sudden emergency doctrine in Indiana

2003Sullivan v. Fairmont Homes, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1130, 1137 (Ind.Ct.App.1989).

2001Sudden Emergency The sudden emergency doctrine recognizes that "'a reasonable person innocently deprived of time to consider his actions does not always exercise the same accuracy of judgment as one who has had the opportunity for reflection.'" Barnard v. Himes, 719 N.E.2d 862, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied, (quoting Sulivan v. Fairmont Homes, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1130, 1137 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)).

2005Although the sudden emergency doctrine is often described as an affirmative defense 1 , "it does not act to excuse fault, but rather defines the conduct to be expected of a prudent person in an emergency situation." City of Terre Haute v. Simpson, 746 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trams. denied.

2004See Mullins v. Qualkenbush, 777 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) ("Although the sudden emergency doctrine is generally described as an affirmative defense, it does not act to excuse fault but rather defines the conduct to be expected of a prudent person in an emergency situation."); City of Terre Haute v. Simpson, 746 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied; Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), adopted on transfer, 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind.1991). -Other panels of this Court have previously opined that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense. 3 Such proclama *1153

2018A trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency] defense if there is any evidence to support its application." Compton v. Pletch , 561 N.E.2d 803 , 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), adopted on transfer , 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991). [14] Yates maintains that the evidence did not support giving the sudden emergency instruction, 2 and we agree.

2012Whether or not that evidence was believable or entitled to much weight was for the jury to decide, not the trial court.”); Linville v. Pressley, 744 N.E.2d 974 , 976 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three necessary facts.), trans. denied; and Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency doctrine] if there is any evidence to support its application.”), adopted by, 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991).

2018A trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency] defense if there is any evidence to support its application." Compton v. Pletch , 561 N.E.2d 803 , 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), adopted on transfer , 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991). [14] Yates maintains that the evidence did not support giving the sudden emergency instruction, 2 and we agree.

2012Whether or not that evidence was believable or entitled to much weight was for the jury to decide, not the trial court.”); Linville v. Pressley, 744 N.E.2d 974 , 976 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three necessary facts.), trans. denied; and Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency doctrine] if there is any evidence to support its application.”), adopted by, 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991).

2017E.g., Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng’rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017). [7] With respect to the element of breach, the sudden emergency doctrine, which “was developed by the courts to recognize that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate action,” Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (Ind. 2006), may apply.

2014The sudden emergency doctrine was developed by courts “to recognize that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate action is not expected to exercise the judgment of one acting under normal circumstances.” Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (Ind. 2006) (citing W.P.

2004While the question of whether a proponent of a sudden emergency defense could have the jury instructed on the defense when he did not raise it as an affirmative defense in his pleadings was raised in Barnard v. Himes, the panel deciding that case did not reach the issue of whether Trial Rule 8(C) required sudden emergency to be specifically pled because it resolved that the evidence at trial did not support the giving of a sudden emergency instruction. 719 N.E.2d at 868-69 . 5 .

2004See e.g., Aldana v. School City of East Chicago, 769 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (''The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Barnard v. Himes, 719 N.E.2d 862, 868 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ("'The sudden *1153 emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ('T

2012See Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1184 (“In Indiana, a defendant seeking a sudden emergency instruction must show that three factual prerequisites have been satisfied . . . .”); Collins, 831 N.E.2d at 246 (“A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction.”) (quotation omitted; emphasis in 9 original); Lovings v. Cleary, 799 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three prerequisites.), trans. denied; Brooks, 769 N.E.2d at 7

2012See Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1184 (“In Indiana, a defendant seeking a sudden emergency instruction must show that three factual prerequisites have been satisfied . . . .”); Collins, 831 N.E.2d at 246 (“A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction.”) (quotation omitted; emphasis in 9 original); Lovings v. Cleary, 799 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three prerequisites.), trans. denied; Brooks, 769 N.E.2d at 7

2006Chicago, 769 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied ("The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied (''The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense, and the trial court has the duty to instruct the jury concerning the defense if there is any evidence to support its application."). 4 .

2004See e.g., Aldana v. School City of East Chicago, 769 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (''The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Barnard v. Himes, 719 N.E.2d 862, 868 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ("'The sudden *1153 emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ('T

2018Therefore, even though the jury should have found the sudden emergency instruction inapplicable due to a lack of evidence to support it and therefore disregarded that instruction, Baker , 242 N.E.2d at 515 , it is much more likely that the jury did improperly consider and rely upon the sudden emergency instruction in reaching its verdict, thereby causing prejudice to Yates.

2018Kimbrough , 55 N.E.3d at 339 . 3 Moreover, as we noted in Collins , a sudden emergency cannot exist for a defendant motorist who did not perceive the emergency until after the collision. 831 N.E.2d at 246 ; see also Taylor v. Todd , 439 N.E.2d 190 , 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Baker v. Mason , 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 , 515 (1968) ) ("Without the perception of sudden danger, there is no impairment of judgment and no need for the sudden emergency instruction.").

2006Chicago, 769 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied ("The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied (''The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense, and the trial court has the duty to instruct the jury concerning the defense if there is any evidence to support its application."). 4 .

