19 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davidson v. McClellangreen2 sentences2026See Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 237 (Colo. 2001); see also In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo. App. 1995) (Rule 60(b)(5) isn’t applicable to requests for relief from judgment based on fraud or misrepresentation). 2026Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 237 (Colo. 2001); see also In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo. App. 1995) (finding C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inapplicable when the basis of a motion was the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations of the other party). | 5 | 5 |
Atlas Const. Co. v. DIST. COURT IN AND FOR BOULDER CTY.green2 sentences2010Ct., 197 Colo. 66, 69 , 589 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1979) (finding that where the only basis for setting aside judgment is mistake or excusable neglect, the grounds for obtaining relief from judgment are covered by CRCP. 60(b)(1), and the residuary clause (5) is inapplicable); McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73, 75 (Colo.App.1991) (finding relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inappropriate where the only grounds upon which relief is sought are covered by other clauses of the rule); In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo.App.1995) (finding that, where basis of the challenge was fraud, C.R.C.P. 60( 2010Ct., 197 Colo. 66, 69 , 589 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1979) (finding that where the only basis for setting aside judgment is mistake or excusable neglect, the grounds for obtaining relief from judgment are covered by CRCP. 60(b)(1), and the residuary clause (5) is inapplicable); McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73, 75 (Colo.App.1991) (finding relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inappropriate where the only grounds upon which relief is sought are covered by other clauses of the rule); In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo.App.1995) (finding that, where basis of the challenge was fraud, C.R.C.P. 60( | 3 | 6 |
In Re the Adoption of P.H.A.green2 sentences2026Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 237 (Colo. 2001); see also In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo. App. 1995) (finding C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inapplicable when the basis of a motion was the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations of the other party). 2010Ct., 197 Colo. 66, 69 , 589 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1979) (finding that where the only basis for setting aside judgment is mistake or excusable neglect, the grounds for obtaining relief from judgment are covered by CRCP. 60(b)(1), and the residuary clause (5) is inapplicable); McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73, 75 (Colo.App.1991) (finding relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inappropriate where the only grounds upon which relief is sought are covered by other clauses of the rule); In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo.App.1995) (finding that, where basis of the challenge was fraud, C.R.C.P. 60( | 3 | 3 |
People Ex Rel. JAU v. RLCgreen2 sentences2016See People in Interest of J.A.U., 47 P.3d at 331 . 2016See People in Interest of J.A.U. , 47 P.3d at 331 . | 3 | 3 |
McElvaney v. Batleygreen2 sentences2010Ct., 197 Colo. 66, 69 , 589 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1979) (finding that where the only basis for setting aside judgment is mistake or excusable neglect, the grounds for obtaining relief from judgment are covered by CRCP. 60(b)(1), and the residuary clause (5) is inapplicable); McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73, 75 (Colo.App.1991) (finding relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) inappropriate where the only grounds upon which relief is sought are covered by other clauses of the rule); In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345, 346 (Colo.App.1995) (finding that, where basis of the challenge was fraud, C.R.C.P. 60( 1995McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73 (Colo.App.1991). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Carogreen1 sentence2026Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 3 866, 870 (Colo. App. 2007), and therefore must be interpreted narrowly, People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196, 200 (Colo. 1988). ¶ 10 We review the juvenile court’s denial of C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) relief for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc.green2 sentences1991See Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 759 P.2d 757 (Colo.App.1988). 1991See Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 759 P.2d 757 (Colo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Laughlin Estategreen2 sentences1978See In re Laughlin's Estate, 354 Pa. 43 , 46 A.2d 477 (1946). 1978See In re Laughlin's Estate, 354 Pa. 43 , 46 A.2d 477 (1946). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
E.B. Jones Construction Co. v. City & County of Denver
green
2 sentences2016Co. , 717 P.2d at 1013 . ¶50 Fifth, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), the residuary clause, provides courts with an opportunity to correct errors that implicate the interests of justice in exceptional cases. 2016Co. , 717 P.2d at 1013 . ¶50 Fifth, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), the residuary clause, provides courts with an opportunity to correct errors that implicate the interests of justice in exceptional cases. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Fukutomi v. Siegel
green
1 sentence1995Atlas Construction Co. v. District Court, 197 Colo. 66, 69 , 589 P.2d 953, 956 (1979) (emphasis omitted); Fukutomi v. Siegel, 785 P.2d 147 (Colo.App.1989). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Canton Oil v. DIST. COURT, SECOND JUD. DIST.
