sudden emergency instruction in Texas

2023Further, a sudden emergency instruction “reiterates much of the unavoidable accident instruction.” Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 474 .

2008In Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995), the supreme court found no error in the submission of both an unavoidable accident and a sudden emergency instruction where the facts showed the defendant driver rear ended a car stopped on the blind side of an overpass.

2024Code Ann. § 101.021 (1); see DeLeon v. Pickens, 933 S.W.2d 286, 293 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1996, writ denied) (“[T]he only purpose of the sudden emergency defense doctrine is to relieve a party from the consequences of his conduct which might otherwise be considered negligent.”); see also Benham v. Lynch, No. 04-09-00606-CV, 2011 WL 381665 , at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defendant not liable to plaintiff for negligence if fact-finder found that sudden emergency resulted in defendant rear-ending plaintiff’s car).

2022(Internal quotations omitted.) See DeLeon v. Pickens, 933 S.W.2d 286, 293 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1996, writ denied) (“[T]he only purpose of the sudden emergency defense doctrine is to relieve a party from the consequences of his conduct which might otherwise be considered negligent.”); see also Benham v. Lynch, No. 04-09-00606-CV, 2011 WL 381665 , at *6 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Feb. 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defendant not liable to plaintiff for negligence if fact finder found that sudden emergency resulted in defendant rear-ending plaintiff’s car). 20 A “sudden emergency” exist

2022Here, we cannot say, based on the evidence before the trial court, that the City conclusively 30 established that the sudden emergency was not proximately caused by Robertson’s negligence.15 See Jordan, 222 S.W.3d at 847 (“[T]he elements of the sudden emergency defense [are] . . . (1) an emergency situation arose suddenly and unexpectedly; (2) the emergency situation was not proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the person whose conduct is under inquiry; and (3) after an emergency situation arose that to a reasonable person would have required immediate action without time for

2018Applicable Law “A sudden emergency instruction advises the jurors that if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party’s control caused the accident in question or that the conduct of some person not a party to the litigation caused it, the jury does not have to place blame on a party.” Jordan v. Sava, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

2019Id. (citing Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995)). “[I]f there is any support in the evidence for a sudden emergency instruction, the instruction is properly given.” Id. at 847; accord Dodson v. Muñoz, No. 04-17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 3747748 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). b.

2011See, e.g. , Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) (driver’s testimony that he was traveling the posted speed when the defendant unexpectedly u-turned in front of him did not raise a fact question sufficient to require a sudden-emergency instruction); Priest v. Myers , 598 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.

2011See Higginbotham v. Ritchie, 367 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. Civ.

2011See Higginbotham v. Ritchie , 367 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. Civ.

2019Id. (citing Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995)). “[I]f there is any support in the evidence for a sudden emergency instruction, the instruction is properly given.” Id. at 847; accord Dodson v. Muñoz, No. 04-17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 3747748 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). b.

2019The Sterling Appellants further contend Dr. Eftekhar’s testimony is based on “nothing more than pure speculation and assumption.” The purpose of a sudden emergency instruction is to advise the jurors, that in certain situations, blame need not be placed “on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party’s control caused the accident in question or that the conduct of some person not a party to the litigation caused it.” Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 432 .

2023See Oldham, 864 S.W.2d at 126 ; see also Jordan v. Sava, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2018Oldham v. Thomas, 864 S.W.2d 121, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 895 S.W.2d at 360 . 15 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986) (explaining that, to determine whether alleged error in jury charge is reversible, reviewing court considers pleadings of parties, evidence presented at trial, and charge in entirety).

2008Francis v. Cogdell , 803 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

2008Francis v. Cogdell, 803 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

2011See, e.g. , Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) (driver’s testimony that he was traveling the posted speed when the defendant unexpectedly u-turned in front of him did not raise a fact question sufficient to require a sudden-emergency instruction); Priest v. Myers , 598 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.

1996Appellant cites three cases where a sudden emergency instruction was deemed improper in rear-end collisions: Higginbotham, Priest v. Myers, 598 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), and Deviney v. McLendon, 496 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2011Id.; Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 976 S.W.2d at 676 .

2007In rejecting Knighten’s argument that a sudden emergency instruction was improper, the supreme court stated, “The trial court has great latitude and considerable discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions_If an instruction might aid the jury in answering the issues presented to them, or if there is any support in the evidence for an instruction, the instruction is proper.” Id. at 676 .