2004See e.g., Aldana v. School City of East Chicago, 769 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (''The sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Barnard v. Himes, 719 N.E.2d 862, 868 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ("'The sudden *1153 emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense and the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ('T

2018Kimbrough , 55 N.E.3d at 339 . 3 Moreover, as we noted in Collins , a sudden emergency cannot exist for a defendant motorist who did not perceive the emergency until after the collision. 831 N.E.2d at 246 ; see also Taylor v. Todd , 439 N.E.2d 190 , 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Baker v. Mason , 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 , 515 (1968) ) ("Without the perception of sudden danger, there is no impairment of judgment and no need for the sudden emergency instruction.").

2014“A trial court has a ‘duty to instruct’ the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction.” Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).

2019The Denson court recognized that in Holcomb v. Miller, 149 Ind. App. 46, 50 , 269 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1971) the court “acknowledged the status of sudden loss of consciousness while driving as an affirmative defense to a negligence action,” but found that Holcomb did not constitute “a formal adoption of the specific affirmative defense to negligence.” Id. at n.3.

2019The Denson court recognized that in Holcomb v. Miller, 149 Ind. App. 46, 50 , 269 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1971) the court “acknowledged the status of sudden loss of consciousness while driving as an affirmative defense to a negligence action,” but found that Holcomb did not constitute “a formal adoption of the specific affirmative defense to negligence.” Id. at n.3.

2012See Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1184 (“In Indiana, a defendant seeking a sudden emergency instruction must show that three factual prerequisites have been satisfied . . . .”); Collins, 831 N.E.2d at 246 (“A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction.”) (quotation omitted; emphasis in 9 original); Lovings v. Cleary, 799 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three prerequisites.), trans. denied; Brooks, 769 N.E.2d at 7

2012See Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1184 (“In Indiana, a defendant seeking a sudden emergency instruction must show that three factual prerequisites have been satisfied . . . .”); Collins, 831 N.E.2d at 246 (“A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine if the evidence presented at trial supports the instruction.”) (quotation omitted; emphasis in 9 original); Lovings v. Cleary, 799 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three prerequisites.), trans. denied; Brooks, 769 N.E.2d at 7

1990Evans, supra; Stein v. Yung (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 52 , trans. denied.

1989Although there are recorded decisions involving sudden emergencies purportedly arising because of driving conditions, see, e.g., Stein v. Yung, supra and Michigan City v. Rudolph (1938), 104 Ind.App. 643 , 12 N.E.2d 970 , these cases were not resolved against the actor based upon the rationale that a sudden emergency may only arise from the negligence or conduct of another.

2005See Lovely, 166 Ind.App. at 109 , 3338 N.E.2d at 868 (noting that actor must perceive the emergency as a part of the second prong of the sudden emergency doctrine); see also Baker v. Mason, 258 Ind. 348, 350 , 242 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1968) (holding that sudden emergency instruction was erroneously given where actor testified that she was unaware of emergency or peril until after impact).

1987E.g., Baker v. Mason (1968), 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 ; Taylor v. Todd (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 190 ; Lovely v. Keele (1975), 166 Ind.App. 106 , 333 N.E.2d 866 ; Stansberry v. Clabbers (1975), 164 Ind.App. 594 , 330 N.E.2d 123 .

2018Kimbrough , 55 N.E.3d at 339 . 3 Moreover, as we noted in Collins , a sudden emergency cannot exist for a defendant motorist who did not perceive the emergency until after the collision. 831 N.E.2d at 246 ; see also Taylor v. Todd , 439 N.E.2d 190 , 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Baker v. Mason , 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 , 515 (1968) ) ("Without the perception of sudden danger, there is no impairment of judgment and no need for the sudden emergency instruction.").

2018Kimbrough , 55 N.E.3d at 339 . 3 Moreover, as we noted in Collins , a sudden emergency cannot exist for a defendant motorist who did not perceive the emergency until after the collision. 831 N.E.2d at 246 ; see also Taylor v. Todd , 439 N.E.2d 190 , 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Baker v. Mason , 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 , 515 (1968) ) ("Without the perception of sudden danger, there is no impairment of judgment and no need for the sudden emergency instruction.").

2012Whether or not that evidence was believable or entitled to much weight was for the jury to decide, not the trial court.”); Linville v. Pressley, 744 N.E.2d 974 , 976 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three necessary facts.), trans. denied; and Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency doctrine] if there is any evidence to support its application.”), adopted by, 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991).

2012Whether or not that evidence was believable or entitled to much weight was for the jury to decide, not the trial court.”); Linville v. Pressley, 744 N.E.2d 974 , 976 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“An instruction on sudden emergency is appropriate only when there is evidence” of the three necessary facts.), trans. denied; and Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury concerning [the sudden emergency doctrine] if there is any evidence to support its application.”), adopted by, 580 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1991).

2018See Buhring v. Tavoletti , 905 N.E.2d 1059 , 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an erroneously-given instruction was prejudicial error under either the Penn Harris or Fleetwood Enters. standards because "the matters discussed in the instructions at issue were emphasized to the jury, and the likelihood that the matters were discussed and impacted the jury's verdict is significant.").

2018See, e.g. , Cochran v. Rodenbarger , 736 N.E.2d 1279 , 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 2 Yates does not dispute that the sudden emergency instruction correctly stated the law, nor does he contend the instruction was covered by other instructions.

2017E.g., Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng’rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017). [7] With respect to the element of breach, the sudden emergency doctrine, which “was developed by the courts to recognize that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate action,” Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (Ind. 2006), may apply.