green
1 sentence1991Canton Oil v. District Court, 731 P.2d 687 (Colo.1987). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Klapprott v. United States
green
2 sentences1979In Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 , 69 S.Ct. 384 , 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949), the Supreme Court said that clause (6) [which is, as pointed out above, our clause (5)] is a residuary clause, covering extreme situations not covered by the preceding clauses in the rule. 1979In Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 , 69 S.Ct. 384 , 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949), the Supreme Court said that clause (6) [which is, as pointed out above, our clause (5)] is a residuary clause, covering extreme situations not covered by the preceding clauses in the rule. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
In Re Boyle's Estate
green
2 sentences1952Rochester, John Rochester Richards and Thomas Richards, identical language is employed, and that following the name of each legatee appear these words, “her (his) heirs or assigns forever.” In each of the other paragraphs of the residuary clause the name of the legatee is followed by these words: “her heirs and assigns forever.” The trial court considered all of the provisions of the will and in so doing could arrive at only one conclusion in the light of our pronouncement in Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599 , 221 P. (2d) 357 . 1952Rochester, John Rochester Richards and Thomas Richards, identical language is employed, and that following the name of each legatee appear these words, “her (his) heirs or assigns forever.” In each of the other paragraphs of the residuary clause the name of the legatee is followed by these words: “her heirs and assigns forever.” The trial court considered all of the provisions of the will and in so doing could arrive at only one conclusion in the light of our pronouncement in Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599 , 221 P. (2d) 357 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Lewis v. Darling
green
1 sentence1929In Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. (21 U. S.) 1, 14 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Bristol v. Stump
green
1 sentence1929In Bristol v. Stump, 136 Md. 236 , 110' Atl. 470, was considered a residuary clause almost identical in language with the case in hand. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Ferri v. Lenni Quarry Co.
green
1 sentence1929In Reel’s Estate, 266 Pa. St. 221, 109 Atl. 845 , the testatrix after making a number of bequests, blended her whole estate in the residuary clause. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Rinehart v. Rinehart
green
1 sentence1929Rinehart v. Rinehart, 98 W. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Painter v. Widow & Sons
green
2 sentences1929It reads: “I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed, including my farm called‘Waverly,’to my nephew * * * and his heirs forever.” The court in speaking of this clause said: “The enumeration of property in a residuary clause of a will in general terms does not constitute the legacy or devise a specific one.” To the same effect is the Estate of Painter, 150 Cal. 498 . 1929It reads: “I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed, including my farm called‘Waverly,’to my nephew * * * and his heirs forever.” The court in speaking of this clause said: “The enumeration of property in a residuary clause of a will in general terms does not constitute the legacy or devise a specific one.” To the same effect is the Estate of Painter, 150 Cal. 498 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Platt v. Brannan
neutral
1 sentence1927In Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 72 , 224 Pac. 411 , quoting from Platt v. Brannan, 34 Colo. 125 , 81 Pac. 755 , 114 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Hignett v. Sherman
green
2 sentences1927In Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 72 , 224 Pac. 411 , quoting from Platt v. Brannan, 34 Colo. 125 , 81 Pac. 755 , 114 Am. 1927In Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 72 , 224 Pac. 411 , quoting from Platt v. Brannan, 34 Colo. 125 , 81 Pac. 755 , 114 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.