2007See Knighten, 976 S.W.2d at 676 (sudden emergency instruction did not cause rendition of improper judgment when defendant struck plaintiff from behind after plaintiff abruptly applied her brakes on wet street in rain); Francis, 803 S.W.2d at 871 (testimony that rear-end collision was caused by plaintiff suddenly slamming on brakes at yellow light during morning rush hour in rain on wet and slick roads supported trial court’s instruction on sudden emergency); Crowley v. Babolcsay, 611 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex.App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e) (sudden emergency instruction was warranted when evide

2007See Knighten , 976 S.W.2d at 676 (sudden emergency instruction did not cause rendition of improper judgment when defendant struck plaintiff from behind after plaintiff abruptly applied her brakes on wet street in rain); Francis , 803 S.W.2d at 871 (testimony that rear-end collision was caused by plaintiff suddenly slamming on brakes at yellow light during morning rush hour in rain on wet and slick roads supported trial court's instruction on sudden emergency); Crowley v. Babolcsay , 611 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sudden emergency instruction was warranted when

2007See Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 432 (“The purpose of [a sudden emergency instruction] is to advise the jurors, in the appropriate case, that they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party’s control caused the accident in question[.]”); Bed, Bath & Beyond, 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“[SJometimes accidents are no one’s fault, and an unavoidable accident instruction ... simply explains to the jury that they are not required to find someone at fault.”).

2007See Dillard , 157 S.W.3d at 432 ("The purpose of [a sudden emergency instruction] is to advise the jurors, in the appropriate case, that they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party's control caused the accident in question[.]"); Bed, Bath & Beyond , 211 S.W.3d at 757 ("[S]ometimes accidents are no one's fault, and an unavoidable accident instruction . . . simply explains to the jury that they are not required to find someone at fault.").

2009See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Tex. 2006).

2009See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc. , 208 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Tex. 2006).

2008See Buls v. Fuselier, 55 S.W.3d 204, 211-12 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Erickson, 627 S.W.2d at 478 ; Mo. Pac.

2008See Buls v. Fuselier , 55 S.W.3d 204, 211-12 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Erickson , 627 S.W.2d at 478 ; Mo. Pac.

2008Bounds v. Scurlock Oil Co., 730 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2008Bounds v. Scurlock Oil Co. , 730 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2007See Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex.1995); Evans v. Allwhite, 111 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Priest v. Myers, 598 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 432 n. 4.

2007See Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); Evans v. Allwhite , 111 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Priest v. Myers , 598 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also Dillard , 157 S.W.3d at 432 n.4.

2011App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (court found no evidence to warrant the submission of a sudden-emergency instruction where the defendant was looking around to try to change lanes and could not stop when the plaintiff’s car slowed in front of him); Deviney v. McLendon , 496 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ.

1996Appellant cites three cases where a sudden emergency instruction was deemed improper in rear-end collisions: Higginbotham, Priest v. Myers, 598 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), and Deviney v. McLendon, 496 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1971Co., supra, “are, in law, regarded as would be the movements of an inanimate object set in motion by such [defendant’s] negligence.” It is insisted by the appellants that Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Sup.1971) equates imminent peril with the sudden emergency doctrine and in practical effect merges and unifies these concepts into one and the same doctrine, but this court does not agree that the case has that effect.

1971His argument is predicated upon judicial declarations, such as appear in our opinion in Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Sup.1971), concerning the purpose of the sudden emergency doctrine.

2019See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 693 (Tex. 2012); DeWolf v. Kohler, 452 S.W.3d 373 , 394–95 (Tex. 3 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

2013Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 687 .

2013See Jordan v. Sava, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 840 , 852–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Del Bosque v. Heitmann Bering-Cortes Co., 474 S.W.2d 450 , 452–53 (Tex. 1971) (explaining that two cases interpreting sudden emergency doctrine as lower standard of care misapplied doctrine by intermingling it with doctrine of imminent peril).

1977Accord, Del Bosque v. Heitman Bering-Cortes Company, 474 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex.1971), where former Chief Justice Calvert, after quoting passages intermingling the doctrines of sudden emergency and imminent peril, wrote: .

2025P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017).

2022Co., 962 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (conflicting evidence creates fact issue precluding summary judgment).

2018Oldham v. Thomas, 864 S.W.2d 121, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 895 S.W.2d at 360 . 15 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986) (explaining that, to determine whether alleged error in jury charge is reversible, reviewing court considers pleadings of parties, evidence presented at trial, and charge in entirety).

2001Id .; Wilson v. Whitcher , 477 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. Civ.

2001Higginbotham , 367 S.W.2d at 212 (failed to keep proper lookout); Deviney , 496 S.W.2d at 166-67 (failed to keep proper lookout); Priest , 598 S.W.2d at 362-63 (failed to maintain proper distance); Jordan , 674 S.W.2d at 469 (failed to keep proper lookout, apply brakes, and stop at red light).

2001Borrego v. City of El Paso , 964 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1998, pet. denied)(sudden emergency doctrine did not apply where there was negligence by emergency medical service personnel in immobilizing plaintiff in the middle of the road after an accident and such negligence occurred prior to the emergency created when a car later spun wildly into the accident scene, striking the immobilized plaintiff, who was abandoned in the street by the fleeing EMS personnel.) We note that in the present case the chain of events leading to the accident began when a car switched lanes in front of t

1995It would also require overruling Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.1977) (per *361 curiam), in which we refused to discard the sudden emergency instruction although we abolished the doctrine of imminent peril.

1995It would also require overruling Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.1977) (per curiam), in which we refused to discard the sudden emergency instruction although we abolished the doctrine of imminent peril.