failure to obey statutory law when confronted with an emergency not of the defendant’s own making.” Foster v. Ankrum, 636 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2001).

2014The district court concluded, “those are jury questions—the jury can analyze and take into account that evidence and then compare it to the jury instruction [setting out the law on] the sudden emergency doctrine.” We agree and recognize the “extent and nature of an emergency is usually a fact question and, if there is substantial evidence that an emergency had developed, the jury should be instructed thereon.” Bangs, 174 N.W.2d at 374 .

1994Bangs v. Keifer, 174 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Iowa 1970); see also Dickman v. Truck Transport, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1974) (valid defense to sudden dust storm). 2 .

1972Sieren v. Stoutner, 162 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1968); Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 678 , 128 N.W.2d 896, 901 (1964), and citations.

1972Sieren v. Stoutner, 162 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1968); Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 678 , 128 N.W.2d 896, 901 (1964), and citations.

2014Jur Proof of Facts 3d. § 13, at 424 (1990 & Supp.2013) (emphasis added); see also Bardwell v. McLaughlin, 257 Ark. 782 , 520 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1975) (holding sudden emergency instruction inappropriate when “it was physically impossible for appellee to make a decisional act”); Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 726 (2009) (holding driver who suffered acute medical crisis and lost consciousness was not entitled to sudden emergency instruction because “[t]here was no action he could take or did take”).

2014Jur Proof of Facts 3d. § 13, at 424 (1990 & Supp.2013) (emphasis added); see also Bardwell v. McLaughlin, 257 Ark. 782 , 520 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1975) (holding sudden emergency instruction inappropriate when “it was physically impossible for appellee to make a decisional act”); Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 726 (2009) (holding driver who suffered acute medical crisis and lost consciousness was not entitled to sudden emergency instruction because “[t]here was no action he could take or did take”).

2014Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 927-31 (Colo.2013) (collecting cases).

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

2014Compare Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 54 (Iowa 2002) (explaining the fact finder may excuse an alleged tortfea-sor’s violation of statutory law if the alleged tortfeasor proves he or she was con *380 fronted with an unforeseen emergency), with W.

2014See Koenig, 766 N.W.2d at 637 (noting only prejudicial error requires reversal).

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

2014Compare Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Iowa 2013) (declining to extend state volunteer’s immunity to the state after considering policy consequences, among other considerations); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-89 (Iowa 1981) (abrogating absolute parental immunity for negligence after considering “the values which that doctrine purports to foster”), with Vasconez, 651 N.W.2d at 54 (explaining the rationale of the sudden emergency defense); Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (noting a person acting in an emergency “is not held to the same standard of care as one who ha

2014Smith concludes: “This expert testimony regarding whether or not certain legal standards are met is inadmissible.” We employ a liberal rule allowing “expert opinion testimony if it will aid the jury and is based on special training, experience, or knowledge with respect to the issue in question.” Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).

2014Jur Proof of Facts 3d. § 13, at 424 (1990 & Supp.2013) (emphasis added); see also Bardwell v. McLaughlin, 257 Ark. 782 , 520 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1975) (holding sudden emergency instruction inappropriate when “it was physically impossible for appellee to make a decisional act”); Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 726 (2009) (holding driver who suffered acute medical crisis and lost consciousness was not entitled to sudden emergency instruction because “[t]here was no action he could take or did take”).

2014Jur Proof of Facts 3d. § 13, at 424 (1990 & Supp.2013) (emphasis added); see also Bardwell v. McLaughlin, 257 Ark. 782 , 520 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1975) (holding sudden emergency instruction inappropriate when “it was physically impossible for appellee to make a decisional act”); Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 726 (2009) (holding driver who suffered acute medical crisis and lost consciousness was not entitled to sudden emergency instruction because “[t]here was no action he could take or did take”).

2014In Weiss , we listed “a sudden heart attack” as an example of a situation that could warrant a sudden emergency instruction. 501 N.W.2d at 482 ; see also Fitas v. Estate of Baldridge, 102 Ohio App.3d 365 , 657 N.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1995) (finding heart attack suffered by driver of automobile created sudden emergency that precluded liability of driver or his wife); Diaz v. Sopade, 69 A.D.3d 558 , 893 N.Y.S.2d 164 , 165 (2010) (concluding sudden emergency defense applied to motorist who, after being assaulted by his passenger and rendered unconscious, struck a bicyclist).

