residuary clause in Vermont

1966See Waln’s Estate, 156 Pa. 194, 197 , 27 Atl. *39 59; Aitken v. Sharp, 93 N.J.

1966In Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 457-8 , 173 N.E. 676 , Justice Cardozo characterized it in the following language: “There is indeed a technical rule, reluctantly enforced by courts when tokens are not at hand to suggest an opposite intention, that a gift of a 'residue of a residue’ is not to be augmented by the lapse of another gift out of the general residuum.” In the Oliver case he goes on to find such a “token” in a clause in the will which states: “This clause to be contrued and considered as the residuary clause of this my last will and testament.” He then states, “The intention is thus

1966In Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 457-8 , 173 N.E. 676 , Justice Cardozo characterized it in the following language: “There is indeed a technical rule, reluctantly enforced by courts when tokens are not at hand to suggest an opposite intention, that a gift of a 'residue of a residue’ is not to be augmented by the lapse of another gift out of the general residuum.” In the Oliver case he goes on to find such a “token” in a clause in the will which states: “This clause to be contrued and considered as the residuary clause of this my last will and testament.” He then states, “The intention is thus

1966It is given in all cases — whether there is a will or not, whether the widow waives the provisions of the will or not, whether there is a residuary clause or not — provided there are personal assets from which the allowance can be made.” Williams v. Williams, 5 Gray (Mass.) 24 , 25, cited and followed in Baker v. Baker, 57 Wis. 382 , 15 N.W. 425, 431 .

1966It is given in all cases — whether there is a will or not, whether the widow waives the provisions of the will or not, whether there is a residuary clause or not — provided there are personal assets from which the allowance can be made.” Williams v. Williams, 5 Gray (Mass.) 24 , 25, cited and followed in Baker v. Baker, 57 Wis. 382 , 15 N.W. 425, 431 .

1946“In construing a will the first and chief object is to ascertain the intention of the testator, from the language used, since, so far as it may be legally carried out, that governs.” Tuttle et al v. Tuttle et al, 112 Vt 271, 278, 23 A2d 523, 525 , and cases cited.

1934(See Sparrow v. Watson, 87 Vt. 366 , 89 Atl. 468 ).” The court, after stating that the circumstances might have been such that neither of the trust funds would have become a part of the residue of the estate, said: "Neither of these events occurred and the two trust funds are still intact for distribution * * *; and now that these trusts have terminated, the opinion of this court is that these funds should be distributed in accordance with the residuary clause of the will; — not to the heirs of the testator, but to the heirs of his two sisters, Margaret (Mattock) and Elisia (Cavanaugh) who wer

1934(See Sparrow v. Watson, 87 Vt. 366 , 89 Atl. 468 ).” The court, after stating that the circumstances might have been such that neither of the trust funds would have become a part of the residue of the estate, said: "Neither of these events occurred and the two trust funds are still intact for distribution * * *; and now that these trusts have terminated, the opinion of this court is that these funds should be distributed in accordance with the residuary clause of the will; — not to the heirs of the testator, but to the heirs of his two sisters, Margaret (Mattock) and Elisia (Cavanaugh) who wer

1929Hibbard v. Hurlburt, 10 Vt. 173, 178 .

1929In reaching this conclusion, we are only adopting the attitude of the court in Hull v. Holloway, 58 Conn. 210 , 20 Atl. 445 , 446 — a case much relied upon by the hospital— wherein the clause under consideration was in much the same *468 terms as the one before us, which terms the court characterized as “ambiguous language.” The following propositions are unquestionably established as the law: (1) Where property is given b'y will to one absolutely, together with the power, express or implied, of unlimited disposition of it, and by another clause of the will it is attempted to give over an undi

1929In reaching this conclusion, we are only adopting the attitude of the court in Hull v. Holloway, 58 Conn. 210 , 20 Atl. 445 , 446 — a case much relied upon by the hospital— wherein the clause under consideration was in much the same *468 terms as the one before us, which terms the court characterized as “ambiguous language.” The following propositions are unquestionably established as the law: (1) Where property is given b'y will to one absolutely, together with the power, express or implied, of unlimited disposition of it, and by another clause of the will it is attempted to give over an undi

1903Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102 , 25 Am.