2014In Weiss , we listed “a sudden heart attack” as an example of a situation that could warrant a sudden emergency instruction. 501 N.W.2d at 482 ; see also Fitas v. Estate of Baldridge, 102 Ohio App.3d 365 , 657 N.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1995) (finding heart attack suffered by driver of automobile created sudden emergency that precluded liability of driver or his wife); Diaz v. Sopade, 69 A.D.3d 558 , 893 N.Y.S.2d 164 , 165 (2010) (concluding sudden emergency defense applied to motorist who, after being assaulted by his passenger and rendered unconscious, struck a bicyclist).

1999Cf. Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 367 (Colo.1991) (trial court properly instructed jury on the sudden emergency doctrine; sudden and unexpected reentry of unknown driver into flow of traffic was sufficient evidence to support giving the sudden emergency instruction and there was no evidence that driver who rear-ended vehicle in front of her was driving too fast or following too closely). 5 .

1999Cf. Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 367 (Colo.1991) (trial court properly instructed jury on the sudden emergency doctrine; sudden and unexpected reentry of unknown driver into flow of traffic was sufficient evidence to support giving the sudden emergency instruction and there was no evidence that driver who rear-ended vehicle in front of her was driving too fast or following too closely). 5 .

1999See Reener v. Hill & Williams Bros., Inc., 502 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa App.1993) (applying Tennessee law, substantial evidence existed to justify submitting a sudden emergency instruction to jury where traffic on freeway was moving steadily at highway speeds and it was impossible to change lanes quickly when couch fell from pickup onto freeway).

1994Bangs v. Keifer, 174 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Iowa 1970); see also Dickman v. Truck Transport, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1974) (valid defense to sudden dust storm). 2 .

1994See Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 1988).

1993Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (S.D.1977); Prosser § 33, at 196-97.

1993See Paiva v. Pfeiffer, 229 N.J.Super. 276, 283-84 , 551 A.2d 201, 205 (1988) (ordinary rules of negligence afforded sufficient gauge to appraise driver’s conduct; giving additional sudden emergency instruction unduly emphasized one phase of proofs and was argumentative in effect); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or.App. 266, 268 , 744 P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (judgment for defendant motorist reversed; court expressed doubt that sudden emergency instruction should ever be given in ordinary auto accident case); see also William L.

1993See Paiva v. Pfeiffer, 229 N.J.Super. 276, 283-84 , 551 A.2d 201, 205 (1988) (ordinary rules of negligence afforded sufficient gauge to appraise driver’s conduct; giving additional sudden emergency instruction unduly emphasized one phase of proofs and was argumentative in effect); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or.App. 266, 268 , 744 P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (judgment for defendant motorist reversed; court expressed doubt that sudden emergency instruction should ever be given in ordinary auto accident case); see also William L.

1993Irvin v. City of Kingsport, 602 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tenn.App.1980).

1993Irvin v. City of Kingsport, 602 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tenn.App.1980).

1993See Paiva v. Pfeiffer, 229 N.J.Super. 276, 283-84 , 551 A.2d 201, 205 (1988) (ordinary rules of negligence afforded sufficient gauge to appraise driver’s conduct; giving additional sudden emergency instruction unduly emphasized one phase of proofs and was argumentative in effect); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or.App. 266, 268 , 744 P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (judgment for defendant motorist reversed; court expressed doubt that sudden emergency instruction should ever be given in ordinary auto accident case); see also William L.

1993See Paiva v. Pfeiffer, 229 N.J.Super. 276, 283-84 , 551 A.2d 201, 205 (1988) (ordinary rules of negligence afforded sufficient gauge to appraise driver’s conduct; giving additional sudden emergency instruction unduly emphasized one phase of proofs and was argumentative in effect); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or.App. 266, 268 , 744 P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (judgment for defendant motorist reversed; court expressed doubt that sudden emergency instruction should ever be given in ordinary auto accident case); see also William L.